{"id":21206,"date":"2016-12-09T18:41:40","date_gmt":"2016-12-09T18:41:40","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/?page_id=21206"},"modified":"2026-01-26T18:35:10","modified_gmt":"2026-01-26T23:35:10","slug":"beira-desastre-pos-chavez-venezuela","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/pt\/publicacoes\/beira-desastre-pos-chavez-venezuela\/","title":{"rendered":"Pesquisa de mercado na Venezuela"},"content":{"rendered":"

Pesquisa de mercado na Venezuela<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
\"Pesquisa<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

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Ap\u00f3s Ch\u00e1vez<\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Since the death of charismatic United Socialist Party leader Hugo Chavez in 2013, Venezuela has struggled during the presidential tenure of his hand-picked successor, Nicol\u00e1s Maduro. With a one-product economy based almost entirely on oil production, the financial fortunes and the quality of life for many in Venezuela have plummeted in direct relationship to world oil prices. Already in decline during Chavez\u2019s waning years in office, under Maduro the decline has devolved into an outright collapse. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hoje, o governo n\u00e3o consegue importar ou fornecer nem mesmo produtos b\u00e1sicos. As pessoas se re\u00fanem por horas intermin\u00e1veis em longas filas, esperando para conseguir utens\u00edlios dom\u00e9sticos, rem\u00e9dios e alimentos. \u00c0 medida que as condi\u00e7\u00f5es continuam a piorar, os incidentes de protesto, saques e viol\u00eancia tornam-se mais comuns. Maduro atribui a escassez ao ac\u00famulo e ao contrabando, mas a m\u00e1 gest\u00e3o do governo \u00e9 vista por muitos como a causa. As ind\u00fastrias nacionais tamb\u00e9m est\u00e3o a sofrer e os seus n\u00edveis de produ\u00e7\u00e3o foram reduzidos ao solo. Entretanto, a classifica\u00e7\u00e3o de cr\u00e9dito da Venezuela est\u00e1 em territ\u00f3rio lixo. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Price controls are in effect to protect consumers from runaway inflation and currency has been shockingly devalued. Exports are shutting down, and companies continue to leave the country or close down. Inflation has risen into triple-digit territory \u2013 the highest in the world \u2013 and salaries are far from keeping pace. Crime is on the upswing in Caracas and to a greater degree in the interior of the country. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\"Pesquisa<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

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\u00c9 dif\u00edcil imaginar que, apenas uma d\u00e9cada antes, a Venezuela tivesse registado um dos maiores booms de mat\u00e9rias-primas da hist\u00f3ria moderna, com lucros brutos provenientes do petr\u00f3leo estimados em quase meio bili\u00e3o de d\u00f3lares, equivalentes aos do Kuwait. No entanto, no rescaldo, a m\u00e1 gest\u00e3o econ\u00f3mica e a queda dos pre\u00e7os mundiais do petr\u00f3leo deixaram o pa\u00eds em ru\u00ednas, com pouca esperan\u00e7a de qualquer al\u00edvio imediato. A agita\u00e7\u00e3o social \u00e9 abundante e o sentimento predominante de que a Venezuela atingiu um ponto de ruptura \u00e9 generalizado. At\u00e9 agora, o governo conseguiu isolar-se da turbul\u00eancia, mas uma mudan\u00e7a pode muito bem estar a caminho. Maduro ser\u00e1 o \u00faltimo l\u00edder chavista? O tempo vai dizer. Enquanto isso, ele adota um tom mais autorit\u00e1rio e linha-dura. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cReceando que a agita\u00e7\u00e3o p\u00fablica se transforme em algo mais s\u00e9rio, o governo enviou agora tropas para controlar as filas de compradores insatisfeitos nas lojas meio vazias do pa\u00eds. E introduziu um sistema de racionamento, limitando os compradores a dois dias por semana em lojas controladas pelo governo. Como Bloomberg<\/i> cynically put it, \u201cVenezuela reduces lines by trimming shoppers, not shortages.\u201d.1<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Essencialmente, o desdobramento do desastre venezuelano \u00e9 visto como um exemplo cl\u00e1ssico de como n\u00e3o<\/i> para gerir uma economia numa era de capitalismo global. \u00c9 um modelo econ\u00f3mico falhado, sem d\u00favida. Actualmente, o d\u00f3lar \u00e9 cem vezes mais valioso no mercado negro do que na bolsa. \u00c9 visto como bastante poss\u00edvel que em algum momento a Venezuela ter\u00e1 que entrar em incumprimento. Com o petr\u00f3leo a menos de $50 por barril, o pa\u00eds est\u00e1 constantemente a perder dinheiro. Estima-se que estejam perdendo $2B em reservas todos os meses.<\/span> <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Os pre\u00e7os mais elevados do petr\u00f3leo resolveriam os problemas da Venezuela?<\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

World oil prices historically fluctuate. While they are presently at rock bottom, most industry prognosticators feel that prices will inevitably rise once again. Unfortunately for big oil-producing nations such as Venezuela, just when this might occur is uncertain. Certainly, a normalizing of oil prices would help to keep Venezuela solvent and operative. At $70-$80-a-barrel, it could sustain itself and feed its people. Concurrently, if the people do better, the Chavista government stands a far better chance of enduring. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conforme relatado recentemente por Voz da Am\u00e9rica<\/i>, \u201cVenezuela is among the members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries most deeply wounded by the oil price fall. Its need for OPEC to cut supply to support prices has failed to shift the stance of Saudi Arabia and its Gulf OPEC allies, which are focusing on protecting market share.\u201d2 Sans<\/a> assurances from Saudi Arabia, OPEC, Russia and other petroleum-rich nations to curb production, the immediate financial outlook for Venezuela is grim.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Of course, other problems existed before the bottom fell out of the oil market. Even if and when oil prices rise, Venezuela will have to deal with its broken system, price controls, gas subsidies, rationing, and inadequate food supplies. Paying off creditors won\u2019t help a hungry populace. An influx of cash also won\u2019t restore political freedoms. Ch\u00e1vez and Maduro dealt with a lot of problems by throwing money at them. With the money gone, that\u2019s no longer possible. At best, a new infusion of oil money might help them to kick the can down the road a bit further, but it\u2019s no magic bullet. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Venezuela: democracia ou n\u00e3o?<\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Despite all of the accusations leveled against it, the Chavista government of Venezuela built its legitimacy on fair electoral processes and relatively clean elections. Today, however, the playing field is uneven. The government controls all of the institutions and the people are unable to express their choices freely.\u00a0 <\/span>De acordo com A Besta Di\u00e1ria<\/i>, \u201cA Assembleia Nacional da Venezuela aprovou\u00a0Presidente Nicol\u00e1s Maduro<\/span><\/a>(pedido recente) para governar por decreto pela segunda vez desde que assumiu o cargo em 2013. A decis\u00e3o concede ao presidente autoridade especial ampliada fora dos poderes executivos. Maduro chamou isso de um impulso para combater o imperialismo\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

O que resta \u00e9 um gerenciou<\/i> democracia. A oposi\u00e7\u00e3o de Maduro poderia chamar-lhe uma ditadura. Com o governo controlando a maior parte da m\u00eddia, eles s\u00e3o capazes de us\u00e1-la para gerar votos. Os funcion\u00e1rios do governo s\u00e3o convidados a participar de protestos pr\u00f3-governo. Os candidatos da oposi\u00e7\u00e3o foram at\u00e9 impedidos de concorrer a cargos p\u00fablicos, para desgosto dos grupos de direitos humanos. Maduro sofre problemas adicionais porque claramente lhe falta o carisma que Hugo Ch\u00e1vez possu\u00eda e usou com grande vantagem. Uma gra\u00e7a salvadora para os chavistas \u00e9 a incapacidade da oposi\u00e7\u00e3o de unificar e superar as suas pr\u00f3prias tend\u00eancias de luta interna. Podem perder nas pr\u00f3ximas elei\u00e7\u00f5es parlamentares porque n\u00e3o conseguem unir-se. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Avalia\u00e7\u00e3o das institui\u00e7\u00f5es democr\u00e1ticas da Venezuela <\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Venezuela has a long history of crony interests exploiting situations for their own gain. Even Chavez was seen as channeling the hatred of older political factions to obtain power. The Venezuelan constitution has been rewritten numerous times for political expediency. The State Assembly was often used as a rubber stamp to enforce Ch\u00e1vez\u2019s power.\u00a0 <\/span>As t\u00e1cticas intimidat\u00f3rias foram e s\u00e3o frequentemente utilizadas para silenciar l\u00edderes da oposi\u00e7\u00e3o, como Leopoldo L\u00f3pez, que est\u00e1 actualmente preso sob acusa\u00e7\u00f5es forjadas de estar a inspirar tumultos e viol\u00eancia contra o regime de Maduro. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

A corrup\u00e7\u00e3o massiva \u00e9 evidente e os militares parecem ser c\u00famplices, com o oficial militar de longa data Diostado Cavelo a estar t\u00e3o estreitamente alinhado com Maduro que muitos sentem que ele est\u00e1 secretamente a \u201ccomandar o espect\u00e1culo\u201d. Cavelo est\u00e1 sendo investigado por suposto envolvimento com cart\u00e9is de drogas e entrega de coca\u00edna aos Estados Unidos. Ao contr\u00e1rio da separa\u00e7\u00e3o de poderes que \u00e9 comum em muitos pa\u00edses, todos marcham sob as ordens do Poder Executivo na Venezuela. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Is Chavez Still A Hero to The Poor?<\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Though it has been some time now since the passing of Hugo Chavez, his legacy and legend still live in Venezuela. This is especially true among the nation\u2019s poor and among Chavista leaders. \u201cSince Chavez\u2019s death after a battle with an undisclosed cancer in 2013, the government and the PSUV party have made great efforts to present him as a national hero and capitalize his legacy. President Nicol\u00e1s Maduro mentions Ch\u00e1vez<\/span> in almost every speech, urging people to follow his example.\u201d4\u00a0 It\u2019s true that no one has benefitted quite as much from attaching himself to Chavez\u2019s enduring popularity as Maduro. Since his Chavez-endorsed election, there have been chronic shortages, sporadic violence, inflation, and accusations of impropriety on many levels, but past association with Chavez allowed Maduro to cling to<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

power. However, when people can\u2019t eat and have no money, their patience can begin to erode. Even Maduro is playing the \u201cChavez card\u201d less and less, as it is a currency that no longer guarantees reverence or votes at election time. Many feel the true revolution died along with Chavez. Perhaps not even another compelling charismatic could revive it. From colorful murals on building exteriors to stories that still circulate among the faithful, Chavez image and his savior-status among the poor still survives, due to his personal magnetism, the work he did for the disadvantaged, and the way he stood up to and defied the establishment. The Oligopoly that he railed against did in fact exist, . It was a system that deeply entrenched the powers of a small group of the privileged <\/span>elite. Today, Maduro can still blame Venezuela\u2019s problems on these entitled few. It is this class-driven cleavage that makes governing extremely difficult. In truth, unless oil prices rebound and reverses the country\u2019s economic fortunes, these lingering echoes of Chavista glory may fade forever. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

O Significado da Revolu\u00e7\u00e3o Bolivariana <\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\"Pesquisa<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

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A Revolu\u00e7\u00e3o Bolivariana resultou numa tremenda redistribui\u00e7\u00e3o da riqueza em 20<\/span>\u00ba<\/sup><\/span>Century Am\u00e9rica do Sul, levando a uma transforma\u00e7\u00e3o completa da Venezuela nos \u00faltimos 16 anos. O boom do petr\u00f3leo permitiu a Hugo Ch\u00e1vez esbanjar grandes quantias de dinheiro em generosos programas sociais. Hoje, a maioria destes programas falhou. Apesar deste facto, os pobres continuam a apoiar o governo chavista, sentindo que as coisas seriam ainda piores sob um governo de direita. Muitos prefeririam suportar longas filas e mercadorias baratas em vez de apoiar uma oposi\u00e7\u00e3o que consideram que aumentaria ainda mais os pre\u00e7os. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cPrior to its current domestic woes, Venezuela worked hard and often succeeded in establishing itself as a major alternative influence in Latin America, as a kind of \u201cBolivarian\u201d power. Now, Venezuela must confront the fact that the conditions once anchoring its global aspirations \u2013 like excessive revenues generated by the petrostate \u2013 have evaporated. Venezuela\u2019s capabilities for international power projection are constrained by domestic unrest, reservas internacionais esgotadas<\/span><\/a>, infla\u00e7\u00e3o desenfreada<\/span>, pre\u00e7os baixos do petr\u00f3leo e produ\u00e7\u00e3o lenta de petr\u00f3leo<\/span><\/a>, tornando cada vez mais sombrias as perspectivas de prolongamento do projecto bolivariano internacional.\u201d<\/span>12<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Em ess\u00eancia, Ch\u00e1vez transformou sozinho a psique venezuelana. Ele capacitou os pobres e os introduziu no processo pol\u00edtico. Maduro pode ser impopular, mas o cora\u00e7\u00e3o da revolu\u00e7\u00e3o ainda bate no cora\u00e7\u00e3o de muitos venezuelanos. Eles n\u00e3o esqueceram os tempos melhores. Os l\u00edderes da oposi\u00e7\u00e3o fazem promessas populistas na tentativa de atrair os eleitores chavistas, mas a desconfian\u00e7a do povo \u00e9 forte. As ra\u00edzes da revolu\u00e7\u00e3o basearam-se no fim da desigualdade econ\u00f3mica, mas a corrup\u00e7\u00e3o sufocou essa inten\u00e7\u00e3o. Para os investidores internacionais, o sentimento persistente em rela\u00e7\u00e3o a Ch\u00e1vez \u00e9 visto como uma amea\u00e7a. Para outros, \u00e9 um sonho de esperan\u00e7a que, embora marginalizado, continua vivo. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Direitos Civis, Direitos Humanos e Condi\u00e7\u00f5es de Vida dos Pobres\u2026 <\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

In Venezuela today, there is growing discontent and repression. There are long lines with hundreds of people waiting for subsidized food and supplies. Among the ranks of the waiting there is hatred, aggression and fear. The people, while not starving, are surely struggling and crime is escalating to the point where the people no longer feel safe. The police who might protect the citizenry are corrupt. It is estimated that of all the homicides committed in Venezuela (and it has one of the highest murder rates in the world) only 3% of perpetrators are ever prosecuted. The country\u2019s prisons are among the world\u2019s worst according to the U.N. At the root of this crime-wave is social inequality and the great and widening gulf between the haves and the have-nots that dates back over 100 years.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

O socialismo de Hugo Ch\u00e1vez tentou resolver esta desigualdade, mas acabou por n\u00e3o ter sucesso. O governo Maduro parece ter perdido a capacidade de manter as pol\u00edticas populistas anteriores. O desespero resultante manifesta-se no aumento da criminalidade, no contrabando, no com\u00e9rcio no mercado negro e numa diminui\u00e7\u00e3o do incentivo das pessoas para trabalhar devido \u00e0 sua futilidade final.\u00a0 <\/span>Those who managed to escape poverty during Chavez\u2019 glory years now find themselves slipping back into it. Segregation is evident and the pall of depression is palpable in the air. In addition, Venezuela is suffering from acute Dreno cerebral<\/i>, ou, um \u00eaxodo de profissionais como m\u00e9dicos, engenheiros, advogados e outros profissionais que deixaram o pa\u00eds em busca de um lugar menos vol\u00e1til para fazer neg\u00f3cios. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Os candidatos a cargos e as pessoas que votam a favor ou contra eles consideram a Venezuela um lugar cada vez mais hostil para a pol\u00edtica. De acordo com Jos\u00e9 Miguel Vivanco, Diretor para as Am\u00e9ricas da Human Rights Watch, \u201cO governo da Venezuela usa o sistema de justi\u00e7a como fachada, mas a realidade \u00e9 que os ju\u00edzes e procuradores venezuelanos tornaram-se soldados obedientes. As autoridades venezuelanas t\u00eam abusado sistematicamente dos seus poderes para limitar a liberdade de express\u00e3o, minando o debate aberto e democr\u00e1tico que \u00e9 especialmente cr\u00edtico com as elei\u00e7\u00f5es legislativas que se aproximam em Dezembro.\u201d<\/span>5 <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Various political leaders have been jailed, driven from the country, or sued. Of course, jailing political prisoners on trumped-up charges is a classic totalitarian approach. Intimidation is also an effective method of repression, and it\u2019s often done in such a way that the government can wash its hands of any implications of wrongdoing. Chavista thugs and motorcycle gangs have been known to terrorize journalists under the guise of being independent citizens. Even Twitter users on social media have been jailed for inflammatory comments concerning Maduro, instilling fear in not only journalists, but voters as well. Protests are met with harsh police crackdowns and the journalists who cover them routinely have their cameras confiscated or worse. It\u2019s estimated that 70-80 press members are presently imprisoned in Venezuela. Even the mayor of Caracas is under house arrest. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

L\u00edderes emergentes e figuras pol\u00edticas consolidadas<\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Talvez nenhuma pris\u00e3o pol\u00edtica na Venezuela tenha tido maior visibilidade do que a do L\u00edder da Oposi\u00e7\u00e3o, Leopoldo L\u00f3pez<\/b>. O New York Times<\/i> declarou que: \u201cAs acusa\u00e7\u00f5es contra o Sr. L\u00f3pez, um ex-prefeito de um dos munic\u00edpios que comp\u00f5em Caracas, formado em Harvard, eram obscenas. Maduro ordenou a sua pris\u00e3o em Fevereiro de 2014 e acusou-o de fomentar a viol\u00eancia enquanto as manifesta\u00e7\u00f5es contra o governo se espalhavam. O governo, na sua queixa criminal, alegou absurdamente que o senhor L\u00f3pez incitou os venezuelanos \u00e0 viol\u00eancia atrav\u00e9s de mensagens subliminares.\u201d<\/span>6<\/span> Hoje, Lopez \u00e9 o \u00fanico prisioneiro no pr\u00e9dio onde est\u00e1 detido, com seis portas trancadas entre sua cela solit\u00e1ria e sua liberdade. \u00c9 claro que ele n\u00e3o seria encarcerado se Maduro n\u00e3o o considerasse uma amea\u00e7a. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Overall, many feel there is a dearth of leadership in Venezuela. On the Chavista side, Chavez was able to nurture a cult of personality, but wherever this occurs, a charismatic tends to be surrounded by mediocrity. Case in point,\u00a0 <\/span>Nicol\u00e1s Maduro. Sem a personalidade de Ch\u00e1vez, ele n\u00e3o goza da popularidade de seu antecessor junto ao povo. Ele herdou o c\u00e1lice envenenado de uma na\u00e7\u00e3o com um modelo econ\u00f3mico falido. Imagine gerir um lugar onde a infla\u00e7\u00e3o est\u00e1 a aproximar-se dos 100% e as pessoas fazem fila durante horas por ra\u00e7\u00f5es escassas ao abrigo de um programa de identifica\u00e7\u00e3o que est\u00e1 a ser explorado por gangues e transformado num bandido de entrega de comida.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Diosdado Cabello<\/b>, Presidente da Assembleia Nacional,  <\/span>\u00e9 um executor astuto e implac\u00e1vel, mas n\u00e3o tem apoio popular. Ele seria um l\u00edder l\u00f3gico de qualquer junta ou tomada militar.  <\/span>Cabello entusiasma, motiva e suscita a lealdade dos elementos mais radicais da oposi\u00e7\u00e3o, mas n\u00e3o tem aceita\u00e7\u00e3o com os apoiantes do chavismo devido \u00e0s suas pol\u00edticas econ\u00f3micas libert\u00e1rias radicais e \u00e0 sua origem privilegiada.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Candidato presidencial da oposi\u00e7\u00e3o, Henrique Capriles<\/b>, is a major player with good support, but he may be seen among voters as a has-been. He has had chances in the past as an opposition leader to create change, so it is hard to imagine him creating much of a buzz. Chavista defector and Lara state Governor Henrique Falc\u00e3o<\/b> \u00e9 um moderado que \u00e9 h\u00e1bil em trilhar o meio-termo. Ele consegue se manter discreto e \u00e9 considerado um azar\u00e3o de se observar.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

De acordo com Fox News.com, \u201c<\/span>Autoridades eleitorais venezuelanas rejeitaram l\u00edder de oposi\u00e7\u00e3o de alto n\u00edvel Maria Corina Machado<\/b>tentativa de se registrar como candidato para as pr\u00f3ximas elei\u00e7\u00f5es para o Congresso. Machado anunciou na segunda-feira (28.9.15) que o Conselho Nacional Eleitoral rejeitou sua tentativa de inscri\u00e7\u00e3o para concorrer nas elei\u00e7\u00f5es de 6 de dezembro. Machado chama a rejei\u00e7\u00e3o de sua candidatura de uma viola\u00e7\u00e3o grotesca de seus direitos.\u201d<\/span>7<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

As pr\u00f3ximas elei\u00e7\u00f5es: previs\u00f5es e poss\u00edveis resultados<\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\"Pesquisa<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

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As elei\u00e7\u00f5es parlamentares na Venezuela, em Dezembro de 2015, s\u00e3o vistas por alguns como a \u00faltima e \u00faltima esperan\u00e7a para que as pessoas com inclina\u00e7\u00f5es democr\u00e1ticas expressem os seus desejos e melhorem o seu pa\u00eds atrav\u00e9s das urnas. Depois disso, \u00e9 um territ\u00f3rio desconhecido. A maioria acha que a oposi\u00e7\u00e3o ter\u00e1 um bom desempenho, o que \u00e9 uma grande not\u00edcia depois de muitos anos de dom\u00ednio chavista nas urnas. No entanto, a oposi\u00e7\u00e3o n\u00e3o est\u00e1 particularmente unida, pelo que poder\u00e1 n\u00e3o haver uma \u00fanica figura de proa quando a fuma\u00e7a se dissipar. A capacidade do presidente Maduro de governar depender\u00e1 do desenrolar das elei\u00e7\u00f5es. Diosdado Cabello, como Chefe da Assembleia Nacional, tentar\u00e1 aproveitar qualquer impulso que a oposi\u00e7\u00e3o consiga reunir.  <\/span>Com alguns prevendo uma vit\u00f3ria esmagadora da oposi\u00e7\u00e3o, h\u00e1 d\u00favidas sobre se o governo ir\u00e1 permitir<\/i> tal coisa aconte\u00e7a. Como foi mencionado,  <\/span>figuras da oposi\u00e7\u00e3o  <\/span>Leopoldo Lopez e Maria Corina Machado foram presos e\/ou  <\/span>impedidos de participar nas elei\u00e7\u00f5es. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Another government advantage is near outright ownership of the media airwaves. The opposition candidates, once they declare, are immediately intimidated by the government and not allowed to have adequate airtime. For the most part they are denigrated, criticized, and are said to be fomenting violence and unrest. Of course, if the Chavistas lose, they won\u2019t control all of the government anymore. In that event, they may attempt to enact laws that limit congressional power. Regardless of the outcome,\u00a0 <\/span>\u201cAccording to a leading Venezuelan polling organization, Datan\u00e1lisis, 84 percent of the population believes that the country is on the wrong path and only 13 percent view Venezuela\u2019s situation positively.\u201d8<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Liberdade de imprensa? Qualidade da informa\u00e7\u00e3o? <\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Desde<\/span> <\/b>Nicol\u00e1s Maduro assumed power in Venezuela, journalistic opinion and information are allowed much less space in available publications. Local news outlets have been bought out by government supporters or have been driven out of business altogether, their resources often drained by ongoing court cases. In many instances they are refused permission to advertise or broadcast. Even worse, journalists are often jailed or fined by a wary government intent on neutralizing negative reports on\u00a0its conduct and policies. Freedom of the press is not altogether forbidden as it is in North Korea, but those who do publish anti-government content are almost sure to not be publishing much longer. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Para contornar as medidas institu\u00eddas pelo governo para reprimir a liberdade de imprensa, muitos jornalistas recorreram \u00e0 Internet, utilizando blogues e publicando atrav\u00e9s de meios de comunica\u00e7\u00e3o estrangeiros. No entanto, o regime de Maduro est\u00e1 a come\u00e7ar a agir contra a express\u00e3o nas redes sociais, prendendo seis indiv\u00edduos por Tweets que lan\u00e7am uma luz negativa sobre o governo. Apesar do perigo e dos obst\u00e1culos \u00e0 publica\u00e7\u00e3o de opini\u00f5es livres, ainda existe independ\u00eancia e resist\u00eancia entre grandes segmentos da imprensa. As dif\u00edceis condi\u00e7\u00f5es econ\u00f3micas fizeram com que muitos jornalistas sa\u00edssem do pa\u00eds, deixando correspondentes estrangeiros no seu rasto. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The government is unable to crack down on foreign journalists because of the repercussions it would have internationally. No new reporters are coming in, but those already there have been allowed to stay. Ultimately, the government aims to negate local press outlets and mute the foreign journalists with a war of attrition. Social media is a helpful alternative to traditional delivery mediums, but money, resources, and talent are necessary for the production of substantial, informative reporting. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sair da Venezuela \u2013 O Custo do Nacionalismo <\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

\u201cIn 2007, the Bolivarian government issued a law-decree nationalizing all remaining oil production sites under foreign control and mandating that all oil extraction in Venezuela be undertaken within the framework of joint ventures, in which the state oil company PDVSA retains the majority stake.\u00a0This move sparked a wave of lawsuits by foreign trans-nationals in international arbitration bodies demanding compensation for expropriated assets. In response, Venezuela withdrew from the ICSID in 2012, citing institutional bias in favor of transnational corporations on the part of the Washington-based body.\u00a0\u201c13<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Where once Venezuela was home to many large multi-national firms, today only a handful remain. It\u2019s difficult to make a profit because labor costs and the prices of goods are predetermined. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

As maiores empresas est\u00e3o a resistir, contando com tempos econ\u00f3micos melhores no futuro, enquanto as empresas mais pequenas n\u00e3o podem dar-se ao luxo de esperar tanto tempo. As grandes empresas petrol\u00edferas est\u00e3o a enfrentar a situa\u00e7\u00e3o financeiramente, mas o potencial de lucros futuros \u00e9 demasiado grande para ser ignorado. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

O ICSID, o Centro Internacional para Resolu\u00e7\u00e3o de Disputas sobre Investimentos, tem muitos casos pendentes envolvendo alega\u00e7\u00f5es de que o governo venezuelano expropriou empresas no decurso dos esfor\u00e7os de nacionaliza\u00e7\u00e3o. A Exxon ganhou recentemente um caso $1.6B em 2014, e diz-se que o pa\u00eds deve milhares de milh\u00f5es a companhias a\u00e9reas que continuam por pagar. No geral, a Venezuela tornou-se um lugar dif\u00edcil para conduzir o com\u00e9rcio para os interesses petrol\u00edferos internacionais e para as grandes empresas em geral. Para aqueles que partiram, \u00e9 improv\u00e1vel que regressem at\u00e9 que um governo novo e mais receptivo esteja em fun\u00e7\u00f5es. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

A import\u00e2ncia da Venezuela para a petroeconomia global <\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Durante algum tempo, a Venezuela de Hugo Ch\u00e1vez brilhou como um farol para pa\u00edses de todo o mundo que ansiavam por obter maior independ\u00eancia dos EUA e por controlar os seus pr\u00f3prios recursos.\u00a0 <\/span>He was seen as that rare individual with the courage to stand up to the U.S. in defiance, and as a central figurehead in a worldwide alliance of left-leaning, socialistic powers. After world oil prices plummeted, the bottom fell out of Chavez\u2019s plans and his mystique was weakened.\u00a0 <\/span>Na sua esteira, o sucessor Nicol\u00e1s Maduro faz discursos inflamados, mas eles t\u00eam um impacto discreto. Programas como Petrocaribe, <\/i>que fornecia petr\u00f3leo \u00e0 Venezuela e aos pa\u00edses das Cara\u00edbas, perdeu apoio quando o dinheiro deixou de fluir. Hoje, restam poucas na\u00e7\u00f5es que defendem a Venezuela no cen\u00e1rio mundial. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

No doubt, Venezuela can still be a major provider of oil. They have the largest reserves in the world, but theirs is a viscous, hard-to-process type of petroleum product that is expensive to refine. With current prices at a nadir, Venezuela\u2019s role as an oil producer has diminished, and its position as a lion of socialism has been undermined, as well. Globally, they are still a top ten producer of oil and they are important in that regard. Presently, there is a glut of oil on the global market, but this will not always be\u00a0so. In the long-term, the world will need Venezuela\u2019s vast reserves to supply an unquenchable need for petroleum. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

O estrategista do UBS, Julius Walker, resumiu desta forma. \u201cA Venezuela ainda \u00e9 importante para o mercado global de petr\u00f3leo. Qualquer interrup\u00e7\u00e3o na produ\u00e7\u00e3o causaria um aumento significativo nos pre\u00e7os. Qualquer interrup\u00e7\u00e3o da produ\u00e7\u00e3o como resultado de agita\u00e7\u00e3o pol\u00edtica resultaria quase certamente em picos acentuados de pre\u00e7os, e um d\u00e9fice total de produ\u00e7\u00e3o prejudicaria gravemente os mercados petrol\u00edferos globais.\u201d<\/span>9<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

O petr\u00f3leo \u00e9 a \u00fanica resposta? <\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Al\u00e9m do petr\u00f3leo, a Venezuela \u00e9 bem dotada de recursos naturais abundantes; min\u00e9rio de ferro, alum\u00ednio, ouro, diamantes e g\u00e1s natural. A diversifica\u00e7\u00e3o foi tentada no passado, mas em \u00faltima an\u00e1lise o petr\u00f3leo governou os 20<\/span>\u00ba<\/sup><\/span> S\u00e9culo e al\u00e9m. At\u00e9 agora, a produ\u00e7\u00e3o de petr\u00f3leo tem sido t\u00e3o barata que a necessidade de fazer qualquer outra coisa era praticamente um ponto discut\u00edvel. Ainda assim, existe um tremendo potencial. Deixemos que a Venezuela de hoje crie obst\u00e1culos ao progresso, nomeadamente quest\u00f5es de capital e direitos de propriedade que dificultam os esfor\u00e7os de diversifica\u00e7\u00e3o. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

O Ministro do Tesouro venezuelano, Julio Sosa Rodriguez, resumiu bem a situa\u00e7\u00e3o numa entrevista recente em Caracas, quando disse: \u201cPara a minha gera\u00e7\u00e3o, ser\u00e1 a primeira vez que veremos o petr\u00f3leo cair abaixo de metade do or\u00e7amento nacional. A coisa mais tola dos \u00faltimos 20 anos foi n\u00e3o diversificar a economia.\u201d<\/span>10         <\/span><\/span>Pode ser necess\u00e1rio um grande investimento estrangeiro para investir e ajudar a economia venezuelana, se e quando essa economia estiver estabilizada. Existir\u00e3o oportunidades em muitos sectores se for permitido que sejam actualizadas e concretizadas. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Venezuela\u2019s Relationship with Other Latin American Governments <\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The left-wing governments of Ecuador, Cuba, Argentina, and Bolivia have historically had alliances with Venezuela. These affiliations are based more upon ideology than on copying Venezuela as an economic model. Latin American ties were especially strong when Chavez ruled and money and oil were flowing. However, relationships have deteriorated noticeably under the Maduro regime. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Brazil pretends to have decent relations with Venezuela, but there is no real respect for Maduro that isn\u2019t based on fear of his power and of losing access to Venezuela\u2019s ready supply of oil. After all, Venezuela used to give money to their allies, but in light of its current economic woes, those days are gone. Some Caribbean nations such as Barbados rely on Venezuela for oil, so they are reticent to speak out against Maduro in any meaningful way. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

While the embattled leader is struggling to hold together his frayed alliances, human rights groups are leaning hard on Latin American countries to hold the Venezuelan government accountable for its many transgressions against its political prisoners. Columbia has raised its voice to the issue, but it shares a border with Venezuela and isn\u2019t too anxious to pick a fight. Cuba has long shared left-leaning proclivities with Venezuela, but their recent thawing of relations with the U.S. has placed Maduro in an awkward position given the vitriol and disdain he regularly aims at Washington and Obama.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

E quanto \u00e0 R\u00fassia e \u00e0 China? <\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

If Venezuela is a strong ally of Russia and China, the relationship is mostly superficial. Venezuela has offered the two world powers a place to sell their products on preferential terms. The loans they have given are typically based on contractual obligations for the selling of Russian and Chinese products. When times were better, sales were good and everyone was happy, but today the business is winding down.\u00a0 <\/span>Russia claims continued alliance, but they have trouble dealing with of their own. It is China that has continued to lend to Venezuela, even when getting paid back for these loans seems unlikely. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

De acordo com The Economist, \u201co Presidente Nicol\u00e1s Maduro anunciou um novo empr\u00e9stimo de $5 mil milh\u00f5es da China no seu programa semanal de televis\u00e3o, que foi transmitido em 1 de Setembro. No programa de duas horas (\u201cEm contato com Maduro\u201d, \u201cEn contato con Maduro\u201d), ele anunciou brevemente que o acordo havia sido assinado, antes de passar para imagens de soldados chineses marchando e um clipe dele tocando bateria com dignit\u00e1rios chineses. . \u2026 Dado que o empr\u00e9stimo ser\u00e1 reembolsado em petr\u00f3leo, n\u00e3o precisou de ser ratificado pelo parlamento venezuelano (pois n\u00e3o contar\u00e1 oficialmente como d\u00edvida).\u201d<\/span>11 <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

China\u2019s place at the bargaining table is solid and they are not giving the money away for free. The strings are inevitably tied to the provision of a steady supply of oil in the future. Like Russia, China is dealing with its own economic turndown. Venezuela is located far away from China and the cost of refining the plentiful but viscous oil supply will be very expensive. The Chinese have made similar deals in Africa, leveraging present-day loans for long-term provisions of much-needed oil. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Aliados e oponentes internacionais<\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

As alian\u00e7as e amizades percebidas envolvendo a Venezuela e outras na\u00e7\u00f5es baseiam-se quase sempre no petr\u00f3leo, no dinheiro e em pol\u00edticas de esquerda. Para o Ir\u00e3o, a R\u00fassia, a S\u00edria e a China, qualquer associa\u00e7\u00e3o \u00e9 de natureza puramente monet\u00e1ria. A ideologia n\u00e3o \u00e9 uma considera\u00e7\u00e3o importante. Al\u00e9m disso, qualquer na\u00e7\u00e3o democr\u00e1tica \u00e9 quase certamente um oponente do governo venezuelano. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cuba \u00e9 um aliado ideol\u00f3gico de longa data da Venezuela. No entanto, o recente aquecimento das rela\u00e7\u00f5es com os EUA criou problemas para o governo Maduro. Venezuela e Cuba estiveram em conjunto durante muitos anos, protestando contra os males da Am\u00e9rica. A viragem de 180 graus de Cuba n\u00e3o s\u00f3 confundiu Maduro, como tamb\u00e9m p\u00f5e em causa a sua pr\u00f3pria legitimidade. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Brazil\u2019s friendship with Venezuela is of great importance to the Maduro government as Brazil is in good economic shape. Elsewhere, Algeria, Palestine, and the Assad regime in Syria have shown an alliance to the Venezuelan<\/span> government. Some believe that Maduro\u2019s regime has been somehow complicit in helping Iran to conceal its ongoing nuclear development program. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Quanto aos inimigos, n\u00e3o h\u00e1 d\u00favida de que os EUA s\u00e3o o n\u00famero um. Maduro tem afirmado insistentemente que os EUA t\u00eam tentado assassin\u00e1-lo, implicando at\u00e9 o vice-presidente Joe Biden nessas afirma\u00e7\u00f5es. O Presidente Obama, fazendo o seu melhor para n\u00e3o fornecer \u00e0 Venezuela raz\u00f5es para rotular os EUA como imperialistas, tem tentado descongelar as rela\u00e7\u00f5es com o regime de Maduro. Noutras frentes, a Espanha pode ser vista como ideologicamente oposta \u00e0 Venezuela, e a Col\u00f4mbia incitou definitivamente a ira de Maduro. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Novo Di\u00e1logo com os EUA?<\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\"Pesquisa<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Para Nicol\u00e1s Maduro, quaisquer negocia\u00e7\u00f5es com o governo dos EUA s\u00e3o, na melhor das hip\u00f3teses, uma proposta arriscada. Afinal de contas, ele e o seu antecessor, o falecido Hugo Ch\u00e1vez, passaram muitos anos a denegrir e a vomitar veneno anticapitalista no seu vilipendiado vizinho do Norte. Dito isto, as conversa\u00e7\u00f5es recentes entre as duas na\u00e7\u00f5es t\u00eam de facto estado em curso. Como foi relatado recentemente pela ag\u00eancia de not\u00edcias Reuters\u2026 <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cOs Estados Unidos e Venezuela<\/span><\/a> iniciaram o seu di\u00e1logo mais extenso em anos, numa tentativa de melhorar as suas rela\u00e7\u00f5es amargas, de acordo com um alto funcion\u00e1rio da administra\u00e7\u00e3o dos EUA. A diplomacia silenciosa, cuja extens\u00e3o n\u00e3o foi anteriormente divulgada, \u00e9 um sinal de que a distens\u00e3o dos EUA com a Cuba comunista pode estar a ajudar a remodelar outra rela\u00e7\u00e3o conturbada da Am\u00e9rica Latina. O respons\u00e1vel, que tem conhecimento directo das conversa\u00e7\u00f5es de alto n\u00edvel, advertiu que o processo est\u00e1 numa fase inicial. O esfor\u00e7o do governo mais ardentemente anti-Washington da Am\u00e9rica Latina e do principal fornecedor de petr\u00f3leo dos EUA para melhorar as rela\u00e7\u00f5es ocorre num momento em que o presidente Nicol\u00e1s Maduro luta com uma economia estatal decadente que foi deixada mais isolada pelos la\u00e7os aquecidos do aliado pr\u00f3ximo Cuba com os EUA.\u201d<\/span>14<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

For the U.S, having a failed state in Venezuela is not a good thing. It creates increased security issues and opens the door to escalation in drug trafficking activities. The DEA has been investigating high-ranking Venezuelan officials for believed involvement in drug-related criminality. To mollify the U.S., some arrests have been made in relation to the investigations. One possible scenario sees the U.S. providing financial aid to Venezuela, though some doubt this will happen. In the pursuit of U.S. dollars, it\u2019s reported that the Venezuelan Head of the Assemblage, Diosdado Cabello recently met in Haiti with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Shannon. In the meantime, Maduro continues to vent on TV against the U.S., blaming it for most of Venezuela\u2019s ills. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

O desastre est\u00e1 logo \u00e0 frente? <\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Despite loans from China to keep it economically solvent and ongoing relations with the U.S. portending possible relief for Venezuelans, day-to-day<\/span> life is still miserable for millions. Long lines of poor people stand in line for food and supplies. Constant shortages provide unending aggravation. Crime threatens the very lives of a vulnerable population. Many say that short of a quick and demonstrative intervention of some type, Venezuela may soon be heading off the cliff. This makes the coming elections even more important. With external debts mounting and oil prices remaining low month after month, conditions are perfect for a cataclysm of the highest order. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

De acordo com o Barclays, \u201ca Venezuela est\u00e1 a sofrer a crise econ\u00f3mica mais profunda da sua hist\u00f3ria, prevendo-se que a produ\u00e7\u00e3o contraia 9,1 por cento este ano. A contrac\u00e7\u00e3o econ\u00f3mica atingir\u00e1 provavelmente 16,5 por cento entre 2014 e 2016, enquanto a infla\u00e7\u00e3o durante esse per\u00edodo exceder\u00e1 1.000 por cento.\u201d<\/span>15<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The middle-class continues to protest, but unless they are joined by the poor, creating numbers too big to be ignored, little will change. True, petrol bombs, thrown stones, unrest, and violence can lead to an awareness that might affect real change, but without organization and leadership, such protests stand little chance of uniting huge amounts of people and of being effective. With Venezuelan citizens so hungry and angry, it\u2019s not hard to see why Chavez-worship is on the wane. An epochal event might be necessary to usher in a new era for the nation and to reinvigorate its beleaguered markets. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

A longo prazo\u2026<\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Most experts agree that things will get worse in Venezuela before they get better. Even if oil prices rise, the best that might be expected is a few more years of \u201ckicking the can down the road.\u201d The country\u2019s debts are astronomical. There isn\u2019t enough food. Problems are myriad to the point that it may take decades for Venezuela to sift through the wreckage wrought by Chavez\u2019s experiment, and by the fickle<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

natureza dos mercados de combust\u00edveis f\u00f3sseis. Resta saber se a queda prevista do chavismo ser\u00e1 resolvida rapidamente ou se haver\u00e1 uma luta longa e dolorosa para sair da escurid\u00e3o. Qualquer que seja a resolu\u00e7\u00e3o, deve envolver um mandato do povo e n\u00e3o a vontade dos velhos oligarcas. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Will a moderate such as Capriles provide the bridge to unite right and left in Venezuela? Can Chinese loans stave off default? China may well be tiring of waiting for its<\/span> return on investment to pay dividends. On the upside, Venezuela is sitting on a sea of oil, and there is no doubt that eventually, the world will need it. Oil prices are bound to rise and when that happens, Venezuela will be well-positioned to reap the benefits. Investors, meanwhile, are in a wait-and-see mode. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

De LFPress.com; \u201cA economia continuar\u00e1 a sofrer e n\u00e3o h\u00e1 vontade pol\u00edtica no governo para tomar medidas fortes para fazer face ao r\u00e1pido aumento da infla\u00e7\u00e3o e \u00e0 deteriora\u00e7\u00e3o do ambiente fiscal.  <\/span>Na verdade, a insatisfa\u00e7\u00e3o p\u00fablica que se manifesta neste momento torna Maduro ainda menos propenso a implementar reformas dolorosas que poderiam levar a protestos revigorados. Isso significa que veremos novas rodadas de descontentamento social no futuro.\u201d<\/span>16<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Qual caminho a seguir? <\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

As improbable as it sounds, many feel the best course of action for Venezuela to take regarding its future would be to form a transitional government with representation from all sides, in the interest of national solidarity. This would include the opposition, the Chavista government, and the military. Some feel that painful austerity measures presented by a unified front are needed in order to stabilize the economy. The IMF could provide emergency funding. The people will decide who they want to lead through fair elections monitored by the international community. The ultimate goal would be to achieve some type of peaceful democratic transition. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Outras solu\u00e7\u00f5es sugeridas incluem uma desvaloriza\u00e7\u00e3o da actual taxa de c\u00e2mbio para incentivar as empresas a regressar \u00e0 Venezuela. Do ponto de vista da ind\u00fastria petrol\u00edfera e do investimento internacional, o controlo da oposi\u00e7\u00e3o seria uma melhoria, uma vez que existe uma grande desconfian\u00e7a em Maduro e nas suas pol\u00edticas. Actualmente, seria dif\u00edcil para o governo Maduro consertar as barreiras, por mais decr\u00e9pita que a economia se tenha tornado. Dito isso,  <\/span>apesar dos seus fracassos, muitos ainda apoiam o chavismo e alimentam esperan\u00e7as de reavivar a revolu\u00e7\u00e3o. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Maduro still has four years left to rule, but it\u2019s hard to imagine him surviving that long as badly as things have been. Should the urban poor mobilize and show their extreme discontent in the streets, Maduro\u2019s tenure could be shortened. In an interesting article in the Huffington Post recently, this assessment was published \u2026 <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cUma solu\u00e7\u00e3o vi\u00e1vel seria encontrar um novo l\u00edder, que potencialmente venha das favelas de Petare, San Agust\u00edn ou 23 de Enero; que \u00e9 capaz de apelar aos muitos insatisfeitos Chavistas<\/i> que n\u00e3o confiam nos actuais l\u00edderes da oposi\u00e7\u00e3o. O surgimento de tal figura poderia potencialmente representar um terreno comum entre Chavistas<\/i> e a oposi\u00e7\u00e3o e poderia muito bem assinalar o ponto de viragem na crise pol\u00edtica da Venezuela.\u201d<\/span>17<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

O que os venezuelanos realmente querem <\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Most experts feel that the wants of the Venezuelan people are actually not so complex or impossible to satisfy. Like everyone, they wish for the basics; food, shelter, and clothing. They want to be able to eat and have a minimal amount of purchasing power. As one insider put it, \u201cthey want a peaceful nation with plenty to eat, drink, decent beaches, and they will be happy.\u201d Venezuelans also want to be heard, to have a voice, a vote, and honest representation. In addition, they insist on a decent education for their children. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Do jeito que est\u00e1, a classe m\u00e9dia est\u00e1 a aumentar as apostas e a sair na aus\u00eancia de oportunidades para prosperar. Os pobres t\u00eam realmente muito pouca esperan\u00e7a de que algum al\u00edvio para as mis\u00e9rias actuais esteja pr\u00f3ximo. Infelizmente, a Venezuela \u00e9 um pa\u00eds polarizado. Os desejos e vontades daqueles que apoiam a oposi\u00e7\u00e3o e os chavistas diferem significativamente. Muitos desejam veementemente ver o fim das pol\u00edticas do Chavismo, enquanto os pobres e desfavorecidos querem a continua\u00e7\u00e3o dos gastos sociais e das pol\u00edticas de esquerda. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Al\u00e9m disso, as pessoas querem se sentir seguras nas ruas e em suas casas. Eles est\u00e3o com medo porque o crime violento continua a aumentar. Muitas pessoas tamb\u00e9m passam fome e est\u00e3o cansadas de esperar na fila por comida e suprimentos. A raiva deles est\u00e1 crescendo. \u00c9 um rastilho aceso queimando cada vez mais perto de uma explos\u00e3o de propor\u00e7\u00f5es catacl\u00edsmicas. Que forma isso pode assumir n\u00e3o est\u00e1 claro. Resta saber se essa explos\u00e3o poder\u00e1 ser neutralizada rapidamente, antes que seja tarde demais. O futuro parece promissor para a Venezuela e o seu povo. \u00c9 o presente <\/i>isso \u00e9 extremamente vol\u00e1til e problem\u00e1tico. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n

Localiza\u00e7\u00e3o de nossas instala\u00e7\u00f5es em Nova York<\/h2>\n