Sumário executivo
Em 1995, o Carrefour expandiu seu conceito de hipermercado europeu, que havia sido pioneiro há décadas, em Dubai, nos Emirados Árabes Unidos. Seguindo uma estratégia cautelosa de expansão país por país nos mercados emergentes, o Carrefour viu potencial no emirado de Dubai. O emirado tinha uma indústria retalhista próspera e exibia fundamentos sólidos na sua economia próspera. O objectivo do Carrefour era encontrar um modo de entrada que lhe permitisse reduzir o risco de falência e manter a rentabilidade, ao mesmo tempo que compensava o seu rival global de longa data, Wal-Mart.
Dubai apresentou muitas vantagens para as empresas que consideravam a entrada no mercado de Dubai em 1995. Apesar de uma população pequena em relação a outros mercados que atendia, Dubai oferecia uma composição incomum de expatriados e residentes locais em uma economia com um dos mais altos padrões de vida e renda do mundo. mundo. O mercado era extremamente favorável aos negócios, com muitas vantagens, como zero impostos corporativos em conjunto com muito poucas barreiras ao comércio. Tinha redes de transporte superiores, um sistema jurídico bem definido, condições de retalho positivas, forte crescimento económico, baixos riscos políticos e de transferência.
O Carrefour revisou as leis e determinou que uma joint venture seria melhor para minimizar o risco de fracasso e ao mesmo tempo ter um parceiro qualificado para buscar agressivamente o crescimento e gerenciar as operações. Associou-se numa joint venture com Majid Al Futtaim, um conglomerado pan-regional com experiência em varejo no Oriente Médio. A joint venture adaptou-se ao mercado mudando a localização das suas lojas para o centro comercial, adaptou a sua alimentação às normas socioculturais, promoveu principalmente produtos não alimentares devido às margens de lucro mais elevadas e foi muito cuidadosa nos descontos entre preços de dois dígitos. inflação.
The venture was successful for Carrefour, given that it increased the number of stores opened in Dubai and expanded to nearby countries. Ultimately, Carrefour was successful because it developed a First Mover Advantage, it thoroughly adapted to the extent that it did not feel foreign to many consumers, and because of Majid Al Futtaim’s aggressiveness in identifying and pursuing growth opportunities. Carrefour faces two key problems including Customer inconvenience and Dubai’s long-term macroeconomic challenges. To address these challenges, Carrefour should seek to build new advantages through market positioning, strengthen its First Mover Advantage to limit competitive pressures, and build up specialty foods sections to better target expatriates.
Visão Geral da Empresa
The French Fournier and Defforey families founded Carrefour in 1959 as a supermarket retailer. It was not until four years later in 1963 that the group opened its first hypermarket, which eventually led Carrefour to its success. In 1969 the company decided to expand internationally and opened its first hypermarket in Belgium In 1977, “Produits Libres” or unbranded products were introduced as a substitute to popular brands and were dubbed just as good. This pioneering idea led the company to create its own brand in 1985, which led the way for supermarket and hypermarkets worldwide. The idea was to help create even lower prices at the markets. Extremely low prices were one of the guiding strategies the company used to compete and buy out other chains.
A chave do sucesso do Carrefour é o hipermercado, a loja completa que vende de tudo, desde bananas até carrinhos de bebê, a preços promocionais. Foi a ideia original da empresa e agora se expandiu em todo o mundo, seus jogadores estão entre os maiores gigantes empresariais que a história já conheceu. Como parte das suas Vantagens Específicas da Empresa, é líder global em hipermercados, tendo sido pioneira no conceito, conferindo-lhe vantagens significativas entre os seus concorrentes na operação do conceito. Em segundo lugar, desenvolveu o seu portfólio de produtos de marca própria que permite ao Carrefour oferecer preços mais baixos.
Terceiro, tem uma marca muito forte de qualidade e valor nos mercados e, como resultado, ganhou reconhecimento global, evidente pelo seu estatuto de número dois como líder mundial no segmento de hipermercados. Além disso, o Carrefour desenvolveu vantagens significativas de ser o pioneiro por ter sido o primeiro a entrar em muitos mercados emergentes.
Algumas desvantagens específicas da empresa incluem as várias falhas de entrada do Carrefour em outros mercados e as conotações negativas associadas à convicção da empresa de propaganda enganosa e acusação de minar o capitalismo. Além disso, como pioneiro, o Carrefour enfrenta o aumento dos custos associados ao desenvolvimento de infra-estruturas e à publicidade extensiva. Finalmente, o Carrefour deve adaptar bastante o seu produto porque o alimento é um produto multidoméstico e os consumidores locais têm preferências e requisitos funcionais diversos.
As a French company, Carrefour has several Country Specific Advantages (CSAs). First, French companies were considered to have high-quality goods and specialty items. In particular, French goods had a reputation for being luxurious, unique, and beautiful. Second, countries like the United Arab Emirates and cities like Dubai considered France an ally, given the strong political relationships between the countries. Eventually, France decided to locate a French permanent military base in the UAE in 2008 due to the strong relations. However, France also developed Country Specific Disadvantages. One of these perceptions was that the French were considered uptight and that the French considered their ways of doing things superior. Compared to English, the French language was not widely spoken worldwide and thus a language barrier existed. Last, although goods were luxurious, a disadvantage was that French goods were deemed too fancy for everyday life.
Em 1993, as receitas globais do Carrefour foram de $21,82 mil milhões e o Carrefour procurava vorazmente o crescimento nos Mercados Emergentes. Nessa época, nenhum dos concorrentes do Carrefour, como Wal-Mart, Tesco, Auchuan, Casino e E. Leclrc, expandiu-se para os Emirados Árabes Unidos. Embora a rival Geant possa ter considerado o mercado dada a sua estratégia de expansão para mercados emergentes, o Carrefour teria sido o primeiro grande retalhista estrangeiro a operar no mercado do Dubai, o que lhe daria uma vantagem de ser o pioneiro.
Currently, Carrefour is the second largest hypermarket chain worldwide behind Wal-Mart and the largest in Europe, with 2006 sales of $102,774,800 and 16.5% growth. It operates about 15,000 stores of many different sizes and categories including hypermarkets, supermarkets, convenience stores, discount stores, and cash-and-carry stores. Today Carrefour hypermarkets “offer an average surface area of 8,400 sq.m filled with a range of between 20,000 and 80,000 food and non-food items.”
Carrefour’s major competitor is Wal-Mart who seemed to have similar success and failure abroad. Wal-Mart succeeded in Japan, through joint ventures and an emphasis on local culture. It did, however, fail in Germany where the concept of a huge American discount store did not culturally resonate. Carrefour’s major French competitors are Auchan, Casino Guichard and E.Leclerc who all fall far behind the company in sales and size, by provide constant price competition to Carrefour.
Inscrições Estrangeiras Anteriores: Lições Aprendidas
O Carrefour tem uma tradição de buscar fortemente o crescimento, especialmente nos mercados emergentes, onde o crescimento é maior do que nos mercados desenvolvidos. A empresa segue uma Estratégia de Crescimento em Cascata porque escolhe cuidadosamente a expansão depois de se sentir confortável com o sucesso no mercado-alvo. No entanto, apesar desta cautela, a empresa teve de se retirar de mercados onde não atingiu os seus objectivos de crescimento.”
Primeiro, na década de 1980, o Carrefour fracassou nos Estados Unidos com apenas dois hipermercados. Sua entrada no mercado da Filadélfia foi difícil, com o antagonismo sindical protestando contra a loja de 335.000 pés quadrados e piquetes visíveis que incomodavam os clientes existentes. Depois dessa difícil experiência, abriu em 1992 uma loja em Nova Jersey bem menor e que lembrava um armazém com produtos que pareciam vir de um supermercado.
But Carrefour conducted little advertising to bring more customers into its huge stores. Also, Wal-Mart opened a store nearby, and Carrefour finally pulled out of the US. Ultimately, Carrefour lost $80 million on its failed US expansion. Second, Carrefour failed in Japan because of Carrefour’s inability to answer the needs of Japanese consumers, highlighting the importance of pre-entry research.
In addition, the company tried to enter alone rather than working with a local partner in a joint venture. Consequently, Carrefour sold its stores to the AEON group, a Japanese retailing chain, to operate its stores under the Carrefour brand name. In addition, Carrefour withdrew from Hong Kong in 2000 due to the difficulty in transferring the concept due to the lack of retail space, and Korea in 2006, largely due to intense competitive practices and poor performance.
Da mesma forma, o Carrefour normalmente utiliza tanto propriedade direta como joint ventures, dependendo do mercado. Especificamente, os mercados considerados difíceis pelo Carrefour tendem a ser joint ventures.
Análise do país de origem: Dubai como mercado para o Carrefour em 1995
Carrefour began the market entry process by examining the barriers to entry into Dubai and government regulations that might affect the introduction of the Carrefour brand into the market. The company had read how over only a few decades, the Emirate of Dubai had rapidly moved from an oil-producing economy into an economic marvel with towering skyscrapers, abundant wealth, and booming free markets in the middle of the desert.
Sheikh Rashid led Dubai’s economy through a period of explosive economic growth from the 1970s to the 1990s with a vision to diversify away from oil production towards a modern city in the Arabian Gulf. The Sheikh’s son, Sheikh Maktoum Bin Rashid Al Maktoum became ruler in 1990, and pursued free trade, technology, transportation, and tourism, dramatically turning Dubai into a global economic powerhouse.
Fueling Dubai’s success was its increasingly diversified economy outside of oil, strategic location between continents, burgeoning re-exports market to emerging markets, robust infrastructure, high quality of life, competitive cost structure, stable political situation, exceptionally business-friendly climate, defined legal structure, lack of preexisting legacy system, and highly optimistic economic outlook. This prosperity sparked a common expectation and saying in Dubai, “If you build it, they will come.”
On top of these economic figures, Carrefour saw positive retail conditions. The discounting concept had the potential to become successful due to high inflation. Also from 1987 to 2002, Dubai boosted its total retail floor space from 23,000m2 to 365,000m2, making it a major global contender in retail growth opportunities. Retail competition consisted of a handful of privately owned supermarket chains that imported goods and public member-owned cooperatives that were not legally permitted to import.
O Carrefour percebeu muitos outros benefícios na entrada no mercado. Embora a população de Dubai fosse de apenas 689.000 pessoas, a população crescia em 12,5% em 1995, de acordo com estatísticas do governo. Além disso, Dubai esperava um afluxo de expatriados e turistas para impulsionar as vendas. Além disso, a economia do Dubai era muito favorável aos negócios por três razões principais. Primeiro, Dubai desenvolveu sistemas simplificados para estabelecer rapidamente uma empresa. Em segundo lugar, os direitos aduaneiros sobre as importações eram baixos ou inexistentes para muitos produtos. Em terceiro lugar, foi um dos poucos países que não ofereceu impostos sobre os lucros empresariais e individuais (excluindo o sector petrolífero e o sector financeiro) ou sobre os lucros pessoais.
Os riscos políticos e de transferência do Dubai eram baixos. Dubai permitiu 100% a propriedade da empresa a investidores estrangeiros, 100% a repatriação de lucros e capital de volta ao país de origem. Em segundo lugar, o governo não exigiu que os investidores estrangeiros realizassem um investimento mínimo de capital. Em terceiro lugar, o Dubai tinha um sistema jurídico forte e rápido. Tinha proteções de propriedade intelectual, com proteções legais e Departamento de Marcas, Departamento de Propriedade Industrial e Departamento de Direitos Autorais. Dubai tinha um sistema judicial semelhante ao dos países ocidentais, com três níveis de tribunais seculares. Além disso, as leis sobre empresas estrangeiras foram modeladas de acordo com os modelos ocidentais.
Many laws were established to protect consumers, prevent fraudulent trading, and ensure fair trading among companies. Despite this, Emirati law favored local Emiratis and gave benefits to local companies over foreign ones. For example, Article 3 of Emirati Law did not afford the same rights of UAE nationals to foreign corporations: “Each company incorporated in the State shall hold its nationality but it shall not necessarily be entitled to privileges reserved only to U.A.E nationals.” Nonetheless, Emirati law had very low political risks. Lastly, there were very low transfer risks. Foreign investors enjoyed the fact that the UAE’s currency, the Dirham, was pegged to the dollar. This peg meant that investors would have confidence in not losing the value of their revenues in currency fluctuations against other major currencies. Lastly, Dubai had one of the lowest crime rates for a city in the world, which was optimal for retail companies selling expensive merchandise.
Dubai possessed superior transportation networks starting in the 1960s. Given its strategic location between continents, it eventually became a transshipment point between Australia and Europe; and between Asia and Africa. This infrastructure provided many benefits for a retail commercial hypermarket firm. Furthermore, major infrastructure projects were planned in the future, optimizing the logistics in Dubai. In the future, Carrefour could expect major logistics projects to be built. One of these was the world’s largest free trade logistics zone, Dubai Logistics City. Another project was the rapidly growing number of passengers and renovations to the Dubai International Airport, a major airport aiming to become the region’s main hub and service several dozen million passengers and tons of cargo. This infrastructure was important to Carrefour, which planned to important its inventory. Thus, Dubai’s outlook for global retailers like Carrefour seemed to provide ample opportunities.
Estratégia de entrada no mercado no mercado de Dubai
Carrefour evaluated Dubai’s laws and market conditions, and determined that a joint venture would be best for market entry. Factoring in this decision were the favorable laws towards Joint Ventures. First, there was less risk in a joint venture. This was important as Carrefour had suffered an $80 million loss in the US market. Second, the UAE’s Federal Commercial Agencies Law protected foreign companies in a joint venture from contract termination and exclusive presence in the region. To qualify as a Joint Venture, companies would have to be partnered with UAE nationals or commercial entities owned solely by UAE nationals. Carrefour would also have to rent and not own the property in its operations. This condition was not a drawback to Carrefour, which saw benefits in joint venturing with the sponsor embracing the liability of ownership. Furthermore, operating as a Joint Venture with a local sponsor would likely make it easier for Carrefour to obtain Food Health Certificates to import food, given that it was a foreign retailer attempting to sell food in a culture with important religious and cultural restrictions. Part of the Health Certificates was the Halal slaughter certificate allowing the sale of meat that has been slaughtered by a Muslim man according to Islamic rites. With the Joint Venture, Carrefour would enjoy the same low or no trade barriers on most of its inventory, excluding cigarettes and other luxury goods.
Yet, Carrefour saw some major barriers to entry include the difficulty in finding a local partner who was willing to accept the burden of navigating complex local import statutes and pre-operational regulations such as product licensing, ensuring that the local municipal lab has access to product samples to test that the products being sold meet their health and cultural standards. Another barrier to entry was the costs of operating associated with the size of the locations used. For example, choosing to open large hypermarkets rather than smaller supermarkets, Carrefour would have to endure high costs of renting stock shelving as well as listing fees. Another barrier to entry was a regulation passed by the Gulf Cooperation Council, which the UAE was a part of, which stated that all food products imported into the UAE must have half or more of its shelf life remaining at the time of entrance or clearance will not be issued. Some minor factors influencing entry into Dubai included the fact that weekends in Dubai did not correspond with traditional western weekends. Fridays and Saturdays constituted the weekend in the UAE and this would require adaptation to local customs to conduct daily business.
Carrefour evaluated Dubai’s market benefits and risks as well as the modes of entry and decided in 1995 to partner with Majid Al Futtaim (MAF), a major pan-regional company owning and operating mall properties. The first benefit was that MAF owned the high-traffic malls and properties that would be perfect for Carrefour’s location. Also, this could prevent other large hypermarket chains from entering the same malls, limiting direct competition. Secondly, MAF had operations throughout the entire Middle East, and this could potentially allow Carrefour to expand to other countries in the Middle East under the same partnership. Thirdly, Carrefour preferred Dubai as a first market because it is the most populated emirate in the UAE, Lastly, MAF had experience in venturing with foreign retailers and could handle Carrefour’s operations. By positioning itself correctly in Dubai, Carrefour could then use the waterfall approach to enter the remaining six emirates and capitalize on the rising growth of standard of living in the UAE.
Estratégia de marketing
Lugar
Carrefour/Majid al Futtaim’s strategy was to adapt to the cultural importance of shopping malls and create a “city within a city” by being located inside a mall with entertainment centers, cinemas, food courts, and other convenience amenities. Hence, Carrefour decided to place its stores in big malls in Deira City Centre Mall, Mall of the Emirates, Al Mamzar Century Mall, and Bur Dubai – Al Shindagha. Indeed, this adaptation differed from Carrefour’s standard location of a freestanding warehouse-like building.
The rationale behind adapting the traditional hypermarket was due to the fact that Dubai has a very strong mall culture, owing largely to Dubai’s cultural dynamics and harsh climate. First, the climate in Dubai is often so harsh that going to the mall is one of the few options to keep cool and entertained. Second, daily the mall provides an exciting experience beyond the shopping. In Arab society, socializing with family is paramount, and malls provide culturally appropriate entertainment for long periods of time. During the workday, Arab housewives will often go to malls with their friends to socialize, and bring their young children to play with each other at entertainment centers located on upper floors, while men are at work.
The elements Masculinity and Collectivism of Hofstede’s Model are evident in Emirati culture. Men will often go with their friends to watch movies in cinemas located in the upper levels of the mall, and drink coffee with friends at cafes into the late hours of the night. During the Friday and Saturday weekend, large Arab families pour into malls and spend many hours there shopping, taking their kids to arcades, eating at restaurants, staying at mall hotels, walking, and reclining. Despite spending long periods of time in the malls, many consumers only expect to window-shop and leave without buying merchandise. Third, Dubai’s society has adapted to the convenience of being able to get high-quality consumer goods in one mall. Fourth, Dubai’s society is very young and enamored by the popular brands, found in malls. For many of these reasons, retailers must often accept malls as the place to locate their stores.
Os outros benefícios de estar localizado em shopping centers eram que o Carrefour poderia esperar um volume ainda maior de clientes chegando às lojas do Carrefour. Além disso, havia um espaço de varejo grande o suficiente nos shoppings de Dubai para o Carrefour operar. Além disso, o Carrefour manteve seu tradicional grande porte, visto que Majid Al Futtaim era dono de dois dos shoppings em questão. Como resultado, a loja Deira City Centre do Carrefour tornou-se a maior loja de Dubai. No entanto, por estar localizado em áreas centrais de Dubai, o Carrefour competia com pequenas lojas tradicionais de varejo localizadas mais próximas do consumidor. A importância da localização em Dubai não poderia ser subestimada, dados os problemas de trânsito de Dubai.
produtos
Dubai was a very international and diverse Emirate, particularly due to the large number of foreign workers. As such, Carrefour adapted by accepting foreign credit cards, the currencies of all GCC countries, and international currencies like the Euro and US dollar. While Carrefour implemented bilingual signage in the stores, language and cultural barriers were not likely problems given that English was so widely spoken and consumers had experience with Western products.
Primeiro, o Carrefour teve que adaptar suas mercadorias à cultura. Por exemplo, certas nuances alimentares tinham que ser apreciadas, como a venda de alimentos halal sem carne de porco. Em segundo lugar, o Carrefour teve de se adaptar à sazonalidade do ciclo económico do Dubai, uma vez que era habitual na cultura do Dubai que as pessoas tirassem as férias de verão para fugir para destinos mais frescos. Terceiro, o Carrefour teve de se adaptar aos feriados culturais islâmicos como o Ramadão e o Eid, o que aumentaria o seu pico de vendas. Durante estas férias, o Carrefour teve de dar conta do aumento da procura e planear a sua oferta em conformidade para não desiludir os clientes. Quarto, o horário de funcionamento em Dubai teve que acomodar a semana de trabalho de Dubai de domingo a quinta-feira e o fim de semana de sexta a sábado.
Promoção
Carrefour did not adapt its promotional effort, which consisted of discounting certain items. Majid Al Futtaim handled local promotions and coordinated some of these regionally with its stores throughout the Middle East. Promotions were placed in print media and in-store, to attract mall-walking traffic. Because Dubai was a society emphasizing the importance of social relationships, Carrefour could reasonably expect that consumers might discuss some of the deals.
A promoção foi importante em Dubai devido ao alto custo de vida e à alta inflação. A demografia de Dubai era altamente distorcida. Na época da entrada do Carrefour, apenas 17% da população consistia de “árabes locais” em 1998, enquanto 85% eram “asiáticos expatriados” e 3% eram ocidentais. O segmento de expatriados asiáticos tinha o rendimento disponível mais baixo, mas era um segmento grande e estava amplamente aberto à compra de produtos electrónicos e produtos ocidentais. Devido à importância da inflação e desta demografia, o segmento-alvo do Carrefour envolvia principalmente expatriados.
Preço
A posição de preços do Carrefour era de descontos e utilizava os preços como parte de seu esforço promocional. Devido à sua marca forte, o Carrefour não precisou se preocupar com a diluição da marca devido aos seus produtos com descontos. No entanto
er, o desconto era problemático em Dubai, onde a inflação era altíssima e quando as flutuações na inflação podiam corroer os lucros. Outra preocupação em matéria de preços era que o mercado retalhista alimentar era mais competitivo e, portanto, as margens de lucro eram reduzidas. O Carrefour poderia vender produtos não alimentares, bens domésticos e produtos de higiene pessoal com margens mais elevadas.
Desempenho
Carrefour / Majid Al Futtaim does not report its Dubai-generated revenues or other countries’ specific sales. We did a thorough literature search and even contacted Carrefour’s Investor Relations. Yet in both cases, the information was unavailable. There are two reasons for this. First, Carrefour MAF was a private joint venture and was not obligated to show its sales figures. Secondly, in the region, there is a tendency to underreport information and lack transparency due to suspicion of what other entities might use such data for, according to Seraphina Anderson Executive Director of Feedback Market Research in Dubai/Sharjah. This venture likely prefers to keep their sales figures and data private to prevent competitors from taking such information and using it to their advantage.
Regionalmente, no entanto, o Carrefour MAF publicou números globais de vendas em 2005 em $1 mil milhões das suas 13 lojas em 2005, cerca de 1% de vendas globais. Outros indicadores mostram que a Joint Venture foi bem sucedida. Em 2007, as vendas do Carrefour aumentaram para $2,5 mil milhões a nível regional, devido ao crescimento regional agressivo. Em 2008, a joint venture anunciou planos de entrar no Irão para um maior crescimento.
Avaliação crítica
Escolher Majid Al Futtaim (MAF) foi uma boa ideia para o Carrefour. Tinha apetite por expansão e crescimento e entrou agressivamente em outros mercados do Médio Oriente. A escolha também impediu a concorrência direta nos mesmos shoppings do MAF. Além disso, a adaptação da joint venture ao mercado local garantiu o seu sucesso, visto que hoje muitos habitantes de Dubai consideram a loja como não-estrangeira e como parte da vida. No entanto, o Carrefour MAF não fez o suficiente para garantir estacionamento suficiente, táxis suficientes e um bom fluxo de tráfego nos seus centros comerciais, especialmente nos fins de semana e feriados. Isso torna o empreendimento mais vulnerável a lojas de nichos menores e localizadas mais próximas do consumidor.
O mercado de Dubai enfrenta desafios consideráveis. Em primeiro lugar, a concorrência está a aumentar, especialmente no segmento alimentar, o que reduz efectivamente as margens de lucro. Embora a Wal-Mart e a Costco não estejam a considerar o Médio Oriente, outros hipermercados europeus estão a entrar estrategicamente no mercado do Médio Oriente. Em 2006, a Union Coop abriu um hipermercado de 180.000 pés quadrados em Dubai. A Geant, uma cadeia europeia de hipermercados, também entrou no Dubai em 2003. Além disso, as lojas próximas estão a roubar clientes como os asiáticos expatriados, que preferem não ir muito longe para fazer compras.
The second challenge is chronic inflation. Due to rapid growth, high liquidity, high demand, low supply, and a currency peg to the recently declining US dollar, national inflation rates stood at around 13% in 2008, though economists expect actual consumer price inflation in Dubai to be at 20% per year. This inflation erodes revenues and rapidly raises the costs of inventory and staffing. Thirdly, the decline of the dollar versus other currencies can lower the value of revenues when repatriated to foreign countries.
Fourthly, the UAE government has recently implemented more difficult visa regulations. This makes it more difficult to attract skilled Asians and Westerners to help drive the economy’s growth. Lastly, the region faces political risks from Iran, Iraq, and from terrorism. Additionally, Dubai is more dependent on foreign investment and tourism than the other Emirates.
Dubai was expected to be more vulnerable to global economic downturns than Abu Dhabi and other emirates. Due to the global credit crunch, the UAE’s non-oil GDP growth was expected to slow from 8.8% in 2008 to 7.1% in 2009. Foremost to retailers is the expected implementation in early 2009 of a VAT (Value Added Tax) tax regimen of around 5%. It was anticipated that this tax system will drive inflation even higher than its current high level.
O Carrefour tem uma grande dificuldade com seu modelo: a facilidade de fazer compras em suas lojas. Como as compras são feitas em shoppings, muitas vezes é difícil fazer compras no Carrefour, principalmente nos finais de semana e feriados, quando os shoppings ficam lotados. Dubai tem uma cultura de direção muito forte, o que dificulta quando há espaço limitado e poucos táxis. Consequentemente, a fila para um táxi pode se estender por centenas de metros, como no shopping Deira Center, e o estacionamento pode ficar lotado. O Carrefour precisa resolver esse problema para garantir que esse inconveniente não impeça os compradores de irem às suas lojas.
Possíveis cursos de ação
To best compete in the Dubai market, Carrefour MAF could follow several potential courses of action. Each focuses on improving Carrefour’s competitive advantages, market positioning, and driving sales. First, Carrefour may need to ensure that customers are not leaving its stores due to more convenient specialty stores located closer to customers.
Para isso, seria necessário resolver os inconvenientes que acompanham a experiência de compra do Carrefour, especialmente relacionados com os inconvenientes de trânsito e transporte do Dubai. Entre estas estão garantir que haja estacionamento e táxis suficientes, bem como um fluxo de tráfego eficaz, especialmente durante fins de semana e feriados. Poderia fazê-lo fazendo lobby junto ao governo para a situação dos táxis e do trânsito, e Majid Al Futtaim para questões de estacionamento, porque administra as propriedades.
Secondly, Carrefour could seek new advantages to solidify its position. Among these include positioning Carrefour as the place to go during economic turmoil. The rationale is that by attaching this perception to Carrefour’s brand, it ensures that customers associate Carrefour with savings and with rough economic times. In so doing, it can improve its performance in economic downturns. Also, Carrefour could reinforce its First Mover Advantage as the authentic hypermarket. In Eastern countries, the most loved brands are those that are considered authentic. As such, by reinforcing this perception, Carrefour could potentially limit the effectiveness of direct European hypermarket competitors in Dubai like Geant and Union Coop.
Thirdly, Carrefour has been successful in Dubai along several indicators, but it could find significant growth in the market by focusing on the countless expatriates that come in and out of the country. Carrefour could strengthen its specialty food sections to attract various demographics, in terms of a better selection. In so doing, it can better target Dubai’s expatriate population that prefers to eat its own cultural food, and increase the frequency at which these huge segments visit its stores.
Carrefour’s pricing strategy is also helpful in targeting this group because most expatriates work in Dubai to remit money home to their families. So Carrefour could become a great place to save money while not compromising quality. It could even develop to be a great place to buy gifts to send home. This effort could be supported by a Word of Mouth promotional strategy, harnessing existing customers to tell their friends about the deals and quality at Carrefour.
Given that Dubai’s expats mostly come from Asia where there are high-context cultures, Word of Mouth could be effective in targeting those expats who strongly value friends’ and family’s suggestions over media and corporate opinion. Further marketing techniques adhering to Dubai’s cultural imperatives could include discount coupons, a customer loyalty card, and a home delivery service to the expatriate segment. Home delivery service may be a viable option for Carrefour because it fits into the cultural context of Dubai. The service could take advantage of the lack of public transportation in Dubai, thus helping it to better reach a broader customer base. Ultimately by targeting the expatriate population, Carrefour could potentially continue to grow and hit the population of Dubai that is not included in the 689,000 citizens (est. 1995).
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