Sintesi
Nel 1995, Carrefour ha ampliato a Dubai, negli Emirati Arabi Uniti, il suo concetto di ipermercato europeo, originariamente lanciato decenni fa. Seguendo una cauta strategia di espansione paese per paese nei mercati emergenti, Carrefour ha visto del potenziale nell'emirato di Dubai. L'emirato aveva un fiorente settore della vendita al dettaglio e mostrava solidi fondamentali nella sua fiorente economia. L'obiettivo di Carrefour era trovare una modalità di ingresso che gli permettesse di ridurre il rischio di fallimento e di mantenere la redditività, compensando al contempo il suo rivale globale di lunga data Wal-Mart.
Dubai presentava molti vantaggi per le aziende che consideravano l’ingresso nel mercato di Dubai nel 1995. Nonostante una piccola popolazione rispetto ad altri mercati serviti, Dubai offriva una composizione insolita di espatriati e residenti locali in un’economia con uno degli standard di vita e di reddito più alti al mondo. mondo. Il mercato era estremamente favorevole alle imprese, con molti vantaggi come l’assenza di tasse sulle società insieme a pochissime barriere al commercio. Aveva reti di trasporto superiori, un sistema legale ben definito, condizioni di vendita al dettaglio positive, una forte crescita economica, bassi rischi politici e di trasferimento.
Carrefour ha esaminato le leggi e ha stabilito che una joint venture sarebbe stata la soluzione migliore per ridurre al minimo il rischio di fallimento pur avendo un partner qualificato per cercare aggressivamente la crescita e gestire le operazioni. Ha collaborato in una joint venture con Majid Al Futtaim, un conglomerato panregionale con esperienza di vendita al dettaglio in Medio Oriente. La joint venture si è adattata al mercato cambiando la sede dei suoi negozi in un centro commerciale, ha adattato il suo cibo alle norme socio-culturali, ha promosso principalmente articoli non alimentari a causa dei margini di profitto più elevati ed è stata molto attenta negli sconti in situazioni a due cifre. inflazione.
The venture was successful for Carrefour, given that it increased the number of stores opened in Dubai and expanded to nearby countries. Ultimately, Carrefour was successful because it developed a First Mover Advantage, it thoroughly adapted to the extent that it did not feel foreign to many consumers, and because of Majid Al Futtaim’s aggressiveness in identifying and pursuing growth opportunities. Carrefour faces two key problems including Customer inconvenience and Dubai’s long-term macroeconomic challenges. To address these challenges, Carrefour should seek to build new advantages through market positioning, strengthen its First Mover Advantage to limit competitive pressures, and build up specialty foods sections to better target expatriates.
Descrizione della società
The French Fournier and Defforey families founded Carrefour in 1959 as a supermarket retailer. It was not until four years later in 1963 that the group opened its first hypermarket, which eventually led Carrefour to its success. In 1969 the company decided to expand internationally and opened its first hypermarket in Belgium In 1977, “Produits Libres” or unbranded products were introduced as a substitute to popular brands and were dubbed just as good. This pioneering idea led the company to create its own brand in 1985, which led the way for supermarket and hypermarkets worldwide. The idea was to help create even lower prices at the markets. Extremely low prices were one of the guiding strategies the company used to compete and buy out other chains.
La chiave del successo di Carrefour è l'ipermercato, il negozio tutto in uno che vende di tutto, dalle banane ai passeggini a prezzi scontati. Era l'idea originale dell'azienda e ora si è espansa in tutto il mondo, con protagonisti tra i più grandi colossi aziendali che la storia abbia conosciuto. Nell'ambito dei suoi vantaggi specifici aziendali, è il leader globale negli ipermercati avendo aperto la strada al concetto, conferendogli vantaggi significativi rispetto ai suoi concorrenti nella gestione del concetto. In secondo luogo, ha sviluppato il proprio portafoglio di prodotti a marchio del distributore che consente a Carrefour di offrire prezzi più bassi.
In terzo luogo, ha un marchio molto forte per qualità e valore sui mercati e, di conseguenza, ha ottenuto un riconoscimento globale, evidente dal suo status di numero due come leader mondiale nel segmento degli ipermercati. Inoltre, Carrefour aveva sviluppato significativi vantaggi di First Mover essendo stata la prima ad entrare in molti mercati emergenti.
Alcuni svantaggi specifici dell'azienda includono i vari fallimenti di ingresso di Carrefour in altri mercati e le connotazioni negative associate alla convinzione dell'azienda di pubblicità ingannevole e all'accusa di indebolire il capitalismo. Inoltre, in qualità di First Mover, Carrefour deve affrontare l'aumento dei costi associati allo sviluppo delle infrastrutture e all'ampia pubblicità. Infine, Carrefour deve adattare notevolmente il suo prodotto perché il cibo è un prodotto multidomestico e i consumatori locali hanno preferenze ed esigenze funzionali diverse.
As a French company, Carrefour has several Country Specific Advantages (CSAs). First, French companies were considered to have high-quality goods and specialty items. In particular, French goods had a reputation for being luxurious, unique, and beautiful. Second, countries like the United Arab Emirates and cities like Dubai considered France an ally, given the strong political relationships between the countries. Eventually, France decided to locate a French permanent military base in the UAE in 2008 due to the strong relations. However, France also developed Country Specific Disadvantages. One of these perceptions was that the French were considered uptight and that the French considered their ways of doing things superior. Compared to English, the French language was not widely spoken worldwide and thus a language barrier existed. Last, although goods were luxurious, a disadvantage was that French goods were deemed too fancy for everyday life.
Nel 1993, i ricavi globali di Carrefour ammontavano a $21,82 miliardi e Carrefour cercava voracemente la crescita nei mercati emergenti. In questo periodo, nessuno dei concorrenti di Carrefour come Wal-Mart, Tesco, Auchuan, Casino ed E. Leclrc si espanse negli Emirati Arabi Uniti. Mentre la rivale Geant avrebbe potuto prendere in considerazione il mercato data la sua strategia di espansione nei mercati emergenti, Carrefour sarebbe stato il primo grande rivenditore straniero ad operare nel mercato di Dubai, il che gli avrebbe dato un vantaggio di First Mover.
Currently, Carrefour is the second largest hypermarket chain worldwide behind Wal-Mart and the largest in Europe, with 2006 sales of $102,774,800 and 16.5% growth. It operates about 15,000 stores of many different sizes and categories including hypermarkets, supermarkets, convenience stores, discount stores, and cash-and-carry stores. Today Carrefour hypermarkets “offer an average surface area of 8,400 sq.m filled with a range of between 20,000 and 80,000 food and non-food items.”
Carrefour’s major competitor is Wal-Mart who seemed to have similar success and failure abroad. Wal-Mart succeeded in Japan, through joint ventures and an emphasis on local culture. It did, however, fail in Germany where the concept of a huge American discount store did not culturally resonate. Carrefour’s major French competitors are Auchan, Casino Guichard and E.Leclerc who all fall far behind the company in sales and size, by provide constant price competition to Carrefour.
Voci straniere precedenti: lezioni apprese
Carrefour ha una tradizione di forte ricerca della crescita, in particolare nei mercati emergenti dove la crescita è maggiore rispetto ai mercati sviluppati. L'azienda persegue una strategia di crescita a cascata perché sceglie attentamente di espandersi dopo essersi sentita a proprio agio riguardo al successo nel mercato di riferimento. Eppure, nonostante questa cautela, l’azienda ha dovuto ritirarsi dai mercati in cui non ha raggiunto i suoi obiettivi di crescita”.
In primo luogo, negli anni ’80 Carrefour fallì negli Stati Uniti con solo due ipermercati. Il suo ingresso nel mercato a Filadelfia è stato duro, con antagonismo sindacale che protestava contro il negozio di 335.000 piedi quadrati e picchetti visibili che infastidivano i clienti esistenti. Dopo questa difficile esperienza, nel 1992 aprì un negozio nel New Jersey, molto più piccolo e che somigliava a un magazzino con prodotti che sembravano provenire da un supermercato.
But Carrefour conducted little advertising to bring more customers into its huge stores. Also, Wal-Mart opened a store nearby, and Carrefour finally pulled out of the US. Ultimately, Carrefour lost $80 million on its failed US expansion. Second, Carrefour failed in Japan because of Carrefour’s inability to answer the needs of Japanese consumers, highlighting the importance of pre-entry research.
In addition, the company tried to enter alone rather than working with a local partner in a joint venture. Consequently, Carrefour sold its stores to the AEON group, a Japanese retailing chain, to operate its stores under the Carrefour brand name. In addition, Carrefour withdrew from Hong Kong in 2000 due to the difficulty in transferring the concept due to the lack of retail space, and Korea in 2006, largely due to intense competitive practices and poor performance.
Allo stesso modo, Carrefour utilizza tipicamente sia la proprietà diretta che le joint venture, a seconda del mercato. Nello specifico, i mercati considerati difficili da Carrefour tendono ad essere joint venture.
Analisi del paese d'origine: Dubai come mercato per Carrefour nel 1995
Carrefour began the market entry process by examining the barriers to entry into Dubai and government regulations that might affect the introduction of the Carrefour brand into the market. The company had read how over only a few decades, the Emirate of Dubai had rapidly moved from an oil-producing economy into an economic marvel with towering skyscrapers, abundant wealth, and booming free markets in the middle of the desert.
Sheikh Rashid led Dubai’s economy through a period of explosive economic growth from the 1970s to the 1990s with a vision to diversify away from oil production towards a modern city in the Arabian Gulf. The Sheikh’s son, Sheikh Maktoum Bin Rashid Al Maktoum became ruler in 1990, and pursued free trade, technology, transportation, and tourism, dramatically turning Dubai into a global economic powerhouse.
Fueling Dubai’s success was its increasingly diversified economy outside of oil, strategic location between continents, burgeoning re-exports market to emerging markets, robust infrastructure, high quality of life, competitive cost structure, stable political situation, exceptionally business-friendly climate, defined legal structure, lack of preexisting legacy system, and highly optimistic economic outlook. This prosperity sparked a common expectation and saying in Dubai, “If you build it, they will come.”
On top of these economic figures, Carrefour saw positive retail conditions. The discounting concept had the potential to become successful due to high inflation. Also from 1987 to 2002, Dubai boosted its total retail floor space from 23,000m2 to 365,000m2, making it a major global contender in retail growth opportunities. Retail competition consisted of a handful of privately owned supermarket chains that imported goods and public member-owned cooperatives that were not legally permitted to import.
Carrefour ha notato molti altri vantaggi derivanti dall'ingresso nel mercato. Mentre la popolazione di Dubai era di sole 689.000 persone, nel 1995 secondo le statistiche del governo la popolazione cresceva a 12,5%. Inoltre, Dubai si aspettava un afflusso di espatriati e turisti per incrementare le vendite. Inoltre, l'economia di Dubai è stata molto favorevole alle imprese per tre ragioni principali. Innanzitutto, Dubai aveva sviluppato sistemi semplificati per la creazione rapida di un’azienda. In secondo luogo, per molti beni i dazi doganali sulle importazioni erano bassi o inesistenti. In terzo luogo, è stato uno dei pochi paesi a non offrire tasse sui profitti aziendali e individuali (esclusi il settore petrolifero e il settore finanziario) o sui profitti personali.
I rischi politici e di trasferimento di Dubai erano bassi. Dubai ha consentito 100% la proprietà dell'impresa a investitori stranieri, 100% il rimpatrio di profitti e capitali nel paese d'origine. In secondo luogo, il governo non ha richiesto agli investitori stranieri di effettuare un investimento di capitale minimo. In terzo luogo, Dubai aveva un sistema legale forte e veloce. Aveva tutele della proprietà intellettuale, con tutele legali e un dipartimento dei marchi, un dipartimento della proprietà industriale e un dipartimento dei diritti d'autore. Dubai aveva un sistema giudiziario simile a quelli dei paesi occidentali con tre livelli di tribunali secolari. Inoltre, le leggi sulle società straniere erano modellate sui modelli occidentali.
Many laws were established to protect consumers, prevent fraudulent trading, and ensure fair trading among companies. Despite this, Emirati law favored local Emiratis and gave benefits to local companies over foreign ones. For example, Article 3 of Emirati Law did not afford the same rights of UAE nationals to foreign corporations: “Each company incorporated in the State shall hold its nationality but it shall not necessarily be entitled to privileges reserved only to U.A.E nationals.” Nonetheless, Emirati law had very low political risks. Lastly, there were very low transfer risks. Foreign investors enjoyed the fact that the UAE’s currency, the Dirham, was pegged to the dollar. This peg meant that investors would have confidence in not losing the value of their revenues in currency fluctuations against other major currencies. Lastly, Dubai had one of the lowest crime rates for a city in the world, which was optimal for retail companies selling expensive merchandise.
Dubai possessed superior transportation networks starting in the 1960s. Given its strategic location between continents, it eventually became a transshipment point between Australia and Europe; and between Asia and Africa. This infrastructure provided many benefits for a retail commercial hypermarket firm. Furthermore, major infrastructure projects were planned in the future, optimizing the logistics in Dubai. In the future, Carrefour could expect major logistics projects to be built. One of these was the world’s largest free trade logistics zone, Dubai Logistics City. Another project was the rapidly growing number of passengers and renovations to the Dubai International Airport, a major airport aiming to become the region’s main hub and service several dozen million passengers and tons of cargo. This infrastructure was important to Carrefour, which planned to important its inventory. Thus, Dubai’s outlook for global retailers like Carrefour seemed to provide ample opportunities.
Strategia di ingresso nel mercato di Dubai
Carrefour evaluated Dubai’s laws and market conditions, and determined that a joint venture would be best for market entry. Factoring in this decision were the favorable laws towards Joint Ventures. First, there was less risk in a joint venture. This was important as Carrefour had suffered an $80 million loss in the US market. Second, the UAE’s Federal Commercial Agencies Law protected foreign companies in a joint venture from contract termination and exclusive presence in the region. To qualify as a Joint Venture, companies would have to be partnered with UAE nationals or commercial entities owned solely by UAE nationals. Carrefour would also have to rent and not own the property in its operations. This condition was not a drawback to Carrefour, which saw benefits in joint venturing with the sponsor embracing the liability of ownership. Furthermore, operating as a Joint Venture with a local sponsor would likely make it easier for Carrefour to obtain Food Health Certificates to import food, given that it was a foreign retailer attempting to sell food in a culture with important religious and cultural restrictions. Part of the Health Certificates was the Halal slaughter certificate allowing the sale of meat that has been slaughtered by a Muslim man according to Islamic rites. With the Joint Venture, Carrefour would enjoy the same low or no trade barriers on most of its inventory, excluding cigarettes and other luxury goods.
Yet, Carrefour saw some major barriers to entry include the difficulty in finding a local partner who was willing to accept the burden of navigating complex local import statutes and pre-operational regulations such as product licensing, ensuring that the local municipal lab has access to product samples to test that the products being sold meet their health and cultural standards. Another barrier to entry was the costs of operating associated with the size of the locations used. For example, choosing to open large hypermarkets rather than smaller supermarkets, Carrefour would have to endure high costs of renting stock shelving as well as listing fees. Another barrier to entry was a regulation passed by the Gulf Cooperation Council, which the UAE was a part of, which stated that all food products imported into the UAE must have half or more of its shelf life remaining at the time of entrance or clearance will not be issued. Some minor factors influencing entry into Dubai included the fact that weekends in Dubai did not correspond with traditional western weekends. Fridays and Saturdays constituted the weekend in the UAE and this would require adaptation to local customs to conduct daily business.
Carrefour evaluated Dubai’s market benefits and risks as well as the modes of entry and decided in 1995 to partner with Majid Al Futtaim (MAF), a major pan-regional company owning and operating mall properties. The first benefit was that MAF owned the high-traffic malls and properties that would be perfect for Carrefour’s location. Also, this could prevent other large hypermarket chains from entering the same malls, limiting direct competition. Secondly, MAF had operations throughout the entire Middle East, and this could potentially allow Carrefour to expand to other countries in the Middle East under the same partnership. Thirdly, Carrefour preferred Dubai as a first market because it is the most populated emirate in the UAE, Lastly, MAF had experience in venturing with foreign retailers and could handle Carrefour’s operations. By positioning itself correctly in Dubai, Carrefour could then use the waterfall approach to enter the remaining six emirates and capitalize on the rising growth of standard of living in the UAE.
Strategia di marketing
Posto
Carrefour/Majid al Futtaim’s strategy was to adapt to the cultural importance of shopping malls and create a “city within a city” by being located inside a mall with entertainment centers, cinemas, food courts, and other convenience amenities. Hence, Carrefour decided to place its stores in big malls in Deira City Centre Mall, Mall of the Emirates, Al Mamzar Century Mall, and Bur Dubai – Al Shindagha. Indeed, this adaptation differed from Carrefour’s standard location of a freestanding warehouse-like building.
The rationale behind adapting the traditional hypermarket was due to the fact that Dubai has a very strong mall culture, owing largely to Dubai’s cultural dynamics and harsh climate. First, the climate in Dubai is often so harsh that going to the mall is one of the few options to keep cool and entertained. Second, daily the mall provides an exciting experience beyond the shopping. In Arab society, socializing with family is paramount, and malls provide culturally appropriate entertainment for long periods of time. During the workday, Arab housewives will often go to malls with their friends to socialize, and bring their young children to play with each other at entertainment centers located on upper floors, while men are at work.
The elements Masculinity and Collectivism of Hofstede’s Model are evident in Emirati culture. Men will often go with their friends to watch movies in cinemas located in the upper levels of the mall, and drink coffee with friends at cafes into the late hours of the night. During the Friday and Saturday weekend, large Arab families pour into malls and spend many hours there shopping, taking their kids to arcades, eating at restaurants, staying at mall hotels, walking, and reclining. Despite spending long periods of time in the malls, many consumers only expect to window-shop and leave without buying merchandise. Third, Dubai’s society has adapted to the convenience of being able to get high-quality consumer goods in one mall. Fourth, Dubai’s society is very young and enamored by the popular brands, found in malls. For many of these reasons, retailers must often accept malls as the place to locate their stores.
Gli altri vantaggi dell'ubicazione nei centri commerciali erano che Carrefour poteva aspettarsi un volume ancora maggiore di clienti che arrivavano ai negozi Carrefour. Inoltre, nei centri commerciali di Dubai c'era uno spazio commerciale abbastanza grande da consentire a Carrefour di operare. Inoltre, Carrefour ha mantenuto le sue tradizionali grandi dimensioni, dato che Majid Al Futtaim possedeva due dei centri commerciali presi in esame. Di conseguenza, il negozio Carrefour Deira City Centre è diventato il più grande negozio di Dubai. Tuttavia, essendo situato nelle zone centrali di Dubai, Carrefour doveva competere con i tradizionali piccoli negozi al dettaglio più vicini al consumatore. L'importanza della posizione a Dubai non può essere sottovalutata considerati i problemi di traffico di Dubai.
Prodotto
Dubai was a very international and diverse Emirate, particularly due to the large number of foreign workers. As such, Carrefour adapted by accepting foreign credit cards, the currencies of all GCC countries, and international currencies like the Euro and US dollar. While Carrefour implemented bilingual signage in the stores, language and cultural barriers were not likely problems given that English was so widely spoken and consumers had experience with Western products.
Innanzitutto, Carrefour ha dovuto adattare la propria merce alla cultura. Ad esempio, alcune sfumature alimentari dovevano essere apprezzate, come la vendita di cibo halal in cui mancava la carne di maiale. In secondo luogo, Carrefour ha dovuto adattarsi alla stagionalità del ciclo economico di Dubai, dato che nella cultura di Dubai era consuetudine che le persone prendessero le vacanze estive per fuggire verso destinazioni più fresche. In terzo luogo, Carrefour ha dovuto adattarsi alle festività culturali islamiche come il Ramadan e l’Eid, che avrebbero incrementato il suo picco di vendite. Durante queste festività, Carrefour ha dovuto tenere conto dell'aumento della domanda e pianificare la propria offerta di conseguenza per non deludere gli acquirenti. In quarto luogo, l'orario di lavoro a Dubai doveva adattarsi alla settimana lavorativa di Dubai, dalla domenica al giovedì, e al fine settimana dal venerdì al sabato.
Promozione
Carrefour did not adapt its promotional effort, which consisted of discounting certain items. Majid Al Futtaim handled local promotions and coordinated some of these regionally with its stores throughout the Middle East. Promotions were placed in print media and in-store, to attract mall-walking traffic. Because Dubai was a society emphasizing the importance of social relationships, Carrefour could reasonably expect that consumers might discuss some of the deals.
La promozione era importante a Dubai a causa dell'alto costo della vita e dell'elevata inflazione. I dati demografici di Dubai erano fortemente distorti. Al momento dell'ingresso di Carrefour, nel 1998, solo 17% della popolazione era costituito da “arabi locali”, mentre 85% erano “asiatici espatriati” e 3% erano occidentali. Il segmento degli espatriati asiatici aveva il reddito disponibile più basso, ma era un segmento ampio ed era ampiamente aperto all’acquisto di elettronica e prodotti occidentali. A causa dell'importanza dell'inflazione e di questi dati demografici, il segmento target di Carrefour coinvolgeva principalmente gli espatriati.
Prezzo
La posizione di prezzo di Carrefour era quella di un discount e utilizzava i prezzi come parte del suo sforzo promozionale. Grazie al suo marchio forte, Carrefour non ha dovuto preoccuparsi della diluizione del marchio grazie ai suoi prodotti scontati. Comunque
ehm, lo sconto era problematico a Dubai, dove l’inflazione era alle stelle e quando le fluttuazioni dell’inflazione potevano erodere i profitti. Un’altra preoccupazione relativa ai prezzi era che il mercato al dettaglio alimentare era il più competitivo e quindi i margini di profitto erano ridotti. Carrefour potrebbe vendere prodotti non alimentari, articoli per la casa e articoli da toeletta con margini più elevati.
Prestazione
Carrefour / Majid Al Futtaim does not report its Dubai-generated revenues or other countries’ specific sales. We did a thorough literature search and even contacted Carrefour’s Investor Relations. Yet in both cases, the information was unavailable. There are two reasons for this. First, Carrefour MAF was a private joint venture and was not obligated to show its sales figures. Secondly, in the region, there is a tendency to underreport information and lack transparency due to suspicion of what other entities might use such data for, according to Seraphina Anderson Executive Director of Feedback Market Research in Dubai/Sharjah. This venture likely prefers to keep their sales figures and data private to prevent competitors from taking such information and using it to their advantage.
A livello regionale, tuttavia, Carrefour MAF ha pubblicato cifre di vendita complessive nel 2005 pari a $1 miliardo sui suoi 13 negozi nel 2005, circa 1% delle vendite globali. Altri indicatori mostrano che la joint venture ha avuto successo. Nel 2007, le vendite di Carrefour sono salite a $2,5 miliardi a livello regionale, a causa di una crescita regionale aggressiva. Nel 2008, la joint venture ha annunciato l'intenzione di entrare in Iran per un'ulteriore crescita.
Valutazione critica
Scegliere Majid Al Futtaim (MAF) è stata una buona idea per Carrefour. Aveva voglia di espansione e crescita ed è entrato in modo aggressivo in altri mercati del Medio Oriente. La scelta ha inoltre impedito la concorrenza diretta negli stessi centri commerciali di proprietà della MAF. Inoltre, l'adattamento della joint venture al mercato locale ne ha garantito il successo, dato che molte persone di Dubai oggi considerano il negozio come non straniero e parte della vita. Tuttavia, Carrefour MAF non ha fatto abbastanza per garantire che ci siano abbastanza parcheggi, un numero sufficiente di taxi e un buon flusso di traffico intorno ai suoi centri commerciali, soprattutto durante i fine settimana e i giorni festivi. Ciò rende l’impresa più vulnerabile ai negozi di nicchia più piccoli e ai negozi situati più vicini al consumatore.
Il mercato di Dubai deve affrontare sfide considerevoli. In primo luogo, la concorrenza sta aumentando, soprattutto nel segmento alimentare, il che riduce di fatto i margini di profitto. Mentre Wal-Mart e Costco non stanno prendendo in considerazione il Medio Oriente, altri ipermercati europei stanno entrando strategicamente nel mercato del Medio Oriente. Nel 2006, Union Coop ha aperto un ipermercato di 180.000 piedi quadrati a Dubai. Anche Geant, una catena europea di ipermercati, è entrata a Dubai nel 2003. Oltre a ciò, i negozi vicini stanno scremando clienti come gli asiatici espatriati che preferiscono non guidare lontano per fare acquisti.
The second challenge is chronic inflation. Due to rapid growth, high liquidity, high demand, low supply, and a currency peg to the recently declining US dollar, national inflation rates stood at around 13% in 2008, though economists expect actual consumer price inflation in Dubai to be at 20% per year. This inflation erodes revenues and rapidly raises the costs of inventory and staffing. Thirdly, the decline of the dollar versus other currencies can lower the value of revenues when repatriated to foreign countries.
Fourthly, the UAE government has recently implemented more difficult visa regulations. This makes it more difficult to attract skilled Asians and Westerners to help drive the economy’s growth. Lastly, the region faces political risks from Iran, Iraq, and from terrorism. Additionally, Dubai is more dependent on foreign investment and tourism than the other Emirates.
Dubai was expected to be more vulnerable to global economic downturns than Abu Dhabi and other emirates. Due to the global credit crunch, the UAE’s non-oil GDP growth was expected to slow from 8.8% in 2008 to 7.1% in 2009. Foremost to retailers is the expected implementation in early 2009 of a VAT (Value Added Tax) tax regimen of around 5%. It was anticipated that this tax system will drive inflation even higher than its current high level.
Carrefour ha una grossa difficoltà con il suo modello: la facilità di fare acquisti nei suoi negozi. Poiché lo shopping avviene nei centri commerciali, spesso è difficile fare acquisti presso Carrefour, in particolare nei fine settimana e nei giorni festivi, quando i centri commerciali si riempiono. Dubai ha una cultura della guida molto forte, quindi questo rende difficile il viaggio quando lo spazio è limitato e ci sono pochi taxi. Di conseguenza, la fila per un taxi può estendersi per centinaia di metri, come al centro commerciale Deira Center, e il parcheggio può essere pieno. Carrefour deve affrontare questo problema per garantire che questo inconveniente non impedisca agli acquirenti di recarsi nei suoi negozi.
Potenziali linee d'azione
To best compete in the Dubai market, Carrefour MAF could follow several potential courses of action. Each focuses on improving Carrefour’s competitive advantages, market positioning, and driving sales. First, Carrefour may need to ensure that customers are not leaving its stores due to more convenient specialty stores located closer to customers.
Per fare ciò, dovrebbe affrontare gli inconvenienti che derivano dall'esperienza di acquisto di Carrefour, in particolare legati al traffico e ai disagi dei trasporti di Dubai. Tra questi vi è garantire che vi siano parcheggi e taxi sufficienti nonché un flusso di traffico efficace, soprattutto durante i fine settimana e i giorni festivi. Potrebbe potenzialmente farlo esercitando pressioni sul governo per la situazione dei taxi e del traffico e su Majid Al Futtaim per i problemi di parcheggio poiché è lui che gestisce le proprietà.
Secondly, Carrefour could seek new advantages to solidify its position. Among these include positioning Carrefour as the place to go during economic turmoil. The rationale is that by attaching this perception to Carrefour’s brand, it ensures that customers associate Carrefour with savings and with rough economic times. In so doing, it can improve its performance in economic downturns. Also, Carrefour could reinforce its First Mover Advantage as the authentic hypermarket. In Eastern countries, the most loved brands are those that are considered authentic. As such, by reinforcing this perception, Carrefour could potentially limit the effectiveness of direct European hypermarket competitors in Dubai like Geant and Union Coop.
Thirdly, Carrefour has been successful in Dubai along several indicators, but it could find significant growth in the market by focusing on the countless expatriates that come in and out of the country. Carrefour could strengthen its specialty food sections to attract various demographics, in terms of a better selection. In so doing, it can better target Dubai’s expatriate population that prefers to eat its own cultural food, and increase the frequency at which these huge segments visit its stores.
Carrefour’s pricing strategy is also helpful in targeting this group because most expatriates work in Dubai to remit money home to their families. So Carrefour could become a great place to save money while not compromising quality. It could even develop to be a great place to buy gifts to send home. This effort could be supported by a Word of Mouth promotional strategy, harnessing existing customers to tell their friends about the deals and quality at Carrefour.
Given that Dubai’s expats mostly come from Asia where there are high-context cultures, Word of Mouth could be effective in targeting those expats who strongly value friends’ and family’s suggestions over media and corporate opinion. Further marketing techniques adhering to Dubai’s cultural imperatives could include discount coupons, a customer loyalty card, and a home delivery service to the expatriate segment. Home delivery service may be a viable option for Carrefour because it fits into the cultural context of Dubai. The service could take advantage of the lack of public transportation in Dubai, thus helping it to better reach a broader customer base. Ultimately by targeting the expatriate population, Carrefour could potentially continue to grow and hit the population of Dubai that is not included in the 689,000 citizens (est. 1995).
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