家乐福迪拜市场进入分析

执行摘要

---

1995 年，家乐福将其数十年前开创的欧洲大卖场概念扩展到阿拉伯联合酋长国的迪拜。在采取谨慎的逐国扩张战略进入新兴市场之后，家乐福看到了迪拜酋长国的潜力。该酋长国的零售业蓬勃发展，经济繁荣，基础强劲。家乐福的目标是找到一种进入模式，使其能够降低失败风险并保持盈利能力，同时抵消其长期全球竞争对手沃尔玛的影响。

1995 年，迪拜为考虑进入迪拜市场的公司提供了许多优势。尽管迪拜的人口相对于其服务的其他市场来说较少，但迪拜的经济体系中却拥有不同寻常的外籍人士和当地居民，其生活和收入水平位居世界前列。迪拜市场对企业极为友好，拥有许多优势，例如零企业税和极少的贸易壁垒。迪拜拥有优越的交通网络、完善的法律体系、积极的零售条件、强劲的经济增长、较低的政治和转移风险。

家乐福研究了相关法律，认为合资企业是降低失败风险的最佳方式，同时拥有一个合格的合作伙伴来积极寻求增长和管理运营。家乐福与 Majid Al Futtaim 合作成立了一家合资企业，后者是一家在中东拥有零售经验的泛区域企业集团。该合资企业通过将门店改建为购物中心来适应市场，使其食品适应社会文化规范，由于利润率较高，主要促销非食品类商品，并且在两位数通胀的情况下非常谨慎地打折。

The venture was successful for Carrefour, given that it increased the number of stores opened in Dubai and expanded to nearby countries. Ultimately, Carrefour was successful because it developed a First Mover Advantage, it thoroughly adapted to the extent that it did not feel foreign to many consumers, and because of Majid Al Futtaim’s aggressiveness in identifying and pursuing growth opportunities. Carrefour faces two key problems including Customer inconvenience and Dubai’s long-term macroeconomic challenges. To address these challenges, Carrefour should seek to build new advantages through market positioning, strengthen its First Mover Advantage to limit competitive pressures, and build up specialty foods sections to better target expatriates.

公司简介

The French Fournier and Defforey families founded Carrefour in 1959 as a supermarket retailer. It was not until four years later in 1963 that the group opened its first hypermarket, which eventually led Carrefour to its success. In 1969 the company decided to expand internationally and opened its first hypermarket in Belgium In 1977, “Produits Libres” or unbranded products were introduced as a substitute to popular brands and were dubbed just as good. This pioneering idea led the company to create its own brand in 1985, which led the way for supermarket and hypermarkets worldwide. The idea was to help create even lower prices at the markets. Extremely low prices were one of the guiding strategies the company used to compete and buy out other chains.

家乐福成功的关键在于大卖场，即以折扣价出售从香蕉到婴儿车等各种商品的一体化商店。这是该公司的最初想法，现已扩展到全球，其参与者是历史上最伟大的商业巨头之一。作为其企业特定优势的一部分，它是大卖场领域的全球领导者，率先提出了这一概念，使其在运营这一概念方面比竞争对手具有显著优势。其次，它开发了自有品牌产品组合，使家乐福能够提供更低的价格。

第三，家乐福在市场上拥有非常强大的品牌品质和价值，并因此获得了全球认可，其在大型超市领域排名第二，可见一斑。此外，家乐福率先进入许多新兴市场，积累了显著的先发优势。

一些公司特定的劣势包括家乐福在其他市场的各种进入失败以及与公司被定罪为虚假广告和破坏资本主义相关的负面含义。此外，作为先行者，家乐福面临着与基础设施建设和大量广告相关的成本增加。最后，家乐福必须对其产品进行大力调整，因为食品是一种多国产品，当地消费者的偏好和功能要求各不相同。

As a French company, Carrefour has several Country Specific Advantages (CSAs). First, French companies were considered to have high-quality goods and specialty items. In particular, French goods had a reputation for being luxurious, unique, and beautiful. Second, countries like the United Arab Emirates and cities like Dubai considered France an ally, given the strong political relationships between the countries. Eventually, France decided to locate a French permanent military base in the UAE in 2008 due to the strong relations. However, France also developed Country Specific Disadvantages. One of these perceptions was that the French were considered uptight and that the French considered their ways of doing things superior. Compared to English, the French language was not widely spoken worldwide and thus a language barrier existed. Last, although goods were luxurious, a disadvantage was that French goods were deemed too fancy for everyday life.

1993 年，家乐福的全球营业额为 14218.2 亿美元，家乐福正急切地寻求新兴市场的增长。大约在这个时候，家乐福的竞争对手如沃尔玛、特易购、Auchuan、Casino 和 E. Leclrc 均未将业务扩展到阿联酋。虽然竞争对手 Geant 可能已经考虑到其向新兴市场扩张的战略，但家乐福将成为第一家在迪拜市场运营的大型外国零售商，这将为其带来先发优势。

Currently, Carrefour is the second largest hypermarket chain worldwide behind Wal-Mart and the largest in Europe, with 2006 sales of $102,774,800 and 16.5% growth. It operates about 15,000 stores of many different sizes and categories including hypermarkets, supermarkets, convenience stores, discount stores, and cash-and-carry stores. Today Carrefour hypermarkets “offer an average surface area of 8,400 sq.m filled with a range of between 20,000 and 80,000 food and non-food items.”

Carrefour’s major competitor is Wal-Mart who seemed to have similar success and failure abroad. Wal-Mart succeeded in Japan, through joint ventures and an emphasis on local culture. It did, however, fail in Germany where the concept of a huge American discount store did not culturally resonate. Carrefour’s major French competitors are Auchan, Casino Guichard and E.Leclerc who all fall far behind the company in sales and size, by provide constant price competition to Carrefour.

以前的外国条目：经验教训

家乐福有着强烈寻求增长的传统，尤其是在增长速度高于发达市场的新兴市场。该公司奉行瀑布式增长战略，因为它在对目标市场的成功感到满意后，会谨慎地选择扩张。然而，尽管如此谨慎，该公司还是不得不退出那些尚未实现增长目标的市场。

首先，20 世纪 80 年代，家乐福在美国仅开设了两家大型超市，最终以失败告终。它在费城的市场开拓之路并不顺利，工会对这家 33.5 万平方英尺的商店表示抗议，明显的纠察线也让现有客户感到不安。在经历了这段艰难的经历后，家乐福于 1992 年在新泽西州开设了一家规模小得多的商店，这家商店更像是一个仓库，里面的产品看起来就像是来自超市。

But Carrefour conducted little advertising to bring more customers into its huge stores. Also, Wal-Mart opened a store nearby, and Carrefour finally pulled out of the US. Ultimately, Carrefour lost $80 million on its failed US expansion. Second, Carrefour failed in Japan because of Carrefour’s inability to answer the needs of Japanese consumers, highlighting the importance of pre-entry research.

In addition, the company tried to enter alone rather than working with a local partner in a joint venture. Consequently, Carrefour sold its stores to the AEON group, a Japanese retailing chain, to operate its stores under the Carrefour brand name. In addition, Carrefour withdrew from Hong Kong in 2000 due to the difficulty in transferring the concept due to the lack of retail space, and Korea in 2006, largely due to intense competitive practices and poor performance.

同样，家乐福通常根据市场情况采用直接所有权和合资企业两种方式。具体来说，家乐福认为困难的市场往往采用合资企业。

母国分析：1995 年家乐福选择迪拜作为市场

Carrefour began the market entry process by examining the barriers to entry into Dubai and government regulations that might affect the introduction of the Carrefour brand into the market. The company had read how over only a few decades, the Emirate of Dubai had rapidly moved from an oil-producing economy into an economic marvel with towering skyscrapers, abundant wealth, and booming free markets in the middle of the desert.

Sheikh Rashid led Dubai’s economy through a period of explosive economic growth from the 1970s to the 1990s with a vision to diversify away from oil production towards a modern city in the Arabian Gulf. The Sheikh’s son, Sheikh Maktoum Bin Rashid Al Maktoum became ruler in 1990, and pursued free trade, technology, transportation, and tourism, dramatically turning Dubai into a global economic powerhouse.

Fueling Dubai’s success was its increasingly diversified economy outside of oil, strategic location between continents, burgeoning re-exports market to emerging markets, robust infrastructure, high quality of life, competitive cost structure, stable political situation, exceptionally business-friendly climate, defined legal structure, lack of preexisting legacy system, and highly optimistic economic outlook. This prosperity sparked a common expectation and saying in Dubai, “If you build it, they will come.”

On top of these economic figures, Carrefour saw positive retail conditions. The discounting concept had the potential to become successful due to high inflation. Also from 1987 to 2002, Dubai boosted its total retail floor space from 23,000m2 to 365,000m2, making it a major global contender in retail growth opportunities. Retail competition consisted of a handful of privately owned supermarket chains that imported goods and public member-owned cooperatives that were not legally permitted to import.

家乐福注意到进入该市场还有许多其他好处。根据政府统计，尽管迪拜人口只有 689,000 人，但 1995 年人口增长率为 12.5%。此外，迪拜预计外籍人士和游客的涌入将推动销售。此外，迪拜的经济非常适合经商，主要有三个原因。首先，迪拜已经开发出简化的系统，可以快速建立公司。其次，许多商品的进口关税很低或不存在。第三，它是少数几个不对企业和个人利润（石油部门和金融部门除外）或个人利润征税的国家之一。

迪拜的政治和转移风险较低。迪拜允许外国投资者拥有企业所有权，允许外国投资者将利润和资本汇回本国。其次，政府不要求外国投资者投入最低资本。第三，迪拜拥有强大而迅速的法律体系。迪拜拥有知识产权保护，有法律保护，设有商标局、工业产权局和版权局。迪拜的司法系统与西方国家类似，有三级世俗法院。此外，迪拜对外国公司的法律是仿照西方模式制定的。

Many laws were established to protect consumers, prevent fraudulent trading, and ensure fair trading among companies. Despite this, Emirati law favored local Emiratis and gave benefits to local companies over foreign ones. For example, Article 3 of Emirati Law did not afford the same rights of UAE nationals to foreign corporations: “Each company incorporated in the State shall hold its nationality but it shall not necessarily be entitled to privileges reserved only to U.A.E nationals.” Nonetheless, Emirati law had very low political risks. Lastly, there were very low transfer risks. Foreign investors enjoyed the fact that the UAE’s currency, the Dirham, was pegged to the dollar. This peg meant that investors would have confidence in not losing the value of their revenues in currency fluctuations against other major currencies. Lastly, Dubai had one of the lowest crime rates for a city in the world, which was optimal for retail companies selling expensive merchandise.

Dubai possessed superior transportation networks starting in the 1960s. Given its strategic location between continents, it eventually became a transshipment point between Australia and Europe; and between Asia and Africa. This infrastructure provided many benefits for a retail commercial hypermarket firm. Furthermore, major infrastructure projects were planned in the future, optimizing the logistics in Dubai. In the future, Carrefour could expect major logistics projects to be built. One of these was the world’s largest free trade logistics zone, Dubai Logistics City. Another project was the rapidly growing number of passengers and renovations to the Dubai International Airport, a major airport aiming to become the region’s main hub and service several dozen million passengers and tons of cargo. This infrastructure was important to Carrefour, which planned to important its inventory. Thus, Dubai’s outlook for global retailers like Carrefour seemed to provide ample opportunities.

迪拜市场的进入策略

Carrefour evaluated Dubai’s laws and market conditions, and determined that a joint venture would be best for market entry. Factoring in this decision were the favorable laws towards Joint Ventures. First, there was less risk in a joint venture. This was important as Carrefour had suffered an $80 million loss in the US market. Second, the UAE’s Federal Commercial Agencies Law protected foreign companies in a joint venture from contract termination and exclusive presence in the region. To qualify as a Joint Venture, companies would have to be partnered with UAE nationals or commercial entities owned solely by UAE nationals. Carrefour would also have to rent and not own the property in its operations. This condition was not a drawback to Carrefour, which saw benefits in joint venturing with the sponsor embracing the liability of ownership. Furthermore, operating as a Joint Venture with a local sponsor would likely make it easier for Carrefour to obtain Food Health Certificates to import food, given that it was a foreign retailer attempting to sell food in a culture with important religious and cultural restrictions. Part of the Health Certificates was the Halal slaughter certificate allowing the sale of meat that has been slaughtered by a Muslim man according to Islamic rites. With the Joint Venture, Carrefour would enjoy the same low or no trade barriers on most of its inventory, excluding cigarettes and other luxury goods.

Yet, Carrefour saw some major barriers to entry include the difficulty in finding a local partner who was willing to accept the burden of navigating complex local import statutes and pre-operational regulations such as product licensing, ensuring that the local municipal lab has access to product samples to test that the products being sold meet their health and cultural standards. Another barrier to entry was the costs of operating associated with the size of the locations used. For example, choosing to open large hypermarkets rather than smaller supermarkets, Carrefour would have to endure high costs of renting stock shelving as well as listing fees. Another barrier to entry was a regulation passed by the Gulf Cooperation Council, which the UAE was a part of, which stated that all food products imported into the UAE must have half or more of its shelf life remaining at the time of entrance or clearance will not be issued. Some minor factors influencing entry into Dubai included the fact that weekends in Dubai did not correspond with traditional western weekends. Fridays and Saturdays constituted the weekend in the UAE and this would require adaptation to local customs to conduct daily business.

Carrefour evaluated Dubai’s market benefits and risks as well as the modes of entry and decided in 1995 to partner with Majid Al Futtaim (MAF), a major pan-regional company owning and operating mall properties. The first benefit was that MAF owned the high-traffic malls and properties that would be perfect for Carrefour’s location. Also, this could prevent other large hypermarket chains from entering the same malls, limiting direct competition. Secondly, MAF had operations throughout the entire Middle East, and this could potentially allow Carrefour to expand to other countries in the Middle East under the same partnership. Thirdly, Carrefour preferred Dubai as a first market because it is the most populated emirate in the UAE, Lastly, MAF had experience in venturing with foreign retailers and could handle Carrefour’s operations. By positioning itself correctly in Dubai, Carrefour could then use the waterfall approach to enter the remaining six emirates and capitalize on the rising growth of standard of living in the UAE.

市场策略

地方

Carrefour/Majid al Futtaim’s strategy was to adapt to the cultural importance of shopping malls and create a “city within a city” by being located inside a mall with entertainment centers, cinemas, food courts, and other convenience amenities. Hence, Carrefour decided to place its stores in big malls in Deira City Centre Mall, Mall of the Emirates, Al Mamzar Century Mall, and Bur Dubai – Al Shindagha. Indeed, this adaptation differed from Carrefour’s standard location of a freestanding warehouse-like building.

The rationale behind adapting the traditional hypermarket was due to the fact that Dubai has a very strong mall culture, owing largely to Dubai’s cultural dynamics and harsh climate. First, the climate in Dubai is often so harsh that going to the mall is one of the few options to keep cool and entertained. Second, daily the mall provides an exciting experience beyond the shopping. In Arab society, socializing with family is paramount, and malls provide culturally appropriate entertainment for long periods of time. During the workday, Arab housewives will often go to malls with their friends to socialize, and bring their young children to play with each other at entertainment centers located on upper floors, while men are at work.

The elements Masculinity and Collectivism of Hofstede’s Model are evident in Emirati culture. Men will often go with their friends to watch movies in cinemas located in the upper levels of the mall, and drink coffee with friends at cafes into the late hours of the night. During the Friday and Saturday weekend, large Arab families pour into malls and spend many hours there shopping, taking their kids to arcades, eating at restaurants, staying at mall hotels, walking, and reclining. Despite spending long periods of time in the malls, many consumers only expect to window-shop and leave without buying merchandise. Third, Dubai’s society has adapted to the convenience of being able to get high-quality consumer goods in one mall. Fourth, Dubai’s society is very young and enamored by the popular brands, found in malls. For many of these reasons, retailers must often accept malls as the place to locate their stores.

位于购物中心的另一个好处是，家乐福可以期待更多的顾客涌入家乐福商店。此外，迪拜购物中心有足够的零售空间供家乐福经营。此外，鉴于 Majid Al Futtaim 拥有两家正在考虑的购物中心，家乐福仍保持了其传统的大规模。因此，家乐福的 Deira City Center 商店成为迪拜最大的商店。然而，由于位于迪拜的中心地区，家乐福与更靠近消费者的传统小型零售店竞争。考虑到迪拜的交通问题，位置在迪拜的重要性不容小觑。

产品

Dubai was a very international and diverse Emirate, particularly due to the large number of foreign workers. As such, Carrefour adapted by accepting foreign credit cards, the currencies of all GCC countries, and international currencies like the Euro and US dollar. While Carrefour implemented bilingual signage in the stores, language and cultural barriers were not likely problems given that English was so widely spoken and consumers had experience with Western products.

首先，家乐福必须根据当地文化调整其商品。例如，必须重视某些食品的细微差别，如销售不含猪肉的清真食品。其次，家乐福必须适应迪拜商业周期的季节性，因为在迪拜文化中，人们习惯在夏季度假去较凉爽的地方。第三，家乐福必须适应斋月和开斋节等伊斯兰文化节日，这些节日将推动其销售高峰。在这些节日期间，家乐福必须考虑到需求的增长，并相应地计划其供应，以免让购物者失望。第四，迪拜的营业时间必须适应迪拜的工作周（周日至周四）和周末（周五至周六）。

晋升

Carrefour did not adapt its promotional effort, which consisted of discounting certain items. Majid Al Futtaim handled local promotions and coordinated some of these regionally with its stores throughout the Middle East. Promotions were placed in print media and in-store, to attract mall-walking traffic. Because Dubai was a society emphasizing the importance of social relationships, Carrefour could reasonably expect that consumers might discuss some of the deals.

由于生活成本高、通货膨胀率高，促销在迪拜非常重要。迪拜的人口结构严重不平衡。家乐福进驻迪拜时，1998 年，只有 17% 的人口是“本地阿拉伯人”，而 85% 是“外籍亚洲人”，3% 是西方人。亚洲外籍人士的可支配收入最低，但人数众多，而且大多愿意购买西方电子产品和产品。由于通货膨胀和这些人口结构的重要性，家乐福的目标群体主要是外籍人士。

价格

家乐福的价格定位是折扣店，并将定价作为促销活动的一部分。由于其强大的品牌知名度，家乐福不必担心折扣产品会稀释品牌。然而
呃，在迪拜，折扣是个问题，因为那里通货膨胀率极高，通货膨胀的波动会侵蚀利润。另一个定价问题是食品零售市场竞争最激烈，因此利润率很低。家乐福可以以更高的利润率销售非食品、家居用品和洗漱用品。

表现

Carrefour / Majid Al Futtaim does not report its Dubai-generated revenues or other countries’ specific sales. We did a thorough literature search and even contacted Carrefour’s Investor Relations. Yet in both cases, the information was unavailable. There are two reasons for this. First, Carrefour MAF was a private joint venture and was not obligated to show its sales figures. Secondly, in the region, there is a tendency to underreport information and lack transparency due to suspicion of what other entities might use such data for, according to Seraphina Anderson Executive Director of Feedback Market Research in Dubai/Sharjah. This venture likely prefers to keep their sales figures and data private to prevent competitors from taking such information and using it to their advantage.

然而，从地区来看，家乐福 MAF 公布的 2005 年整体销售额为 $10 亿，其中 13 家门店的销售额约为 1%。其他指标表明合资企业取得了成功。2007 年，由于地区增长强劲，家乐福在地区销售额上升至 $25 亿。2008 年，合资企业宣布计划进入伊朗市场，以进一步发展。

批判性评价

选择 Majid Al Futtaim (MAF) 对家乐福来说是个好主意。它有扩张和增长的欲望，并积极进入中东的其他市场。这一选择也避免了与 MAF 旗下的同一家商场发生直接竞争。此外，这家合资企业对当地市场的适应确保了它的成功，因为如今迪拜的许多人都认为这家商店不是外国人，是生活的一部分。然而，家乐福 MAF 并没有做足够的努力来确保其商场周围有足够的停车位和足够的出租车以及良好的交通流量，尤其是在周末和节假日。这使得该合资企业更容易受到小型利基商店和靠近消费者的商店的攻击。

迪拜市场面临巨大挑战。首先，竞争日益激烈，尤其是在食品领域，这实际上降低了利润率。沃尔玛和好市多没有考虑中东，而其他欧洲大卖场正在战略性地进入中东市场。2006 年，Union Coop 在迪拜开设了一家 180,000 平方英尺的大卖场。欧洲大卖场连锁店 Geant 也于 2003 年进入迪拜。除此之外，附近的商店正在抢夺那些不愿意开车去购物的亚洲外籍人士等客户。

The second challenge is chronic inflation. Due to rapid growth, high liquidity, high demand, low supply, and a currency peg to the recently declining US dollar, national inflation rates stood at around 13% in 2008, though economists expect actual consumer price inflation in Dubai to be at 20% per year. This inflation erodes revenues and rapidly raises the costs of inventory and staffing. Thirdly, the decline of the dollar versus other currencies can lower the value of revenues when repatriated to foreign countries.

Fourthly, the UAE government has recently implemented more difficult visa regulations. This makes it more difficult to attract skilled Asians and Westerners to help drive the economy’s growth. Lastly, the region faces political risks from Iran, Iraq, and from terrorism. Additionally, Dubai is more dependent on foreign investment and tourism than the other Emirates.

Dubai was expected to be more vulnerable to global economic downturns than Abu Dhabi and other emirates. Due to the global credit crunch, the UAE’s non-oil GDP growth was expected to slow from 8.8% in 2008 to 7.1% in 2009. Foremost to retailers is the expected implementation in early 2009 of a VAT (Value Added Tax) tax regimen of around 5%. It was anticipated that this tax system will drive inflation even higher than its current high level.

家乐福的模式有一个主要困难：在其商店购物的便利性。由于购物是在商场进行的，因此在家乐福购物通常很困难，尤其是在周末和节假日，那时商场人满为患。迪拜的驾车文化非常浓厚，因此当空间有限且出租车很少时，购物就变得很困难。结果，出租车的排队线可以延伸数百米，例如在德伊勒中心购物中心，停车场也可能被填满。家乐福需要解决这个问题，以确保这种不便不会阻止购物者光顾其商店。

潜在行动方案

To best compete in the Dubai market, Carrefour MAF could follow several potential courses of action. Each focuses on improving Carrefour’s competitive advantages, market positioning, and driving sales. First, Carrefour may need to ensure that customers are not leaving its stores due to more convenient specialty stores located closer to customers.

要做到这一点，家乐福必须解决购物体验带来的不便，尤其是迪拜的交通和运输不便。其中包括确保有足够的停车位和出租车以及有效的交通流量，尤其是在周末和节假日。家乐福可以通过向政府游说改善出租车和交通状况，并向 Majid Al Futtaim 游说解决停车问题，因为家乐福是家乐福的经营者。

Secondly, Carrefour could seek new advantages to solidify its position. Among these include positioning Carrefour as the place to go during economic turmoil. The rationale is that by attaching this perception to Carrefour’s brand, it ensures that customers associate Carrefour with savings and with rough economic times. In so doing, it can improve its performance in economic downturns. Also, Carrefour could reinforce its First Mover Advantage as the authentic hypermarket. In Eastern countries, the most loved brands are those that are considered authentic. As such, by reinforcing this perception, Carrefour could potentially limit the effectiveness of direct European hypermarket competitors in Dubai like Geant and Union Coop.

Thirdly, Carrefour has been successful in Dubai along several indicators, but it could find significant growth in the market by focusing on the countless expatriates that come in and out of the country. Carrefour could strengthen its specialty food sections to attract various demographics, in terms of a better selection. In so doing, it can better target Dubai’s expatriate population that prefers to eat its own cultural food, and increase the frequency at which these huge segments visit its stores.

Carrefour’s pricing strategy is also helpful in targeting this group because most expatriates work in Dubai to remit money home to their families. So Carrefour could become a great place to save money while not compromising quality. It could even develop to be a great place to buy gifts to send home. This effort could be supported by a Word of Mouth promotional strategy, harnessing existing customers to tell their friends about the deals and quality at Carrefour.

Given that Dubai’s expats mostly come from Asia where there are high-context cultures, Word of Mouth could be effective in targeting those expats who strongly value friends’ and family’s suggestions over media and corporate opinion. Further marketing techniques adhering to Dubai’s cultural imperatives could include discount coupons, a customer loyalty card, and a home delivery service to the expatriate segment. Home delivery service may be a viable option for Carrefour because it fits into the cultural context of Dubai. The service could take advantage of the lack of public transportation in Dubai, thus helping it to better reach a broader customer base. Ultimately by targeting the expatriate population, Carrefour could potentially continue to grow and hit the population of Dubai that is not included in the 689,000 citizens (est. 1995).

笔记：

This article does not necessarily reflect the typical report composition of an SIS International report, and is for information purposes only. The article does not contain advice for decision-making. No permission granted for reproduction.  SIS International.  Copyright (C) 2009.