カルフールのドバイ市場参入分析

エグゼクティブサマリー

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1995 年、カルフールは数十年前に開拓したヨーロッパのハイパーマーケット コンセプトをアラブ首長国連邦のドバイに拡大しました。新興市場への国ごとの慎重な拡大戦略を経て、カルフールはドバイ首長国に可能性を見出しました。この首長国は小売業が盛んで、経済が好調で基盤が強固でした。カルフールの目標は、失敗のリスクを減らし、収益性を維持しながら、長年の世界的なライバルであるウォルマートに対抗できる参入方法を見つけることでした。

1995 年、ドバイへの市場参入を検討していた企業にとって、ドバイは多くの利点を提供しました。他の市場に比べて人口が少ないにもかかわらず、ドバイは世界でも最も高い生活水準と所得を誇る経済圏で、外国人居住者と地元住民の珍しい構成を提供しました。市場は、法人税がゼロで貿易障壁がほとんどないなど、多くの利点があり、非常にビジネスに優しいものでした。優れた輸送ネットワーク、明確な法制度、良好な小売環境、力強い経済成長、低い政治リスク、移転リスクがありました。

カルフールは法律を検討し、失敗のリスクを最小限に抑えながら、積極的に成長を追求し、運営を管理する資格のあるパートナーを得るには、合弁事業が最善であると判断しました。同社は、中東で小売業の経験を持つ地域全体の複合企業であるマジッド・アル・フッタイムと合弁事業を提携しました。合弁事業は、店舗の場所をショッピングモールに変更して市場に適応し、食品を社会文化的規範に適応させ、利益率が高いため主に食品以外の商品を宣伝し、2桁のインフレの中で値引きに非常に慎重でした。

The venture was successful for Carrefour, given that it increased the number of stores opened in Dubai and expanded to nearby countries. Ultimately, Carrefour was successful because it developed a First Mover Advantage, it thoroughly adapted to the extent that it did not feel foreign to many consumers, and because of Majid Al Futtaim’s aggressiveness in identifying and pursuing growth opportunities. Carrefour faces two key problems including Customer inconvenience and Dubai’s long-term macroeconomic challenges. To address these challenges, Carrefour should seek to build new advantages through market positioning, strengthen its First Mover Advantage to limit competitive pressures, and build up specialty foods sections to better target expatriates.

会社概要

The French Fournier and Defforey families founded Carrefour in 1959 as a supermarket retailer. It was not until four years later in 1963 that the group opened its first hypermarket, which eventually led Carrefour to its success. In 1969 the company decided to expand internationally and opened its first hypermarket in Belgium In 1977, “Produits Libres” or unbranded products were introduced as a substitute to popular brands and were dubbed just as good. This pioneering idea led the company to create its own brand in 1985, which led the way for supermarket and hypermarkets worldwide. The idea was to help create even lower prices at the markets. Extremely low prices were one of the guiding strategies the company used to compete and buy out other chains.

カルフールの成功の鍵はハイパーマーケットです。これはバナナからベビーカーまであらゆるものを割引価格で販売するオールインワンショップです。これは同社のオリジナルのアイデアで、現在では世界中に拡大しており、そのプレーヤーは歴史上最も偉大なビジネス界の巨人たちの一人となっています。同社の企業固有の利点の一部として、同社はハイパーマーケットのコンセプトを開拓した世界的リーダーであり、このコンセプトの運用において競合他社よりも大きな優位性を持っています。第二に、カルフールは自社ブランドの製品ポートフォリオを開発し、低価格で提供できるようにしています。

3 つ目は、カルフールは市場で品質と価値に関して非常に強いブランド力を持っており、その結果、ハイパーマーケット部門で世界第 2 位の地位を獲得するなど、世界的な認知度を獲得しています。さらに、カルフールは多くの新興市場に最初に参入したことで、大きな先行者利益を獲得しています。

企業固有のデメリットとしては、カルフールの他の市場への参入の失敗や、虚偽広告の有罪判決や資本主義を弱体化させたという非難に伴う否定的なイメージなどが挙げられます。また、先発企業として、カルフールはインフラ開発や大規模な広告に伴うコストの増加に直面しています。最後に、食品は複数の国で生産される製品であり、現地の消費者の好みや機能要件は多様であるため、カルフールは製品を大幅に適応させる必要があります。

As a French company, Carrefour has several Country Specific Advantages (CSAs). First, French companies were considered to have high-quality goods and specialty items. In particular, French goods had a reputation for being luxurious, unique, and beautiful. Second, countries like the United Arab Emirates and cities like Dubai considered France an ally, given the strong political relationships between the countries. Eventually, France decided to locate a French permanent military base in the UAE in 2008 due to the strong relations. However, France also developed Country Specific Disadvantages. One of these perceptions was that the French were considered uptight and that the French considered their ways of doing things superior. Compared to English, the French language was not widely spoken worldwide and thus a language barrier existed. Last, although goods were luxurious, a disadvantage was that French goods were deemed too fancy for everyday life.

1993 年、カルフールの世界収益は 1 兆 4,218 億 2,000 万ユーロで、カルフールは新興市場での成長を熱心に模索していました。この頃、ウォルマート、テスコ、オーシャン、カジノ、E. レクラルクなどのカルフールの競合他社はいずれもアラブ首長国連邦に進出していませんでした。ライバルのジェアンは新興市場への進出戦略からこの市場を検討していたかもしれませんが、カルフールはドバイ市場で営業する最初の大手外国小売業者であり、先行者利益を得ることになります。

Currently, Carrefour is the second largest hypermarket chain worldwide behind Wal-Mart and the largest in Europe, with 2006 sales of $102,774,800 and 16.5% growth. It operates about 15,000 stores of many different sizes and categories including hypermarkets, supermarkets, convenience stores, discount stores, and cash-and-carry stores. Today Carrefour hypermarkets “offer an average surface area of 8,400 sq.m filled with a range of between 20,000 and 80,000 food and non-food items.”

Carrefour’s major competitor is Wal-Mart who seemed to have similar success and failure abroad. Wal-Mart succeeded in Japan, through joint ventures and an emphasis on local culture. It did, however, fail in Germany where the concept of a huge American discount store did not culturally resonate. Carrefour’s major French competitors are Auchan, Casino Guichard and E.Leclerc who all fall far behind the company in sales and size, by provide constant price competition to Carrefour.

過去の海外エントリー：学んだ教訓

カルフールは、特に先進国市場よりも成長率が高い新興国市場での成長を強く追求してきた伝統があります。同社は、ターゲット市場での成功に安心感を得た後、慎重に拡大を選択するため、ウォーターフォール成長戦略を追求しています。しかし、この慎重さにもかかわらず、同社は成長目標を達成できなかった市場から撤退しなければなりませんでした。」

まず、1980年代にカルフールは米国でハイパーマーケットを2店舗しか開店できずに失敗。フィラデルフィアへの進出は困難を極め、335,000平方フィートの店舗に抗議する労働組合の反感や、既存の顧客を悩ませる目立つピケラインなどがあった。この困難な経験を経て、1992年にニュージャージーに店舗をオープンしたが、その店舗ははるかに小規模で、スーパーマーケットから来たような商品が並ぶ倉庫のような店舗だった。

But Carrefour conducted little advertising to bring more customers into its huge stores. Also, Wal-Mart opened a store nearby, and Carrefour finally pulled out of the US. Ultimately, Carrefour lost $80 million on its failed US expansion. Second, Carrefour failed in Japan because of Carrefour’s inability to answer the needs of Japanese consumers, highlighting the importance of pre-entry research.

In addition, the company tried to enter alone rather than working with a local partner in a joint venture. Consequently, Carrefour sold its stores to the AEON group, a Japanese retailing chain, to operate its stores under the Carrefour brand name. In addition, Carrefour withdrew from Hong Kong in 2000 due to the difficulty in transferring the concept due to the lack of retail space, and Korea in 2006, largely due to intense competitive practices and poor performance.

同様に、カルフールは市場に応じて直接所有と合弁事業の両方を使用するのが一般的です。特に、カルフールが困難と見なす市場では合弁事業になる傾向があります。

母国分析: 1995 年のカルフールの市場としてのドバイ

Carrefour began the market entry process by examining the barriers to entry into Dubai and government regulations that might affect the introduction of the Carrefour brand into the market. The company had read how over only a few decades, the Emirate of Dubai had rapidly moved from an oil-producing economy into an economic marvel with towering skyscrapers, abundant wealth, and booming free markets in the middle of the desert.

Sheikh Rashid led Dubai’s economy through a period of explosive economic growth from the 1970s to the 1990s with a vision to diversify away from oil production towards a modern city in the Arabian Gulf. The Sheikh’s son, Sheikh Maktoum Bin Rashid Al Maktoum became ruler in 1990, and pursued free trade, technology, transportation, and tourism, dramatically turning Dubai into a global economic powerhouse.

Fueling Dubai’s success was its increasingly diversified economy outside of oil, strategic location between continents, burgeoning re-exports market to emerging markets, robust infrastructure, high quality of life, competitive cost structure, stable political situation, exceptionally business-friendly climate, defined legal structure, lack of preexisting legacy system, and highly optimistic economic outlook. This prosperity sparked a common expectation and saying in Dubai, “If you build it, they will come.”

On top of these economic figures, Carrefour saw positive retail conditions. The discounting concept had the potential to become successful due to high inflation. Also from 1987 to 2002, Dubai boosted its total retail floor space from 23,000m2 to 365,000m2, making it a major global contender in retail growth opportunities. Retail competition consisted of a handful of privately owned supermarket chains that imported goods and public member-owned cooperatives that were not legally permitted to import.

カルフールは、市場参入には他にも多くの利点があることに気付きました。ドバイの人口はわずか 689,000 人でしたが、政府統計によると、1995 年の人口は 12.5% で増加していました。また、ドバイは、売上を伸ばすために外国人居住者と観光客の流入を期待していました。さらに、ドバイの経済は、3 つの主な理由から非常にビジネスに優しいものでした。第一に、ドバイは、会社を迅速に設立するための合理化されたシステムを開発していました。第二に、多くの商品に対する輸入関税は低いか、まったくありませんでした。第三に、ドバイは、企業および個人の利益 (石油部門および金融部門を除く) または個人の利益に税金を課さない数少ない国の 1 つでした。

ドバイの政治リスクと移転リスクは低かった。ドバイは、企業の所有権を外国人投資家に認め、利益と資本を母国に送還した。第二に、政府は外国人投資家に最低限の資本投資を要求しなかった。第三に、ドバイには強力で迅速な法制度があった。法律による保護と商標局、工業所有権局、著作権局による知的財産保護があった。ドバイには、西洋諸国の裁判所制度に似た、3 段階の世俗裁判所がある。さらに、外国企業に関する法律は西洋のモデルに倣ったものだった。

Many laws were established to protect consumers, prevent fraudulent trading, and ensure fair trading among companies. Despite this, Emirati law favored local Emiratis and gave benefits to local companies over foreign ones. For example, Article 3 of Emirati Law did not afford the same rights of UAE nationals to foreign corporations: “Each company incorporated in the State shall hold its nationality but it shall not necessarily be entitled to privileges reserved only to U.A.E nationals.” Nonetheless, Emirati law had very low political risks. Lastly, there were very low transfer risks. Foreign investors enjoyed the fact that the UAE’s currency, the Dirham, was pegged to the dollar. This peg meant that investors would have confidence in not losing the value of their revenues in currency fluctuations against other major currencies. Lastly, Dubai had one of the lowest crime rates for a city in the world, which was optimal for retail companies selling expensive merchandise.

Dubai possessed superior transportation networks starting in the 1960s. Given its strategic location between continents, it eventually became a transshipment point between Australia and Europe; and between Asia and Africa. This infrastructure provided many benefits for a retail commercial hypermarket firm. Furthermore, major infrastructure projects were planned in the future, optimizing the logistics in Dubai. In the future, Carrefour could expect major logistics projects to be built. One of these was the world’s largest free trade logistics zone, Dubai Logistics City. Another project was the rapidly growing number of passengers and renovations to the Dubai International Airport, a major airport aiming to become the region’s main hub and service several dozen million passengers and tons of cargo. This infrastructure was important to Carrefour, which planned to important its inventory. Thus, Dubai’s outlook for global retailers like Carrefour seemed to provide ample opportunities.

ドバイ市場への参入戦略

Carrefour evaluated Dubai’s laws and market conditions, and determined that a joint venture would be best for market entry. Factoring in this decision were the favorable laws towards Joint Ventures. First, there was less risk in a joint venture. This was important as Carrefour had suffered an $80 million loss in the US market. Second, the UAE’s Federal Commercial Agencies Law protected foreign companies in a joint venture from contract termination and exclusive presence in the region. To qualify as a Joint Venture, companies would have to be partnered with UAE nationals or commercial entities owned solely by UAE nationals. Carrefour would also have to rent and not own the property in its operations. This condition was not a drawback to Carrefour, which saw benefits in joint venturing with the sponsor embracing the liability of ownership. Furthermore, operating as a Joint Venture with a local sponsor would likely make it easier for Carrefour to obtain Food Health Certificates to import food, given that it was a foreign retailer attempting to sell food in a culture with important religious and cultural restrictions. Part of the Health Certificates was the Halal slaughter certificate allowing the sale of meat that has been slaughtered by a Muslim man according to Islamic rites. With the Joint Venture, Carrefour would enjoy the same low or no trade barriers on most of its inventory, excluding cigarettes and other luxury goods.

Yet, Carrefour saw some major barriers to entry include the difficulty in finding a local partner who was willing to accept the burden of navigating complex local import statutes and pre-operational regulations such as product licensing, ensuring that the local municipal lab has access to product samples to test that the products being sold meet their health and cultural standards. Another barrier to entry was the costs of operating associated with the size of the locations used. For example, choosing to open large hypermarkets rather than smaller supermarkets, Carrefour would have to endure high costs of renting stock shelving as well as listing fees. Another barrier to entry was a regulation passed by the Gulf Cooperation Council, which the UAE was a part of, which stated that all food products imported into the UAE must have half or more of its shelf life remaining at the time of entrance or clearance will not be issued. Some minor factors influencing entry into Dubai included the fact that weekends in Dubai did not correspond with traditional western weekends. Fridays and Saturdays constituted the weekend in the UAE and this would require adaptation to local customs to conduct daily business.

Carrefour evaluated Dubai’s market benefits and risks as well as the modes of entry and decided in 1995 to partner with Majid Al Futtaim (MAF), a major pan-regional company owning and operating mall properties. The first benefit was that MAF owned the high-traffic malls and properties that would be perfect for Carrefour’s location. Also, this could prevent other large hypermarket chains from entering the same malls, limiting direct competition. Secondly, MAF had operations throughout the entire Middle East, and this could potentially allow Carrefour to expand to other countries in the Middle East under the same partnership. Thirdly, Carrefour preferred Dubai as a first market because it is the most populated emirate in the UAE, Lastly, MAF had experience in venturing with foreign retailers and could handle Carrefour’s operations. By positioning itself correctly in Dubai, Carrefour could then use the waterfall approach to enter the remaining six emirates and capitalize on the rising growth of standard of living in the UAE.

マーケティング戦略

場所

Carrefour/Majid al Futtaim’s strategy was to adapt to the cultural importance of shopping malls and create a “city within a city” by being located inside a mall with entertainment centers, cinemas, food courts, and other convenience amenities. Hence, Carrefour decided to place its stores in big malls in Deira City Centre Mall, Mall of the Emirates, Al Mamzar Century Mall, and Bur Dubai – Al Shindagha. Indeed, this adaptation differed from Carrefour’s standard location of a freestanding warehouse-like building.

The rationale behind adapting the traditional hypermarket was due to the fact that Dubai has a very strong mall culture, owing largely to Dubai’s cultural dynamics and harsh climate. First, the climate in Dubai is often so harsh that going to the mall is one of the few options to keep cool and entertained. Second, daily the mall provides an exciting experience beyond the shopping. In Arab society, socializing with family is paramount, and malls provide culturally appropriate entertainment for long periods of time. During the workday, Arab housewives will often go to malls with their friends to socialize, and bring their young children to play with each other at entertainment centers located on upper floors, while men are at work.

The elements Masculinity and Collectivism of Hofstede’s Model are evident in Emirati culture. Men will often go with their friends to watch movies in cinemas located in the upper levels of the mall, and drink coffee with friends at cafes into the late hours of the night. During the Friday and Saturday weekend, large Arab families pour into malls and spend many hours there shopping, taking their kids to arcades, eating at restaurants, staying at mall hotels, walking, and reclining. Despite spending long periods of time in the malls, many consumers only expect to window-shop and leave without buying merchandise. Third, Dubai’s society has adapted to the convenience of being able to get high-quality consumer goods in one mall. Fourth, Dubai’s society is very young and enamored by the popular brands, found in malls. For many of these reasons, retailers must often accept malls as the place to locate their stores.

ショッピング モール内に店舗を構えることのその他の利点は、カルフールの店舗に流れ込む顧客数がさらに増えると見込めることです。また、ドバイのモールにはカルフールが営業するのに十分な小売スペースがありました。さらに、検討対象となったモールのうち 2 つはマジッド アル フッタイムが所有していたため、カルフールは従来の大きな規模を維持しました。その結果、カルフールのデイラ シティ センター店はドバイ最大の店舗となりました。しかし、ドバイの中心部に位置するため、カルフールは消費者に近い従来の小規模小売店と競争することになりました。ドバイの交通問題を考えると、ドバイでの立地の重要性は過小評価できません。

製品

Dubai was a very international and diverse Emirate, particularly due to the large number of foreign workers. As such, Carrefour adapted by accepting foreign credit cards, the currencies of all GCC countries, and international currencies like the Euro and US dollar. While Carrefour implemented bilingual signage in the stores, language and cultural barriers were not likely problems given that English was so widely spoken and consumers had experience with Western products.

まず、カルフールは商品を文化に適応させる必要がありました。たとえば、豚肉を使わないハラール食品の販売など、特定の食品のニュアンスが評価される必要がありました。次に、ドバイの文化では人々が夏休みを取って涼しい場所に逃げるのが慣例であるため、カルフールはドバイのビジネス サイクルの季節性に適応する必要がありました。3 番目に、カルフールはラマダンやイードなどのイスラムの文化的祝日に適応する必要がありました。これらの祝日は売上のピークとなります。これらの祝日中、カルフールは需要の増加を考慮し、買い物客を失望させないようにそれに応じて供給を計画する必要がありました。4 番目に、ドバイでの営業時間は、日曜日から木曜日のドバイの平日と、金曜日から土曜日の週末に合わせて調整する必要がありました。

プロモーション

Carrefour did not adapt its promotional effort, which consisted of discounting certain items. Majid Al Futtaim handled local promotions and coordinated some of these regionally with its stores throughout the Middle East. Promotions were placed in print media and in-store, to attract mall-walking traffic. Because Dubai was a society emphasizing the importance of social relationships, Carrefour could reasonably expect that consumers might discuss some of the deals.

ドバイでは生活費が高く、インフレ率も高いため、プロモーションが重要でした。ドバイの人口統計は非常に偏っていました。カルフールが進出した頃の 1998 年、人口の 17% のみが「現地アラブ人」で、85% が「アジア人駐在員」、3% が西洋人でした。アジア人駐在員セグメントは可処分所得が最も低いものの、大きなセグメントであり、西洋の電子機器や製品を購入することに前向きでした。インフレとこれらの人口統計の重要性のため、カルフールのターゲット セグメントは主に駐在員でした。

価格

カルフールはディスカウント業者として価格設定を行っており、価格設定を販促活動の一環として行っていました。ブランド名が強固だったため、カルフールは割引商品によるブランド希薄化を心配する必要がありませんでした。しかし、
ええと、インフレが極めて高く、インフレの変動が利益を侵食する可能性があるドバイでは、値引きは問題でした。価格設定に関するもう 1 つの懸念は、食品小売市場が最も競争が激しく、利益率が低いことでした。カルフールは、食品以外の商品、家庭用品、トイレタリー製品をより高い利益率で販売することができました。

パフォーマンス

Carrefour / Majid Al Futtaim does not report its Dubai-generated revenues or other countries’ specific sales. We did a thorough literature search and even contacted Carrefour’s Investor Relations. Yet in both cases, the information was unavailable. There are two reasons for this. First, Carrefour MAF was a private joint venture and was not obligated to show its sales figures. Secondly, in the region, there is a tendency to underreport information and lack transparency due to suspicion of what other entities might use such data for, according to Seraphina Anderson Executive Director of Feedback Market Research in Dubai/Sharjah. This venture likely prefers to keep their sales figures and data private to prevent competitors from taking such information and using it to their advantage.

しかし、地域的には、カルフールMAFは2005年に13店舗で14兆10億トンの売上を発表しており、これは全世界の売上の約11兆3000億トンに相当します。他の指標は、合弁事業が成功していることを示しています。2007年には、積極的な地域成長により、カルフールからの売上は地域全体で14兆25億トンに増加しました。2008年、合弁事業はさらなる成長のためにイランに進出する計画を発表しました。

批判的評価

マジッド アル フッタイム (MAF) を選んだのはカルフールにとって良い考えだった。同社は拡大と成長を望んでおり、中東の他の市場に積極的に参入した。この選択により、MAF が所有する同じモールでの直接的な競争も回避された。さらに、今日のドバイの人々の多くがこの店を外国ではなく生活の一部とみなしていることを考えると、合弁事業が現地市場に適応したことで成功が確実となった。しかし、カルフール MAF は、特に週末や休日に、モール周辺に十分な駐車場と十分なタクシー、良好な交通の流れを確保することに十分な努力をしていない。このため、この事業はより小規模なニッチ ストアや消費者に近い場所にある店舗に対してより脆弱になっている。

ドバイ市場は大きな課題に直面しています。まず、競争が激化しており、特に食品部門では利益率が実質的に低下しています。ウォルマートとコストコは中東を検討していませんが、他のヨーロッパのハイパーマーケットは戦略的に中東市場に参入しています。2006 年、ユニオン コープはドバイに 180,000 平方フィートのハイパーマーケットをオープンしました。ヨーロッパのハイパーマーケット チェーンである Geant も 2003 年にドバイに進出しました。さらに、近隣の店舗は、買い物のために遠くまで車を走らせたくないアジア系駐在員などの顧客を奪っています。

The second challenge is chronic inflation. Due to rapid growth, high liquidity, high demand, low supply, and a currency peg to the recently declining US dollar, national inflation rates stood at around 13% in 2008, though economists expect actual consumer price inflation in Dubai to be at 20% per year. This inflation erodes revenues and rapidly raises the costs of inventory and staffing. Thirdly, the decline of the dollar versus other currencies can lower the value of revenues when repatriated to foreign countries.

Fourthly, the UAE government has recently implemented more difficult visa regulations. This makes it more difficult to attract skilled Asians and Westerners to help drive the economy’s growth. Lastly, the region faces political risks from Iran, Iraq, and from terrorism. Additionally, Dubai is more dependent on foreign investment and tourism than the other Emirates.

Dubai was expected to be more vulnerable to global economic downturns than Abu Dhabi and other emirates. Due to the global credit crunch, the UAE’s non-oil GDP growth was expected to slow from 8.8% in 2008 to 7.1% in 2009. Foremost to retailers is the expected implementation in early 2009 of a VAT (Value Added Tax) tax regimen of around 5%. It was anticipated that this tax system will drive inflation even higher than its current high level.

カルフールのビジネスモデルには、店舗での買い物のしやすさという大きな問題が 1 つあります。ショッピングはモール内で行われるため、モールが混雑する週末や休日には特に、カルフールでの買い物は難しいことがよくあります。ドバイは車の運転文化が根付いているため、スペースが限られ、タクシーの数が少ない場合は困難になります。その結果、デイラ センター モールなどでは、タクシーの列が数百メートルに伸び、駐車場が満杯になることがあります。カルフールは、この不便さが買い物客の来店を妨げないように、この問題に対処する必要があります。

考えられる行動方針

To best compete in the Dubai market, Carrefour MAF could follow several potential courses of action. Each focuses on improving Carrefour’s competitive advantages, market positioning, and driving sales. First, Carrefour may need to ensure that customers are not leaving its stores due to more convenient specialty stores located closer to customers.

そのためには、カルフールでのショッピング体験に伴う不便さ、特にドバイの交通や輸送の不便さに対処する必要がある。その中には、特に週末や休日に十分な駐車場とタクシー、そして効率的な交通の流れを確保することなどがある。タクシーと交通状況については政府に、駐車場の問題については施設を運営するマジド・アル・フッタイムにロビー活動を行うことで、これを実現できる可能性がある。

Secondly, Carrefour could seek new advantages to solidify its position. Among these include positioning Carrefour as the place to go during economic turmoil. The rationale is that by attaching this perception to Carrefour’s brand, it ensures that customers associate Carrefour with savings and with rough economic times. In so doing, it can improve its performance in economic downturns. Also, Carrefour could reinforce its First Mover Advantage as the authentic hypermarket. In Eastern countries, the most loved brands are those that are considered authentic. As such, by reinforcing this perception, Carrefour could potentially limit the effectiveness of direct European hypermarket competitors in Dubai like Geant and Union Coop.

Thirdly, Carrefour has been successful in Dubai along several indicators, but it could find significant growth in the market by focusing on the countless expatriates that come in and out of the country. Carrefour could strengthen its specialty food sections to attract various demographics, in terms of a better selection. In so doing, it can better target Dubai’s expatriate population that prefers to eat its own cultural food, and increase the frequency at which these huge segments visit its stores.

Carrefour’s pricing strategy is also helpful in targeting this group because most expatriates work in Dubai to remit money home to their families. So Carrefour could become a great place to save money while not compromising quality. It could even develop to be a great place to buy gifts to send home. This effort could be supported by a Word of Mouth promotional strategy, harnessing existing customers to tell their friends about the deals and quality at Carrefour.

Given that Dubai’s expats mostly come from Asia where there are high-context cultures, Word of Mouth could be effective in targeting those expats who strongly value friends’ and family’s suggestions over media and corporate opinion. Further marketing techniques adhering to Dubai’s cultural imperatives could include discount coupons, a customer loyalty card, and a home delivery service to the expatriate segment. Home delivery service may be a viable option for Carrefour because it fits into the cultural context of Dubai. The service could take advantage of the lack of public transportation in Dubai, thus helping it to better reach a broader customer base. Ultimately by targeting the expatriate population, Carrefour could potentially continue to grow and hit the population of Dubai that is not included in the 689,000 citizens (est. 1995).

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