까르푸의 두바이 시장 진입 분석

요약

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1995년 까르푸는 수십 년 전에 처음 개척했던 유럽 대형 슈퍼마켓 개념을 아랍에미리트 두바이로 확장했습니다. 신흥 시장으로의 신중한 국가별 확장 전략에 따라 까르푸는 두바이 토후국에서 잠재력을 보았습니다. 토후국은 번영하는 소매 산업을 갖고 있었고 번영하는 경제에서 강력한 기반을 보여주었습니다. 까르푸의 목표는 실패의 위험을 줄이고 수익성을 유지하면서 오랜 글로벌 라이벌인 월마트를 상쇄할 수 있는 진입 방식을 찾는 것이었습니다.

두바이는 1995년 두바이 시장 진출을 고려하는 기업에게 많은 이점을 제공했습니다. 다른 시장에 비해 인구가 적었음에도 불구하고 두바이는 세계에서 가장 높은 생활 수준과 소득 수준을 지닌 경제 환경에서 외국인과 현지 주민으로 구성된 특이한 구성을 제공했습니다. 세계. 시장은 무역 장벽이 거의 없고 법인세 제로와 같은 많은 이점을 지닌 매우 비즈니스 친화적이었습니다. 우수한 운송 네트워크, 잘 정의된 법률 시스템, 긍정적인 소매 조건, 강력한 경제 성장, 낮은 정치적, 이전 위험을 갖추고 있었습니다.

까르푸는 법률을 검토한 후, 적격한 파트너를 확보하여 공격적으로 성장을 추구하고 운영을 관리하는 동시에 실패 위험을 최소화하는 것이 합작 투자에 가장 적합하다고 판단했습니다. 중동 지역에서 소매 경험을 보유한 범 지역 대기업인 Majid Al Futtaim과 합작 투자를 통해 파트너십을 맺었습니다. 합작회사는 매장 위치를 쇼핑몰로 변경하여 시장에 적응했고, 식품을 사회 문화적 규범에 적응시켰으며, 높은 이윤폭으로 인해 주로 비식품 품목을 홍보했으며, 두 자리 수의 할인 속에서 매우 신중했습니다. 인플레이션.

The venture was successful for Carrefour, given that it increased the number of stores opened in Dubai and expanded to nearby countries. Ultimately, Carrefour was successful because it developed a First Mover Advantage, it thoroughly adapted to the extent that it did not feel foreign to many consumers, and because of Majid Al Futtaim’s aggressiveness in identifying and pursuing growth opportunities. Carrefour faces two key problems including Customer inconvenience and Dubai’s long-term macroeconomic challenges. To address these challenges, Carrefour should seek to build new advantages through market positioning, strengthen its First Mover Advantage to limit competitive pressures, and build up specialty foods sections to better target expatriates.

회사 개요

The French Fournier and Defforey families founded Carrefour in 1959 as a supermarket retailer. It was not until four years later in 1963 that the group opened its first hypermarket, which eventually led Carrefour to its success. In 1969 the company decided to expand internationally and opened its first hypermarket in Belgium In 1977, “Produits Libres” or unbranded products were introduced as a substitute to popular brands and were dubbed just as good. This pioneering idea led the company to create its own brand in 1985, which led the way for supermarket and hypermarkets worldwide. The idea was to help create even lower prices at the markets. Extremely low prices were one of the guiding strategies the company used to compete and buy out other chains.

까르푸의 성공 비결은 바나나부터 유모차까지 모든 것을 할인된 가격에 판매하는 올인원 매장인 대형마트다. 이는 회사의 독창적인 아이디어였으며 현재 전 세계적으로 확장되었으며 역사상 가장 위대한 비즈니스 거대 기업 중 하나로 알려져 있습니다. 기업별 장점의 일환으로 이 개념을 개척한 대형마트의 글로벌 리더로서 이 개념을 운영하는 데 있어 경쟁사보다 상당한 이점을 제공합니다. 둘째, 까르푸가 더 낮은 가격을 제공할 수 있도록 자체 브랜드 제품 포트폴리오를 개발했습니다.

셋째, 시장에서 품질과 가치 측면에서 매우 강력한 브랜드를 보유하고 있으며, 그 결과 대형마트 부문에서 세계 2위의 지위를 차지하는 등 세계적인 인지도를 얻었습니다. 게다가 까르푸는 많은 신흥 시장에 최초로 진출함으로써 중요한 First Mover Advantage를 개발했습니다.

일부 기업 특유의 단점에는 까르푸가 다른 시장에 진출하는 다양한 실패와 회사가 허위 광고에 대한 확신과 자본주의를 훼손했다는 비난과 관련된 부정적인 의미가 포함됩니다. 또한 까르푸는 First Mover로서 인프라 개발 및 광범위한 광고와 관련된 비용 증가에 직면해 있습니다. 마지막으로, 식품은 다국적 제품이고 현지 소비자의 선호도와 기능적 요구 사항이 다양하기 때문에 까르푸는 제품을 크게 조정해야 합니다.

As a French company, Carrefour has several Country Specific Advantages (CSAs). First, French companies were considered to have high-quality goods and specialty items. In particular, French goods had a reputation for being luxurious, unique, and beautiful. Second, countries like the United Arab Emirates and cities like Dubai considered France an ally, given the strong political relationships between the countries. Eventually, France decided to locate a French permanent military base in the UAE in 2008 due to the strong relations. However, France also developed Country Specific Disadvantages. One of these perceptions was that the French were considered uptight and that the French considered their ways of doing things superior. Compared to English, the French language was not widely spoken worldwide and thus a language barrier existed. Last, although goods were luxurious, a disadvantage was that French goods were deemed too fancy for everyday life.

1993년 까르푸의 전 세계 매출은 $218억2천만 달러였으며, 까르푸는 신흥 시장에서의 성장을 열심히 모색했습니다. 이 무렵 월마트, 테스코, 아우추안, 카지노, E. 르클르크 등 까르푸의 경쟁사 중 누구도 아랍에미리트로 사업을 확장하지 않았다. 라이벌인 Geant가 신흥 시장으로 확장하려는 전략을 고려하여 시장을 고려했을 수도 있지만 Carrefour는 First Mover Advantage를 제공할 두바이 시장에서 운영되는 최초의 주요 외국 소매업체가 되었을 것입니다.

Currently, Carrefour is the second largest hypermarket chain worldwide behind Wal-Mart and the largest in Europe, with 2006 sales of $102,774,800 and 16.5% growth. It operates about 15,000 stores of many different sizes and categories including hypermarkets, supermarkets, convenience stores, discount stores, and cash-and-carry stores. Today Carrefour hypermarkets “offer an average surface area of 8,400 sq.m filled with a range of between 20,000 and 80,000 food and non-food items.”

Carrefour’s major competitor is Wal-Mart who seemed to have similar success and failure abroad. Wal-Mart succeeded in Japan, through joint ventures and an emphasis on local culture. It did, however, fail in Germany where the concept of a huge American discount store did not culturally resonate. Carrefour’s major French competitors are Auchan, Casino Guichard and E.Leclerc who all fall far behind the company in sales and size, by provide constant price competition to Carrefour.

이전 외국 항목: 교훈

까르푸는 특히 선진 시장보다 성장이 더 높은 신흥 시장에서 강력하게 성장을 추구하는 전통을 가지고 있습니다. 회사는 목표 시장에서의 성공에 대해 편안함을 느낀 후 확장을 신중하게 선택하기 때문에 폭포식 성장 전략을 추구합니다. 그러나 이러한 신중함에도 불구하고 회사는 성장 목표를 달성하지 못한 시장에서 철수해야 했습니다.”

첫째, 1980년대 까르푸는 미국에서 단 두 개의 대형마트만 갖고 실패했습니다. 필라델피아에서의 시장 진입은 335,000평방피트 규모의 매장에 대한 노조의 적대감과 기존 고객을 괴롭히는 눈에 띄는 피켓 라인으로 인해 험난했습니다. 이런 힘든 경험을 거쳐 1992년 뉴저지에 훨씬 작은 매장을 열었고, 슈퍼마켓에서 나온 것처럼 보이는 제품들로 가득 찬 창고 같은 매장을 열었습니다.

But Carrefour conducted little advertising to bring more customers into its huge stores. Also, Wal-Mart opened a store nearby, and Carrefour finally pulled out of the US. Ultimately, Carrefour lost $80 million on its failed US expansion. Second, Carrefour failed in Japan because of Carrefour’s inability to answer the needs of Japanese consumers, highlighting the importance of pre-entry research.

In addition, the company tried to enter alone rather than working with a local partner in a joint venture. Consequently, Carrefour sold its stores to the AEON group, a Japanese retailing chain, to operate its stores under the Carrefour brand name. In addition, Carrefour withdrew from Hong Kong in 2000 due to the difficulty in transferring the concept due to the lack of retail space, and Korea in 2006, largely due to intense competitive practices and poor performance.

마찬가지로 까르푸는 일반적으로 시장에 따라 직접 소유권과 합작 투자를 모두 사용합니다. 특히 까르푸가 어렵다고 생각하는 시장은 합작투자를 하는 경향이 있다.

본국 분석: 1995년 까르푸 시장으로서의 두바이

Carrefour began the market entry process by examining the barriers to entry into Dubai and government regulations that might affect the introduction of the Carrefour brand into the market. The company had read how over only a few decades, the Emirate of Dubai had rapidly moved from an oil-producing economy into an economic marvel with towering skyscrapers, abundant wealth, and booming free markets in the middle of the desert.

Sheikh Rashid led Dubai’s economy through a period of explosive economic growth from the 1970s to the 1990s with a vision to diversify away from oil production towards a modern city in the Arabian Gulf. The Sheikh’s son, Sheikh Maktoum Bin Rashid Al Maktoum became ruler in 1990, and pursued free trade, technology, transportation, and tourism, dramatically turning Dubai into a global economic powerhouse.

Fueling Dubai’s success was its increasingly diversified economy outside of oil, strategic location between continents, burgeoning re-exports market to emerging markets, robust infrastructure, high quality of life, competitive cost structure, stable political situation, exceptionally business-friendly climate, defined legal structure, lack of preexisting legacy system, and highly optimistic economic outlook. This prosperity sparked a common expectation and saying in Dubai, “If you build it, they will come.”

On top of these economic figures, Carrefour saw positive retail conditions. The discounting concept had the potential to become successful due to high inflation. Also from 1987 to 2002, Dubai boosted its total retail floor space from 23,000m2 to 365,000m2, making it a major global contender in retail growth opportunities. Retail competition consisted of a handful of privately owned supermarket chains that imported goods and public member-owned cooperatives that were not legally permitted to import.

까르푸는 시장 진입에 있어 다른 많은 이점을 발견했습니다. 두바이의 인구는 689,000명에 불과했지만 정부 통계에 따르면 1995년 인구는 12.5%로 증가했습니다. 또한 두바이는 국외 거주자와 관광객의 유입이 판매를 촉진할 것으로 예상했습니다. 게다가 두바이 경제는 세 가지 주요 이유로 매우 기업 친화적이었습니다. 첫째, 두바이는 신속한 회사 설립을 위해 효율적인 시스템을 개발했습니다. 둘째, 많은 상품에 대한 수입 관세가 낮거나 존재하지 않았습니다. 셋째, 기업 및 개인 이익(석유 부문 및 금융 부문 제외) 또는 개인 이익에 대해 세금을 부과하지 않는 몇 안 되는 국가 중 하나였습니다.

두바이의 정치적, 이적 위험은 낮았습니다. 두바이는 외국인 투자자에게 기업의 100% 소유권을 허용하고, 100%의 이익과 자본을 본국으로 송환하도록 허용했습니다. 둘째, 정부는 외국인 투자자에게 최소한의 자본 투자를 요구하지 않았습니다. 셋째, 두바이는 강력하고 신속한 법률 시스템을 갖추고 있었습니다. 법률 보호와 상표 부서, 산업 재산권 부서 및 저작권 부서를 통해 지적 재산권 보호를 받았습니다. 두바이에는 세 가지 수준의 세속 법원이 있는 서구 국가와 유사한 법원 시스템이 있었습니다. 게다가 외국 기업에 관한 법률은 서구 모델을 모델로 삼았습니다.

Many laws were established to protect consumers, prevent fraudulent trading, and ensure fair trading among companies. Despite this, Emirati law favored local Emiratis and gave benefits to local companies over foreign ones. For example, Article 3 of Emirati Law did not afford the same rights of UAE nationals to foreign corporations: “Each company incorporated in the State shall hold its nationality but it shall not necessarily be entitled to privileges reserved only to U.A.E nationals.” Nonetheless, Emirati law had very low political risks. Lastly, there were very low transfer risks. Foreign investors enjoyed the fact that the UAE’s currency, the Dirham, was pegged to the dollar. This peg meant that investors would have confidence in not losing the value of their revenues in currency fluctuations against other major currencies. Lastly, Dubai had one of the lowest crime rates for a city in the world, which was optimal for retail companies selling expensive merchandise.

Dubai possessed superior transportation networks starting in the 1960s. Given its strategic location between continents, it eventually became a transshipment point between Australia and Europe; and between Asia and Africa. This infrastructure provided many benefits for a retail commercial hypermarket firm. Furthermore, major infrastructure projects were planned in the future, optimizing the logistics in Dubai. In the future, Carrefour could expect major logistics projects to be built. One of these was the world’s largest free trade logistics zone, Dubai Logistics City. Another project was the rapidly growing number of passengers and renovations to the Dubai International Airport, a major airport aiming to become the region’s main hub and service several dozen million passengers and tons of cargo. This infrastructure was important to Carrefour, which planned to important its inventory. Thus, Dubai’s outlook for global retailers like Carrefour seemed to provide ample opportunities.

두바이 시장 진출 전략

Carrefour evaluated Dubai’s laws and market conditions, and determined that a joint venture would be best for market entry. Factoring in this decision were the favorable laws towards Joint Ventures. First, there was less risk in a joint venture. This was important as Carrefour had suffered an $80 million loss in the US market. Second, the UAE’s Federal Commercial Agencies Law protected foreign companies in a joint venture from contract termination and exclusive presence in the region. To qualify as a Joint Venture, companies would have to be partnered with UAE nationals or commercial entities owned solely by UAE nationals. Carrefour would also have to rent and not own the property in its operations. This condition was not a drawback to Carrefour, which saw benefits in joint venturing with the sponsor embracing the liability of ownership. Furthermore, operating as a Joint Venture with a local sponsor would likely make it easier for Carrefour to obtain Food Health Certificates to import food, given that it was a foreign retailer attempting to sell food in a culture with important religious and cultural restrictions. Part of the Health Certificates was the Halal slaughter certificate allowing the sale of meat that has been slaughtered by a Muslim man according to Islamic rites. With the Joint Venture, Carrefour would enjoy the same low or no trade barriers on most of its inventory, excluding cigarettes and other luxury goods.

Yet, Carrefour saw some major barriers to entry include the difficulty in finding a local partner who was willing to accept the burden of navigating complex local import statutes and pre-operational regulations such as product licensing, ensuring that the local municipal lab has access to product samples to test that the products being sold meet their health and cultural standards. Another barrier to entry was the costs of operating associated with the size of the locations used. For example, choosing to open large hypermarkets rather than smaller supermarkets, Carrefour would have to endure high costs of renting stock shelving as well as listing fees. Another barrier to entry was a regulation passed by the Gulf Cooperation Council, which the UAE was a part of, which stated that all food products imported into the UAE must have half or more of its shelf life remaining at the time of entrance or clearance will not be issued. Some minor factors influencing entry into Dubai included the fact that weekends in Dubai did not correspond with traditional western weekends. Fridays and Saturdays constituted the weekend in the UAE and this would require adaptation to local customs to conduct daily business.

Carrefour evaluated Dubai’s market benefits and risks as well as the modes of entry and decided in 1995 to partner with Majid Al Futtaim (MAF), a major pan-regional company owning and operating mall properties. The first benefit was that MAF owned the high-traffic malls and properties that would be perfect for Carrefour’s location. Also, this could prevent other large hypermarket chains from entering the same malls, limiting direct competition. Secondly, MAF had operations throughout the entire Middle East, and this could potentially allow Carrefour to expand to other countries in the Middle East under the same partnership. Thirdly, Carrefour preferred Dubai as a first market because it is the most populated emirate in the UAE, Lastly, MAF had experience in venturing with foreign retailers and could handle Carrefour’s operations. By positioning itself correctly in Dubai, Carrefour could then use the waterfall approach to enter the remaining six emirates and capitalize on the rising growth of standard of living in the UAE.

마케팅 전략

장소

Carrefour/Majid al Futtaim’s strategy was to adapt to the cultural importance of shopping malls and create a “city within a city” by being located inside a mall with entertainment centers, cinemas, food courts, and other convenience amenities. Hence, Carrefour decided to place its stores in big malls in Deira City Centre Mall, Mall of the Emirates, Al Mamzar Century Mall, and Bur Dubai – Al Shindagha. Indeed, this adaptation differed from Carrefour’s standard location of a freestanding warehouse-like building.

The rationale behind adapting the traditional hypermarket was due to the fact that Dubai has a very strong mall culture, owing largely to Dubai’s cultural dynamics and harsh climate. First, the climate in Dubai is often so harsh that going to the mall is one of the few options to keep cool and entertained. Second, daily the mall provides an exciting experience beyond the shopping. In Arab society, socializing with family is paramount, and malls provide culturally appropriate entertainment for long periods of time. During the workday, Arab housewives will often go to malls with their friends to socialize, and bring their young children to play with each other at entertainment centers located on upper floors, while men are at work.

The elements Masculinity and Collectivism of Hofstede’s Model are evident in Emirati culture. Men will often go with their friends to watch movies in cinemas located in the upper levels of the mall, and drink coffee with friends at cafes into the late hours of the night. During the Friday and Saturday weekend, large Arab families pour into malls and spend many hours there shopping, taking their kids to arcades, eating at restaurants, staying at mall hotels, walking, and reclining. Despite spending long periods of time in the malls, many consumers only expect to window-shop and leave without buying merchandise. Third, Dubai’s society has adapted to the convenience of being able to get high-quality consumer goods in one mall. Fourth, Dubai’s society is very young and enamored by the popular brands, found in malls. For many of these reasons, retailers must often accept malls as the place to locate their stores.

쇼핑몰에 위치함으로써 얻을 수 있는 또 다른 이점은 까르푸가 까르푸 매장으로 유입되는 고객의 양이 훨씬 더 많을 것으로 기대할 수 있다는 것입니다. 게다가 두바이 쇼핑몰에는 까르푸가 운영할 수 있을 만큼 충분히 큰 소매 공간이 있었습니다. 게다가 까르푸는 Majid Al Futtaim이 고려 중인 쇼핑몰 두 곳을 소유하고 있다는 점을 고려하여 전통적인 큰 규모를 유지했습니다. 그 결과 까르푸의 데이라 시티 센터 매장은 두바이 최대 매장이 됐다. 그럼에도 불구하고 까르푸는 두바이 중심부에 위치함으로써 소비자에게 더 가까이 위치한 전통적인 소규모 소매점과 경쟁을 벌였습니다. 두바이의 교통 문제를 고려할 때 두바이에서의 위치의 중요성은 과소평가될 수 없습니다.

제품

Dubai was a very international and diverse Emirate, particularly due to the large number of foreign workers. As such, Carrefour adapted by accepting foreign credit cards, the currencies of all GCC countries, and international currencies like the Euro and US dollar. While Carrefour implemented bilingual signage in the stores, language and cultural barriers were not likely problems given that English was so widely spoken and consumers had experience with Western products.

첫째, 까르푸는 상품을 문화에 맞게 조정해야 했습니다. 예를 들어, 돼지고기가 부족한 할랄 음식을 판매하는 등 특정 음식의 미묘한 차이를 이해해야 했습니다. 둘째, 사람들이 더 시원한 곳으로 여름 휴가를 떠나는 것이 두바이 문화에서 관례였기 때문에 까르푸는 두바이 비즈니스 주기의 계절성에 적응해야 했습니다. 셋째, 까르푸는 라마단, 이드 등 이슬람 문화 명절에 적응해야 했고, 이로 인해 매출이 최고조에 달했습니다. 이러한 휴일 동안 까르푸는 수요 증가를 고려하고 이에 따라 쇼핑객을 실망시키지 않기 위해 공급을 계획해야 했습니다. 넷째, 두바이의 영업시간은 두바이의 주중 일요일~목요일과 주말인 금요일~토요일을 수용해야 했다.

홍보

Carrefour did not adapt its promotional effort, which consisted of discounting certain items. Majid Al Futtaim handled local promotions and coordinated some of these regionally with its stores throughout the Middle East. Promotions were placed in print media and in-store, to attract mall-walking traffic. Because Dubai was a society emphasizing the importance of social relationships, Carrefour could reasonably expect that consumers might discuss some of the deals.

높은 생활비와 높은 인플레이션으로 인해 두바이에서는 프로모션이 중요했습니다. 두바이의 인구통계는 매우 편향되어 있습니다. 까르푸가 진출할 당시 1998년 인구 중 17%만이 '현지 아랍인'으로 구성되어 있었고, 85%는 '해외 아시아인', 3%는 서양인이었습니다. 아시아 국외 거주자 부문은 가처분 소득이 가장 낮았지만 규모가 크고 서구 전자 제품 및 제품 구매에 대체로 개방적이었습니다. 인플레이션과 이러한 인구 통계의 중요성으로 인해 까르푸의 대상 부문에는 주로 국외 거주자가 포함되었습니다.

가격

까르푸의 가격 포지션은 할인 판매점이었고 판촉 활동의 일환으로 가격 책정을 사용했습니다. 강력한 브랜드 이름 덕분에 까르푸는 할인된 제품으로 인한 브랜드 희석을 걱정할 필요가 없었습니다. 하웨브
아, 인플레이션이 치솟고 인플레이션 변동으로 인해 수익이 잠식될 수 있는 두바이에서는 할인이 문제가 되었습니다. 또 다른 가격 문제는 식품 소매 시장이 가장 경쟁이 심해서 이윤폭이 낮다는 점이었습니다. 까르푸는 비식품, 가정용품, 세면도구를 더 높은 마진으로 판매할 수 있습니다.

성능

Carrefour / Majid Al Futtaim does not report its Dubai-generated revenues or other countries’ specific sales. We did a thorough literature search and even contacted Carrefour’s Investor Relations. Yet in both cases, the information was unavailable. There are two reasons for this. First, Carrefour MAF was a private joint venture and was not obligated to show its sales figures. Secondly, in the region, there is a tendency to underreport information and lack transparency due to suspicion of what other entities might use such data for, according to Seraphina Anderson Executive Director of Feedback Market Research in Dubai/Sharjah. This venture likely prefers to keep their sales figures and data private to prevent competitors from taking such information and using it to their advantage.

그러나 지역적으로 Carrefour MAF는 2005년 13개 매장 중 $10억의 전체 매출 수치를 발표했는데, 이는 전 세계 매출의 약 1%에 해당합니다. 다른 지표는 합작 투자가 성공했음을 보여줍니다. 2007년에 Carrefour의 매출은 공격적인 지역 성장으로 인해 지역적으로 $25억으로 증가했습니다. 2008년에 합작 회사는 추가 성장을 위해 이란에 진출할 계획을 발표했습니다.

비판적 평가

Majid Al Futtaim(MAF)을 선택한 것은 까르푸에게 좋은 생각이었습니다. 확장과 성장에 대한 열망이 있었고 중동의 다른 시장에도 공격적으로 진출했습니다. 이 선택은 또한 MAF가 소유한 동일한 쇼핑몰에서의 직접적인 경쟁을 방지했습니다. 더욱이, 오늘날 두바이의 많은 사람들이 이 매장을 비외국인이자 삶의 일부로 여기고 있다는 점을 고려하면 합작 투자의 현지 시장 적응은 성공을 보장했습니다. 그러나 Carrefour MAF는 특히 주말과 공휴일에 충분한 주차 공간과 충분한 택시, 쇼핑몰 주변의 원활한 교통 흐름을 보장하기 위해 충분한 노력을 기울이지 않았습니다. 이로 인해 벤처 기업은 소비자에게 더 가까이 위치한 소규모 틈새 매장 및 매장에 더욱 취약해졌습니다.

두바이 시장은 상당한 도전에 직면해 있습니다. 첫째, 특히 식품 부문에서 경쟁이 심화되어 이윤폭이 효과적으로 감소하고 있습니다. 월마트와 코스트코가 중동 시장을 고려하지 않는 가운데, 유럽의 다른 대형마트들도 전략적으로 중동 시장에 진출하고 있다. 2006년 Union Coop은 두바이에 180,000평방피트 규모의 대형 슈퍼마켓을 열었습니다. 유럽의 대형마트 체인인 Geant도 2003년 두바이에 진출했습니다. 게다가 인근 상점들은 쇼핑하러 멀리 운전하는 것을 선호하지 않는 아시아계 국외 거주자들을 피해가고 있습니다.

The second challenge is chronic inflation. Due to rapid growth, high liquidity, high demand, low supply, and a currency peg to the recently declining US dollar, national inflation rates stood at around 13% in 2008, though economists expect actual consumer price inflation in Dubai to be at 20% per year. This inflation erodes revenues and rapidly raises the costs of inventory and staffing. Thirdly, the decline of the dollar versus other currencies can lower the value of revenues when repatriated to foreign countries.

Fourthly, the UAE government has recently implemented more difficult visa regulations. This makes it more difficult to attract skilled Asians and Westerners to help drive the economy’s growth. Lastly, the region faces political risks from Iran, Iraq, and from terrorism. Additionally, Dubai is more dependent on foreign investment and tourism than the other Emirates.

Dubai was expected to be more vulnerable to global economic downturns than Abu Dhabi and other emirates. Due to the global credit crunch, the UAE’s non-oil GDP growth was expected to slow from 8.8% in 2008 to 7.1% in 2009. Foremost to retailers is the expected implementation in early 2009 of a VAT (Value Added Tax) tax regimen of around 5%. It was anticipated that this tax system will drive inflation even higher than its current high level.

까르푸 모델에는 한 가지 큰 어려움이 있습니다. 바로 매장에서 쇼핑이 용이하다는 것입니다. 쇼핑은 쇼핑몰에서 이루어지므로 까르푸에서 쇼핑하기 어려운 경우가 많으며, 특히 쇼핑몰이 꽉 차는 주말이나 공휴일에는 더욱 그렇습니다. 두바이는 운전 문화가 매우 강해서 공간이 제한적이고 택시가 거의 없으면 운전하기가 어렵습니다. 결과적으로 데이라 센터(Deira Center) 몰과 같이 택시 노선이 수백 미터까지 확장될 수 있으며 주차장은 만석이 될 수 있습니다. 까르푸는 이러한 불편으로 인해 쇼핑객이 매장을 방문하는 데 방해가 되지 않도록 이 문제를 해결해야 합니다.

잠재적인 행동 과정

To best compete in the Dubai market, Carrefour MAF could follow several potential courses of action. Each focuses on improving Carrefour’s competitive advantages, market positioning, and driving sales. First, Carrefour may need to ensure that customers are not leaving its stores due to more convenient specialty stores located closer to customers.

그러기 위해서는 까르푸 쇼핑 경험에 수반되는 불편함, 특히 두바이의 교통 및 교통 불편함을 해결해야 합니다. 특히 주말과 공휴일에는 충분한 주차 공간과 택시를 확보하고 효과적인 교통 흐름을 보장하는 것도 그 중 하나입니다. 택시와 교통 상황에 대해서는 정부에 로비를 하고, 부동산을 운영하기 때문에 주차 문제에 대해서는 마지드 알 푸타임(Majid Al Futtaim)에 로비함으로써 잠재적으로 그렇게 할 수 있습니다.

Secondly, Carrefour could seek new advantages to solidify its position. Among these include positioning Carrefour as the place to go during economic turmoil. The rationale is that by attaching this perception to Carrefour’s brand, it ensures that customers associate Carrefour with savings and with rough economic times. In so doing, it can improve its performance in economic downturns. Also, Carrefour could reinforce its First Mover Advantage as the authentic hypermarket. In Eastern countries, the most loved brands are those that are considered authentic. As such, by reinforcing this perception, Carrefour could potentially limit the effectiveness of direct European hypermarket competitors in Dubai like Geant and Union Coop.

Thirdly, Carrefour has been successful in Dubai along several indicators, but it could find significant growth in the market by focusing on the countless expatriates that come in and out of the country. Carrefour could strengthen its specialty food sections to attract various demographics, in terms of a better selection. In so doing, it can better target Dubai’s expatriate population that prefers to eat its own cultural food, and increase the frequency at which these huge segments visit its stores.

Carrefour’s pricing strategy is also helpful in targeting this group because most expatriates work in Dubai to remit money home to their families. So Carrefour could become a great place to save money while not compromising quality. It could even develop to be a great place to buy gifts to send home. This effort could be supported by a Word of Mouth promotional strategy, harnessing existing customers to tell their friends about the deals and quality at Carrefour.

Given that Dubai’s expats mostly come from Asia where there are high-context cultures, Word of Mouth could be effective in targeting those expats who strongly value friends’ and family’s suggestions over media and corporate opinion. Further marketing techniques adhering to Dubai’s cultural imperatives could include discount coupons, a customer loyalty card, and a home delivery service to the expatriate segment. Home delivery service may be a viable option for Carrefour because it fits into the cultural context of Dubai. The service could take advantage of the lack of public transportation in Dubai, thus helping it to better reach a broader customer base. Ultimately by targeting the expatriate population, Carrefour could potentially continue to grow and hit the population of Dubai that is not included in the 689,000 citizens (est. 1995).

노트:

This article does not necessarily reflect the typical report composition of an SIS International report, and is for information purposes only. The article does not contain advice for decision-making. No permission granted for reproduction.  SIS International.  Copyright (C) 2009.