{"id":12104,"date":"2009-05-12T21:39:44","date_gmt":"2009-05-12T21:39:44","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/understanding-the-eu-emissions-trading-scheme-an-sis-report\/"},"modified":"2026-01-25T18:22:08","modified_gmt":"2026-01-25T23:22:08","slug":"compreender-o-regime-de-comercio-de-emissoes-da-ue-um-relatorio-sis","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/pt\/compreender-o-regime-de-comercio-de-emissoes-da-ue-um-relatorio-sis\/","title":{"rendered":"Pesquisa de mercado de com\u00e9rcio de emiss\u00f5es"},"content":{"rendered":"

O maior esquema internacional de com\u00e9rcio de emiss\u00f5es do mundo come\u00e7ou na Europa em Janeiro de 2005.<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\"Pesquisa<\/figure>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n

Conhecido como Esquema de Com\u00e9rcio de Emiss\u00f5es da Uni\u00e3o Europeia (EU ETS), o EU ETS unificou muitos pa\u00edses e setores num vasto mecanismo de com\u00e9rcio de emiss\u00f5es de carbono. O seu objectivo era, at\u00e9 2012, reduzir as emiss\u00f5es de gases com efeito de estufa em 8%, de volta aos n\u00edveis de emiss\u00f5es de 1990. Em 2006, existiam 10.078 instala\u00e7\u00f5es, al\u00e9m das mais de 1.000 instala\u00e7\u00f5es da Pol\u00f3nia. Esta carteira de instala\u00e7\u00f5es, incluindo as ind\u00fastrias qu\u00edmica, energ\u00e9tica, mineral e industrial, constituiu quase metade de todas as emiss\u00f5es da UE. A segunda fase, que come\u00e7a em 2008 e se estende at\u00e9 2012, pretende ir al\u00e9m, envolvendo outras ind\u00fastrias, incluindo a avia\u00e7\u00e3o comercial e os aeroportos.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A l\u00f3gica por tr\u00e1s da constru\u00e7\u00e3o de um importante esquema de com\u00e9rcio de emiss\u00f5es foi o fracasso consider\u00e1vel do mercado livre em internalizar as externalidades negativas.<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Applying economic theory, carbon emitters inflict damage, external to the transaction. \u00a0A third party\u2014the public\u2014subsequently absorbs this cost and damage. \u00a0Governments can choose between price-based policies like taxing carbon, or volume-based policies like Cap and Trade systems. Cap and Trade systems like the EU ETS allow the market to determine the volume of carbon usage, unlike a carbon tax, which influences the volume of carbon usage. \u00a0The downsides are that prices are volatile, and only auctioning can raise revenue unlike taxes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The question arises how exactly does an enormous emissions trading scheme operate across diverse nations.  This central question raises other curiosities such as the various challenges that emerge with such schemes, which might serve as a roadmap for concerns and challenges raised on proposed US emissions legislation plans and the further implementation of EU ETS II, which recently began in 2008.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

O RCLE-UE em a\u00e7\u00e3o<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The EU ETS is best analyzed as a process of four general areas: granting emissions allocations to carbon-emitting \u201cinstallations\u201d, monitoring, reporting, and verifying. \u00a0Each country has more than one authority overseeing the process except for smaller countries like Italy, Portugal and Greece. In larger countries with greater institutional infrastructure, the local authorities administer various aspects of the ETS process. \u00a0These governing authorities face a myriad of administrative tasks, including overseeing allocations, permits, allowances, monitoring, reporting, managing registries, accreditation of verification agencies, compliance, enforcement, public transparency and the use of Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs), Emissions Reduction Units (ERUs), and New Entrant Reserve (NERs).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cInstala\u00e7\u00f5es\u201d e poluidores obt\u00eam licen\u00e7as, principalmente RCEs.<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Countries were allotted several emissions, as part of a National Allocation Plan (NAP), which was overseen by the European Commission. \u00a0Different industries were given different rules. \u00a0For example, under EU ETS I, power plants larger than 20 MW must have a permit for each CO2 ton. \u00a0Moreover, individual installations of the EU ETS were classified by their energy input. In 2006, one third of EU ETS\u2019 installations fell between the range of 20 \u2013 50 megawatts. \u00a0Large installations produced more than 500,000 tons CO2 and were 7% of the installations. \u00a0Small installations lay in the range of 10,000 tons and were 30% of installations around 2006.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Na monitoriza\u00e7\u00e3o, o objectivo do sistema era administrar o com\u00e9rcio de emiss\u00f5es como um banco que gere dinheiro.<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Accordingly, emissions allowances are managed in electronic accounts. The Central Administer examines the Community Independent Transaction Log for inconsistencies. \u00a0This log provides the public full transparency into emissions trading for the year 2008. \u00a0Central Administers adhere to the European Commission\u2019s framework for VAT taxes on emissions allowances. \u00a0For reporting, the EU ETS mandated annual reporting through a closed-answer questionnaire among installations. \u00a0Then, member countries have three months to provide it to the commission, which can then publish a report. \u00a0The goal of the annual report was to improve rules and processes and involved all aspects of the ETS ranging from registries to reporting.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Quanto \u00e0 fixa\u00e7\u00e3o de pre\u00e7os, o sistema cap and trade permitiu ao mercado definir o volume de utiliza\u00e7\u00e3o de carbono.<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

For example, one major challenge was an overallocation of CERs in 2005 and imbalances in market forces. \u00a0Countries overallocated CERs, which in some cases were 12% more than were necessary. \u00a0This resulted in a price collapse within the market<\/a>. \u00a0This was because the EU ETS operated by market forces of supply and demand<\/a>. \u00a0Where there was an oversupply, the price fell. \u00a0Conversely, when demand rose in Spain in the early stages, prices for European Union Allowances (EUAs) rose. \u00a0Consequently, EU ETS II explicitly mentions that it will reduce the number of allowances of CERs and ERUs, to defend against a market collapse.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The overwhelming challenge in such a large trading scheme was a heterogeneous implementation of directives across the EU. One issue lay in each state having slightly different criteria regarding registered installations\u2019 compliance. \u00a0 \u00a0For example, some countries like the Netherlands had random checks at a percentage of their installations\u2019 locations. \u00a0Others did not. \u00a0Some states had different measures to obviate these challenges. \u00a0These included working groups, detailed notes, and training courses for administrative authorities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Outro desafio foi a categoriza\u00e7\u00e3o das diretrizes de conformidade e relat\u00f3rios.<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Indeed, even the EU ETS noted in 2006 that monitoring methods were not strict and \u201cmight lead to unequal treatment of installations across the European Union.\u201d  Specifically, the problem emerged about differences in implementation across borders.  For example, the Netherlands had seven categories of compliance.  Although the United Kingdom had a similar system, all relevant authorities that monitored installations did not implement it.  Another example was that some countries had special categorization for \u201clower tiers\u201d of emitters.  Other EU countries however did not have robust enough systems to classify installations in the \u201clower tiers\u201d of emitters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A aceita\u00e7\u00e3o de ag\u00eancias de verifica\u00e7\u00e3o independentes era padr\u00e3o em todos os pa\u00edses, mas as diferen\u00e7as na verifica\u00e7\u00e3o eram um desafio.<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

A first example of verification challenges was that some EU countries further required as part of their reporting some recommendations for improving the installation\u2019s monitoring in the future.  Secondly, eight EU countries reserved the right to have extra monitoring after independent verification.  Thirdly, verifiers faced different treatment among accrediting authorities across borders.  For example, a verification agency in the UK faced different relations with accrediting authorities in Italy, and this may have impacted how many verification agencies were available to installations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Outros pa\u00edses queriam uma compreens\u00e3o homogeneizada dos protocolos relativos a novos participantes, atribui\u00e7\u00f5es e leil\u00f5es, e instala\u00e7\u00f5es com emiss\u00f5es muito baixas. O inqu\u00e9rito da McKinsey & Company revelou ainda diferen\u00e7as de opini\u00e3o sobre uma defini\u00e7\u00e3o transparente de \u201cinstala\u00e7\u00e3o de combust\u00e3o\u201d, com 70% de organismos governamentais a quererem uma defini\u00e7\u00e3o mais ampla e as empresas a quererem uma defini\u00e7\u00e3o restrita.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Legal interpretations of emissions were also heterogeneous across member countries.  They differed because some countries considered emissions as different financial instruments.  For example, a few countries viewed emissions as commodities.  Others like the United Kingdom legally viewed emissions as liabilities.  Also, fines and fees differed dramatically, ranging from \u20ac3 thousand to \u20ac15 million, and some companies could strategically<\/a> register in countries that did not charge high fees.  Likewise, stakeholders wanted more transparent and homogenized rules, penalty guidelines and interpretations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

O RCLE teve um impacto consider\u00e1vel no funcionamento e nas perspectivas das instala\u00e7\u00f5es.<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

A survey by McKinsey & Company<\/a> found that nearly half of companies largely began accounting for the value of CO2 allowance in their pricing, longterm planning, and operations. \u00a0The survey further suggested that the EU ETS encouraged innovation among industries. \u00a0However, the process was explicitly burdensome to several stakeholders. \u00a0Companies receive accounts or registries within their country of operation. \u00a0At the beginning of implementation, several countries experienced unexpected downtime between 0 and 20%.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Some countries have complained about the limited time for emissions allocations and implementation. \u00a0Another issue was the lack of sufficient data on emissions and projections. \u00a0Administrative burdens were also large at the beginning of implementation. \u00a0These challenges were extraordinarily significant particularly in analyzing what future emissions trading schemes, such as those in the United States, may face upon implementation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclus\u00e3o<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The EU ETS demonstrates Europe\u2019s commitment to fighting climate change and adhering to the Kyoto protocols. \u00a0With a coordinated effort, the EU created the largest climate change-fighting efforts over diverse borders. \u00a0 Several take-aways can be gleaned from analyzing the EU ETS\u2019 intricacies. \u00a0First, a major carbon cab and trade can be implemented without dramatically jeopardizing regional and corporate competitiveness. \u00a0Secondly, challenges do exist as noted by implementation inconsistencies and the EUA price collapse.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thirdly, despite these challenges, the EU ETS has been able to impact the volume of carbon consumed and lower emissions very quickly. Fourthly, while challenges do exist in implementing cap and trade systems, the cap and trade system like EU ETS thrives when there is continuous improvement. This continuous improvement is done through transparency and reporting.  The EU ETS II will likely be even more effective, building on the challenges of the first phase.  Indeed, the EU ETS provides a useful framework for implementing proposed cap and trade systems throughout the world, including most recently the United States.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Descubra novos insights da pesquisa de mercado de com\u00e9rcio de emiss\u00f5es.<\/p>","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":64083,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[287],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-12104","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-industry-spotlight","generate-columns","tablet-grid-50","mobile-grid-100","grid-parent","grid-50"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/pt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12104","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/pt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/pt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/pt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/pt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=12104"}],"version-history":[{"count":6,"href":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/pt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12104\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":81448,"href":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/pt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12104\/revisions\/81448"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/pt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/64083"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/pt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=12104"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/pt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=12104"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/pt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=12104"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}