Resumen ejecutivo
En 1995, Carrefour amplió su concepto de hipermercado europeo, del que había sido pionero hace décadas, a Dubai, Emiratos Árabes Unidos. Tras una cautelosa estrategia de expansión país por país hacia los mercados emergentes, Carrefour vio potencial en el emirato de Dubai. El emirato tenía una floreciente industria minorista y exhibía sólidos fundamentos en su floreciente economía. El objetivo de Carrefour era encontrar un modo de entrada que le permitiera reducir el riesgo de quiebra y mantener la rentabilidad, compensando al mismo tiempo a su antiguo rival global Wal-Mart.
Dubai presentó muchas ventajas para las empresas que consideraban ingresar al mercado de Dubai en 1995. A pesar de tener una población pequeña en comparación con otros mercados a los que atendía, Dubai ofrecía una composición inusual de expatriados y residentes locales en una economía con uno de los niveles de vida e ingresos más altos del mundo. mundo. El mercado era extremadamente favorable a los negocios, con muchas ventajas, como cero impuestos corporativos y muy pocas barreras al comercio. Tenía redes de transporte superiores, un sistema legal bien definido, condiciones comerciales positivas, un fuerte crecimiento económico y bajos riesgos políticos y de transferencia.
Carrefour revisó las leyes y determinó que una empresa conjunta sería lo mejor para minimizar el riesgo de fracaso y al mismo tiempo contar con un socio calificado para buscar agresivamente el crecimiento y administrar las operaciones. Se asoció en una empresa conjunta con Majid Al Futtaim, un conglomerado panregional con experiencia minorista en Medio Oriente. La empresa conjunta se adaptó al mercado cambiando la ubicación de sus tiendas al centro comercial, adaptó su comida a las normas socioculturales, promovió principalmente artículos no alimentarios debido a los mayores márgenes de ganancia y fue muy cuidadosa al realizar descuentos en medio de cifras de dos dígitos. inflación.
The venture was successful for Carrefour, given that it increased the number of stores opened in Dubai and expanded to nearby countries. Ultimately, Carrefour was successful because it developed a First Mover Advantage, it thoroughly adapted to the extent that it did not feel foreign to many consumers, and because of Majid Al Futtaim’s aggressiveness in identifying and pursuing growth opportunities. Carrefour faces two key problems including Customer inconvenience and Dubai’s long-term macroeconomic challenges. To address these challenges, Carrefour should seek to build new advantages through market positioning, strengthen its First Mover Advantage to limit competitive pressures, and build up specialty foods sections to better target expatriates.
Descripción general de la empresa
The French Fournier and Defforey families founded Carrefour in 1959 as a supermarket retailer. It was not until four years later in 1963 that the group opened its first hypermarket, which eventually led Carrefour to its success. In 1969 the company decided to expand internationally and opened its first hypermarket in Belgium In 1977, “Produits Libres” or unbranded products were introduced as a substitute to popular brands and were dubbed just as good. This pioneering idea led the company to create its own brand in 1985, which led the way for supermarket and hypermarkets worldwide. The idea was to help create even lower prices at the markets. Extremely low prices were one of the guiding strategies the company used to compete and buy out other chains.
La clave del éxito de Carrefour es el hipermercado, la tienda todo en uno que vende de todo, desde plátanos hasta cochecitos de bebé a precios reducidos. Fue la idea original de la empresa y ahora se ha expandido por todo el mundo, situando a sus actores entre los mayores gigantes empresariales que ha conocido la historia. Como parte de sus ventajas específicas de la empresa, es el líder mundial en hipermercados y ha sido pionero en el concepto, lo que le otorga ventajas significativas entre sus competidores en la operación del concepto. En segundo lugar, ha desarrollado su cartera de productos de marca privada que permite a Carrefour ofrecer precios más bajos.
En tercer lugar, tiene una marca muy sólida en cuanto a calidad y valor en los mercados y, como resultado, ha ganado reconocimiento mundial, evidente por su estatus de número dos como líder mundial en el segmento de hipermercados. Además, Carrefour había desarrollado importantes ventajas como pionero al haber sido el primero en entrar en muchos mercados emergentes.
Algunas desventajas específicas de la empresa incluyen los diversos fracasos de entrada de Carrefour en otros mercados y las connotaciones negativas asociadas con la condena de la empresa por publicidad engañosa y cargos por socavar el capitalismo. Además, como First Mover, Carrefour enfrenta el aumento de los costos asociados con el desarrollo de infraestructura y la publicidad extensiva. Finalmente, Carrefour debe adaptar mucho su producto porque los alimentos son un producto multinacional y los consumidores locales tienen diversas preferencias y requisitos funcionales.
As a French company, Carrefour has several Country Specific Advantages (CSAs). First, French companies were considered to have high-quality goods and specialty items. In particular, French goods had a reputation for being luxurious, unique, and beautiful. Second, countries like the United Arab Emirates and cities like Dubai considered France an ally, given the strong political relationships between the countries. Eventually, France decided to locate a French permanent military base in the UAE in 2008 due to the strong relations. However, France also developed Country Specific Disadvantages. One of these perceptions was that the French were considered uptight and that the French considered their ways of doing things superior. Compared to English, the French language was not widely spoken worldwide and thus a language barrier existed. Last, although goods were luxurious, a disadvantage was that French goods were deemed too fancy for everyday life.
En 1993, los ingresos globales de Carrefour ascendieron a $21.820 millones, y Carrefour buscaba vorazmente crecimiento en los mercados emergentes. Por esa época, ninguno de los competidores de Carrefour, como Wal-Mart, Tesco, Auchuan, Casino y E. Leclrc, se expandió a los Emiratos Árabes Unidos. Si bien su rival Geant puede haber estado considerando el mercado dada su estrategia de expandirse a mercados emergentes, Carrefour habría sido el primer minorista extranjero importante en operar en el mercado de Dubai, lo que le daría una ventaja de ser el primero en actuar.
Currently, Carrefour is the second largest hypermarket chain worldwide behind Wal-Mart and the largest in Europe, with 2006 sales of $102,774,800 and 16.5% growth. It operates about 15,000 stores of many different sizes and categories including hypermarkets, supermarkets, convenience stores, discount stores, and cash-and-carry stores. Today Carrefour hypermarkets “offer an average surface area of 8,400 sq.m filled with a range of between 20,000 and 80,000 food and non-food items.”
Carrefour’s major competitor is Wal-Mart who seemed to have similar success and failure abroad. Wal-Mart succeeded in Japan, through joint ventures and an emphasis on local culture. It did, however, fail in Germany where the concept of a huge American discount store did not culturally resonate. Carrefour’s major French competitors are Auchan, Casino Guichard and E.Leclerc who all fall far behind the company in sales and size, by provide constant price competition to Carrefour.
Entradas extranjeras anteriores: lecciones aprendidas
Carrefour tiene una tradición de buscar firmemente el crecimiento, particularmente en los mercados emergentes, donde el crecimiento es mayor que en los mercados desarrollados. La empresa sigue una estrategia de crecimiento en cascada porque elige cuidadosamente expandirse después de sentirse cómoda con el éxito en el mercado objetivo. Sin embargo, a pesar de esta cautela, la empresa ha tenido que retirarse de mercados donde no había logrado sus objetivos de crecimiento”.
En primer lugar, en los años 1980 Carrefour fracasó en Estados Unidos con sólo dos hipermercados. Su entrada al mercado en Filadelfia fue difícil, con antagonismo sindical protestando por la tienda de 335.000 pies cuadrados y piquetes visibles que molestaban a los clientes existentes. Después de esta difícil experiencia, abrió en 1992 una tienda en Nueva Jersey que era mucho más pequeña y que parecía un almacén con productos que parecían salidos de un supermercado.
But Carrefour conducted little advertising to bring more customers into its huge stores. Also, Wal-Mart opened a store nearby, and Carrefour finally pulled out of the US. Ultimately, Carrefour lost $80 million on its failed US expansion. Second, Carrefour failed in Japan because of Carrefour’s inability to answer the needs of Japanese consumers, highlighting the importance of pre-entry research.
In addition, the company tried to enter alone rather than working with a local partner in a joint venture. Consequently, Carrefour sold its stores to the AEON group, a Japanese retailing chain, to operate its stores under the Carrefour brand name. In addition, Carrefour withdrew from Hong Kong in 2000 due to the difficulty in transferring the concept due to the lack of retail space, and Korea in 2006, largely due to intense competitive practices and poor performance.
Del mismo modo, Carrefour suele utilizar tanto la propiedad directa como las empresas conjuntas, según el mercado. En concreto, los mercados que Carrefour considera difíciles suelen ser los de empresas conjuntas.
Análisis del país de origen: Dubai como mercado para Carrefour en 1995
Carrefour began the market entry process by examining the barriers to entry into Dubai and government regulations that might affect the introduction of the Carrefour brand into the market. The company had read how over only a few decades, the Emirate of Dubai had rapidly moved from an oil-producing economy into an economic marvel with towering skyscrapers, abundant wealth, and booming free markets in the middle of the desert.
Sheikh Rashid led Dubai’s economy through a period of explosive economic growth from the 1970s to the 1990s with a vision to diversify away from oil production towards a modern city in the Arabian Gulf. The Sheikh’s son, Sheikh Maktoum Bin Rashid Al Maktoum became ruler in 1990, and pursued free trade, technology, transportation, and tourism, dramatically turning Dubai into a global economic powerhouse.
Fueling Dubai’s success was its increasingly diversified economy outside of oil, strategic location between continents, burgeoning re-exports market to emerging markets, robust infrastructure, high quality of life, competitive cost structure, stable political situation, exceptionally business-friendly climate, defined legal structure, lack of preexisting legacy system, and highly optimistic economic outlook. This prosperity sparked a common expectation and saying in Dubai, “If you build it, they will come.”
On top of these economic figures, Carrefour saw positive retail conditions. The discounting concept had the potential to become successful due to high inflation. Also from 1987 to 2002, Dubai boosted its total retail floor space from 23,000m2 to 365,000m2, making it a major global contender in retail growth opportunities. Retail competition consisted of a handful of privately owned supermarket chains that imported goods and public member-owned cooperatives that were not legally permitted to import.
Carrefour notó muchos otros beneficios al ingresar al mercado. Si bien la población de Dubai era sólo de 689.000 personas, según las estadísticas gubernamentales, en 1995 la población estaba creciendo a 12,51 TP3T. Además, Dubái esperaba que una afluencia de expatriados y turistas impulsara las ventas. Además, la economía de Dubai era muy favorable a los negocios por tres razones clave. En primer lugar, Dubai había desarrollado sistemas simplificados para establecer rápidamente una empresa. En segundo lugar, los derechos de aduana sobre las importaciones eran bajos o inexistentes para muchos productos. En tercer lugar, era uno de los pocos países que no ofrecía impuestos sobre las ganancias corporativas e individuales (excluidos el sector petrolero y el sector financiero) ni sobre las ganancias personales.
Los riesgos políticos y de transferencia de Dubai eran bajos. Dubai permitió 100% la propiedad de la empresa a inversores extranjeros, 100% la repatriación de ganancias y capital al país de origen. En segundo lugar, el gobierno no exigió a los inversores extranjeros que realizaran una inversión de capital mínima. En tercer lugar, Dubai tenía un sistema jurídico sólido y rápido. Tenía protecciones de propiedad intelectual, con protecciones legales y un Departamento de Marcas, un Departamento de Propiedad Industrial y un Departamento de Derechos de Autor. Dubai tenía un sistema judicial similar al de los países occidentales con tres niveles de tribunales seculares. Además, las leyes sobre empresas extranjeras se inspiraron en modelos occidentales.
Many laws were established to protect consumers, prevent fraudulent trading, and ensure fair trading among companies. Despite this, Emirati law favored local Emiratis and gave benefits to local companies over foreign ones. For example, Article 3 of Emirati Law did not afford the same rights of UAE nationals to foreign corporations: “Each company incorporated in the State shall hold its nationality but it shall not necessarily be entitled to privileges reserved only to U.A.E nationals.” Nonetheless, Emirati law had very low political risks. Lastly, there were very low transfer risks. Foreign investors enjoyed the fact that the UAE’s currency, the Dirham, was pegged to the dollar. This peg meant that investors would have confidence in not losing the value of their revenues in currency fluctuations against other major currencies. Lastly, Dubai had one of the lowest crime rates for a city in the world, which was optimal for retail companies selling expensive merchandise.
Dubai possessed superior transportation networks starting in the 1960s. Given its strategic location between continents, it eventually became a transshipment point between Australia and Europe; and between Asia and Africa. This infrastructure provided many benefits for a retail commercial hypermarket firm. Furthermore, major infrastructure projects were planned in the future, optimizing the logistics in Dubai. In the future, Carrefour could expect major logistics projects to be built. One of these was the world’s largest free trade logistics zone, Dubai Logistics City. Another project was the rapidly growing number of passengers and renovations to the Dubai International Airport, a major airport aiming to become the region’s main hub and service several dozen million passengers and tons of cargo. This infrastructure was important to Carrefour, which planned to important its inventory. Thus, Dubai’s outlook for global retailers like Carrefour seemed to provide ample opportunities.
Estrategia de entrada al mercado en el mercado de Dubai
Carrefour evaluated Dubai’s laws and market conditions, and determined that a joint venture would be best for market entry. Factoring in this decision were the favorable laws towards Joint Ventures. First, there was less risk in a joint venture. This was important as Carrefour had suffered an $80 million loss in the US market. Second, the UAE’s Federal Commercial Agencies Law protected foreign companies in a joint venture from contract termination and exclusive presence in the region. To qualify as a Joint Venture, companies would have to be partnered with UAE nationals or commercial entities owned solely by UAE nationals. Carrefour would also have to rent and not own the property in its operations. This condition was not a drawback to Carrefour, which saw benefits in joint venturing with the sponsor embracing the liability of ownership. Furthermore, operating as a Joint Venture with a local sponsor would likely make it easier for Carrefour to obtain Food Health Certificates to import food, given that it was a foreign retailer attempting to sell food in a culture with important religious and cultural restrictions. Part of the Health Certificates was the Halal slaughter certificate allowing the sale of meat that has been slaughtered by a Muslim man according to Islamic rites. With the Joint Venture, Carrefour would enjoy the same low or no trade barriers on most of its inventory, excluding cigarettes and other luxury goods.
Yet, Carrefour saw some major barriers to entry include the difficulty in finding a local partner who was willing to accept the burden of navigating complex local import statutes and pre-operational regulations such as product licensing, ensuring that the local municipal lab has access to product samples to test that the products being sold meet their health and cultural standards. Another barrier to entry was the costs of operating associated with the size of the locations used. For example, choosing to open large hypermarkets rather than smaller supermarkets, Carrefour would have to endure high costs of renting stock shelving as well as listing fees. Another barrier to entry was a regulation passed by the Gulf Cooperation Council, which the UAE was a part of, which stated that all food products imported into the UAE must have half or more of its shelf life remaining at the time of entrance or clearance will not be issued. Some minor factors influencing entry into Dubai included the fact that weekends in Dubai did not correspond with traditional western weekends. Fridays and Saturdays constituted the weekend in the UAE and this would require adaptation to local customs to conduct daily business.
Carrefour evaluated Dubai’s market benefits and risks as well as the modes of entry and decided in 1995 to partner with Majid Al Futtaim (MAF), a major pan-regional company owning and operating mall properties. The first benefit was that MAF owned the high-traffic malls and properties that would be perfect for Carrefour’s location. Also, this could prevent other large hypermarket chains from entering the same malls, limiting direct competition. Secondly, MAF had operations throughout the entire Middle East, and this could potentially allow Carrefour to expand to other countries in the Middle East under the same partnership. Thirdly, Carrefour preferred Dubai as a first market because it is the most populated emirate in the UAE, Lastly, MAF had experience in venturing with foreign retailers and could handle Carrefour’s operations. By positioning itself correctly in Dubai, Carrefour could then use the waterfall approach to enter the remaining six emirates and capitalize on the rising growth of standard of living in the UAE.
Estrategia de mercadeo
Lugar
Carrefour/Majid al Futtaim’s strategy was to adapt to the cultural importance of shopping malls and create a “city within a city” by being located inside a mall with entertainment centers, cinemas, food courts, and other convenience amenities. Hence, Carrefour decided to place its stores in big malls in Deira City Centre Mall, Mall of the Emirates, Al Mamzar Century Mall, and Bur Dubai – Al Shindagha. Indeed, this adaptation differed from Carrefour’s standard location of a freestanding warehouse-like building.
The rationale behind adapting the traditional hypermarket was due to the fact that Dubai has a very strong mall culture, owing largely to Dubai’s cultural dynamics and harsh climate. First, the climate in Dubai is often so harsh that going to the mall is one of the few options to keep cool and entertained. Second, daily the mall provides an exciting experience beyond the shopping. In Arab society, socializing with family is paramount, and malls provide culturally appropriate entertainment for long periods of time. During the workday, Arab housewives will often go to malls with their friends to socialize, and bring their young children to play with each other at entertainment centers located on upper floors, while men are at work.
The elements Masculinity and Collectivism of Hofstede’s Model are evident in Emirati culture. Men will often go with their friends to watch movies in cinemas located in the upper levels of the mall, and drink coffee with friends at cafes into the late hours of the night. During the Friday and Saturday weekend, large Arab families pour into malls and spend many hours there shopping, taking their kids to arcades, eating at restaurants, staying at mall hotels, walking, and reclining. Despite spending long periods of time in the malls, many consumers only expect to window-shop and leave without buying merchandise. Third, Dubai’s society has adapted to the convenience of being able to get high-quality consumer goods in one mall. Fourth, Dubai’s society is very young and enamored by the popular brands, found in malls. For many of these reasons, retailers must often accept malls as the place to locate their stores.
Los otros beneficios de estar ubicado en centros comerciales eran que Carrefour podía esperar un volumen aún mayor de clientes que llegaban a las tiendas Carrefour. Además, había un espacio comercial lo suficientemente grande en los centros comerciales de Dubai para que Carrefour operara. Además, Carrefour mantuvo su tradicional gran tamaño, dado que Majid Al Futtaim era propietario de dos de los centros comerciales considerados. Como resultado, la tienda Carrefour en el centro de la ciudad de Deira se convirtió en la tienda más grande de Dubai. Sin embargo, al estar ubicado en zonas centrales de Dubai, Carrefour tenía competencia con las pequeñas tiendas minoristas tradicionales que estaban ubicadas más cerca del consumidor. No se puede subestimar la importancia de la ubicación en Dubai, dados los problemas de tráfico de Dubai.
Producto
Dubai was a very international and diverse Emirate, particularly due to the large number of foreign workers. As such, Carrefour adapted by accepting foreign credit cards, the currencies of all GCC countries, and international currencies like the Euro and US dollar. While Carrefour implemented bilingual signage in the stores, language and cultural barriers were not likely problems given that English was so widely spoken and consumers had experience with Western products.
Primero, Carrefour tuvo que adaptar sus productos a la cultura. Por ejemplo, había que valorar ciertos matices alimentarios, como la venta de comida halal que carecía de carne de cerdo. En segundo lugar, Carrefour tuvo que adaptarse a la estacionalidad del ciclo económico de Dubai, dado que era costumbre en la cultura de Dubai que la gente tomara sus vacaciones de verano para escapar a destinos más frescos. En tercer lugar, Carrefour tuvo que adaptarse a las festividades culturales islámicas como el Ramadán y el Eid, lo que impulsaría sus ventas máximas. Durante estas fiestas, Carrefour tuvo que tener en cuenta el aumento de la demanda y planificar su oferta en consecuencia para no decepcionar a los compradores. En cuarto lugar, el horario de funcionamiento en Dubai tenía que adaptarse a la semana laboral de Dubai de domingo a jueves y al fin de semana de viernes a sábado.
Promoción
Carrefour did not adapt its promotional effort, which consisted of discounting certain items. Majid Al Futtaim handled local promotions and coordinated some of these regionally with its stores throughout the Middle East. Promotions were placed in print media and in-store, to attract mall-walking traffic. Because Dubai was a society emphasizing the importance of social relationships, Carrefour could reasonably expect that consumers might discuss some of the deals.
La promoción era importante en Dubai debido al alto costo de vida y la alta inflación. La demografía de Dubai estaba muy sesgada. En la época de la entrada de Carrefour, en 1998 sólo 171 TP3T de la población estaban formados por “árabes locales”, mientras que 851 TP3T eran “asiáticos expatriados” y 31 TP3T eran occidentales. El segmento de expatriados asiáticos tenía el ingreso disponible más bajo, pero era un segmento grande y estaba en gran medida abierto a comprar productos electrónicos y productos occidentales. Debido a la importancia de la inflación y estos datos demográficos, el segmento objetivo de Carrefour eran principalmente expatriados.
Precio
La posición de precios de Carrefour era la de una tienda de descuento y utilizaba los precios como parte de su esfuerzo promocional. Debido a su fuerte marca, Carrefour no tuvo que preocuparse por la dilución de la marca debido a sus productos con descuento. Sin embargo
Es decir, los descuentos eran problemáticos en Dubai, donde la inflación estaba por las nubes y cuando las fluctuaciones de la inflación podían erosionar las ganancias. Otra preocupación en materia de precios era que el mercado minorista de alimentos era más competitivo y, por tanto, los márgenes de beneficio eran reducidos. Carrefour podría vender productos no alimentarios, artículos para el hogar y artículos de tocador con márgenes más altos.
Actuación
Carrefour / Majid Al Futtaim does not report its Dubai-generated revenues or other countries’ specific sales. We did a thorough literature search and even contacted Carrefour’s Investor Relations. Yet in both cases, the information was unavailable. There are two reasons for this. First, Carrefour MAF was a private joint venture and was not obligated to show its sales figures. Secondly, in the region, there is a tendency to underreport information and lack transparency due to suspicion of what other entities might use such data for, according to Seraphina Anderson Executive Director of Feedback Market Research in Dubai/Sharjah. This venture likely prefers to keep their sales figures and data private to prevent competitors from taking such information and using it to their advantage.
Sin embargo, a nivel regional, Carrefour MAF publicó cifras de ventas totales en 2005 de $1 mil millones de sus 13 tiendas en 2005, alrededor de 1% de las ventas globales. Otros indicadores muestran que el Joint Venture ha sido exitoso. En 2007, sus ventas de Carrefour aumentaron a $2.500 millones a nivel regional, debido al agresivo crecimiento regional. En 2008, la empresa conjunta anunció planes de ingresar a Irán para seguir creciendo.
Evaluación critica
Elegir a Majid Al Futtaim (MAF) fue una buena idea para Carrefour. Tenía apetito de expansión y crecimiento y entró agresivamente en otros mercados de Oriente Medio. La elección también impidió la competencia directa en los mismos centros comerciales propiedad de MAF. Además, la adaptación de la empresa conjunta al mercado local aseguró su éxito, dado que hoy en día muchos habitantes de Dubai consideran la tienda como algo no extranjero y parte de la vida. Sin embargo, Carrefour MAF no ha hecho lo suficiente para garantizar que haya suficientes estacionamientos, suficientes taxis y un buen flujo de tráfico en sus centros comerciales, especialmente durante los fines de semana y días festivos. Esto hace que la empresa sea más vulnerable a las tiendas especializadas más pequeñas y a las tiendas ubicadas más cerca del consumidor.
El mercado de Dubái se enfrenta a retos considerables. En primer lugar, la competencia está aumentando, particularmente en el segmento de alimentos, lo que efectivamente reduce los márgenes de ganancia. Si bien Wal-Mart y Costco no están considerando el Medio Oriente, otros hipermercados europeos están ingresando estratégicamente al mercado de Medio Oriente. En 2006, Union Coop abrió un hipermercado de 180.000 pies cuadrados en Dubai. Geant, una cadena europea de hipermercados, también entró en Dubái en 2003. Además, las tiendas cercanas están captando clientes como los asiáticos expatriados que prefieren no viajar muy lejos para hacer compras.
The second challenge is chronic inflation. Due to rapid growth, high liquidity, high demand, low supply, and a currency peg to the recently declining US dollar, national inflation rates stood at around 13% in 2008, though economists expect actual consumer price inflation in Dubai to be at 20% per year. This inflation erodes revenues and rapidly raises the costs of inventory and staffing. Thirdly, the decline of the dollar versus other currencies can lower the value of revenues when repatriated to foreign countries.
Fourthly, the UAE government has recently implemented more difficult visa regulations. This makes it more difficult to attract skilled Asians and Westerners to help drive the economy’s growth. Lastly, the region faces political risks from Iran, Iraq, and from terrorism. Additionally, Dubai is more dependent on foreign investment and tourism than the other Emirates.
Dubai was expected to be more vulnerable to global economic downturns than Abu Dhabi and other emirates. Due to the global credit crunch, the UAE’s non-oil GDP growth was expected to slow from 8.8% in 2008 to 7.1% in 2009. Foremost to retailers is the expected implementation in early 2009 of a VAT (Value Added Tax) tax regimen of around 5%. It was anticipated that this tax system will drive inflation even higher than its current high level.
Carrefour tiene una gran dificultad con su modelo: la facilidad para comprar en sus tiendas. Como las compras se realizan en los centros comerciales, a menudo resulta difícil comprar en Carrefour, especialmente los fines de semana y días festivos, cuando los centros comerciales se llenan. Dubai tiene una cultura de conducción muy fuerte, por lo que resulta difícil cuando hay espacio limitado y pocos taxis. En consecuencia, la fila para un taxi puede extenderse por cientos de metros, como en el centro comercial Deira Center, y el estacionamiento puede llenarse al máximo. Carrefour debe abordar esta cuestión para garantizar que este inconveniente no impida que los compradores acudan a sus tiendas.
Posibles cursos de acción
To best compete in the Dubai market, Carrefour MAF could follow several potential courses of action. Each focuses on improving Carrefour’s competitive advantages, market positioning, and driving sales. First, Carrefour may need to ensure that customers are not leaving its stores due to more convenient specialty stores located closer to customers.
Para hacerlo, sería necesario abordar los inconvenientes que conlleva la experiencia de comprar en Carrefour, especialmente los relacionados con el tráfico y el transporte de Dubai. Entre ellas está garantizar que haya suficientes estacionamientos y taxis, así como un flujo de tráfico efectivo, especialmente durante los fines de semana y días festivos. Potencialmente podría hacerlo presionando al gobierno por la situación del tráfico y los taxis, y a Majid Al Futtaim por los problemas de estacionamiento porque administra las propiedades.
Secondly, Carrefour could seek new advantages to solidify its position. Among these include positioning Carrefour as the place to go during economic turmoil. The rationale is that by attaching this perception to Carrefour’s brand, it ensures that customers associate Carrefour with savings and with rough economic times. In so doing, it can improve its performance in economic downturns. Also, Carrefour could reinforce its First Mover Advantage as the authentic hypermarket. In Eastern countries, the most loved brands are those that are considered authentic. As such, by reinforcing this perception, Carrefour could potentially limit the effectiveness of direct European hypermarket competitors in Dubai like Geant and Union Coop.
Thirdly, Carrefour has been successful in Dubai along several indicators, but it could find significant growth in the market by focusing on the countless expatriates that come in and out of the country. Carrefour could strengthen its specialty food sections to attract various demographics, in terms of a better selection. In so doing, it can better target Dubai’s expatriate population that prefers to eat its own cultural food, and increase the frequency at which these huge segments visit its stores.
Carrefour’s pricing strategy is also helpful in targeting this group because most expatriates work in Dubai to remit money home to their families. So Carrefour could become a great place to save money while not compromising quality. It could even develop to be a great place to buy gifts to send home. This effort could be supported by a Word of Mouth promotional strategy, harnessing existing customers to tell their friends about the deals and quality at Carrefour.
Given that Dubai’s expats mostly come from Asia where there are high-context cultures, Word of Mouth could be effective in targeting those expats who strongly value friends’ and family’s suggestions over media and corporate opinion. Further marketing techniques adhering to Dubai’s cultural imperatives could include discount coupons, a customer loyalty card, and a home delivery service to the expatriate segment. Home delivery service may be a viable option for Carrefour because it fits into the cultural context of Dubai. The service could take advantage of the lack of public transportation in Dubai, thus helping it to better reach a broader customer base. Ultimately by targeting the expatriate population, Carrefour could potentially continue to grow and hit the population of Dubai that is not included in the 689,000 citizens (est. 1995).
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