{"id":11914,"date":"2009-02-07T10:17:08","date_gmt":"2009-02-07T10:17:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/analysis-of-carrefours-dubai-market-entry\/"},"modified":"2026-01-27T15:20:11","modified_gmt":"2026-01-27T20:20:11","slug":"analysis-of-carrefours-dubai-market-entry","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/fr\/analysis-of-carrefours-dubai-market-entry\/","title":{"rendered":"Analyse de l'entr\u00e9e sur le march\u00e9 de Duba\u00ef par Carrefour"},"content":{"rendered":"

R\u00e9sum\u00e9 ex\u00e9cutif<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\"SIS<\/figure>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n

En 1995, Carrefour a \u00e9tendu son concept d'hypermarch\u00e9 europ\u00e9en qu'il avait initialement lanc\u00e9 il y a plusieurs d\u00e9cennies \u00e0 Duba\u00ef, aux \u00c9mirats arabes unis. Suite \u00e0 une strat\u00e9gie d'expansion prudente pays par pays sur les march\u00e9s \u00e9mergents, Carrefour a vu un potentiel dans l'\u00e9mirat de Duba\u00ef. L\u2019\u00e9mirat poss\u00e9dait un secteur de vente au d\u00e9tail florissant et pr\u00e9sentait des fondamentaux solides dans son \u00e9conomie florissante. L'objectif de Carrefour \u00e9tait de trouver un mode d'entr\u00e9e qui lui permettrait de r\u00e9duire les risques d'\u00e9chec et de maintenir sa rentabilit\u00e9, tout en compensant son rival mondial de longue date, Wal-Mart.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Duba\u00ef pr\u00e9sentait de nombreux avantages pour les entreprises envisageant d'entrer sur le march\u00e9 de Duba\u00ef en 1995. Malgr\u00e9 une petite population par rapport aux autres march\u00e9s qu'elle desservait, Duba\u00ef offrait une composition inhabituelle d'expatri\u00e9s et de r\u00e9sidents locaux dans une \u00e9conomie avec l'un des niveaux de vie et de revenus les plus \u00e9lev\u00e9s du monde. monde. Le march\u00e9 \u00e9tait extr\u00eamement favorable aux affaires, avec de nombreux avantages comme l\u2019absence d\u2019imp\u00f4t sur les soci\u00e9t\u00e9s et tr\u00e8s peu d\u2019obstacles au commerce. Elle disposait de r\u00e9seaux de transport sup\u00e9rieurs, d'un syst\u00e8me juridique bien d\u00e9fini, de conditions de vente au d\u00e9tail positives, d'une forte croissance \u00e9conomique et de faibles risques politiques et de transfert.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Carrefour a examin\u00e9 les lois et a d\u00e9termin\u00e9 qu'une coentreprise serait la meilleure solution pour minimiser le risque d'\u00e9chec tout en disposant d'un partenaire qualifi\u00e9 pour rechercher activement la croissance et g\u00e9rer les op\u00e9rations. Elle s'est associ\u00e9e \u00e0 une coentreprise avec Majid Al Futtaim, un conglom\u00e9rat panr\u00e9gional poss\u00e9dant une exp\u00e9rience de la vente au d\u00e9tail au Moyen-Orient. La coentreprise s'est adapt\u00e9e au march\u00e9 en changeant la place de ses magasins vers le centre commercial, a adapt\u00e9 sa nourriture aux normes socioculturelles, a promu principalement des produits non alimentaires en raison de marges b\u00e9n\u00e9ficiaires plus \u00e9lev\u00e9es et a \u00e9t\u00e9 tr\u00e8s prudente dans les remises dans les march\u00e9s \u00e0 deux chiffres. inflation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The venture was successful for Carrefour, given that it increased the number of stores opened in Dubai and expanded to nearby countries. Ultimately, Carrefour was successful because it developed a First Mover Advantage, it thoroughly adapted to the extent that it did not feel foreign to many consumers, and because of Majid Al Futtaim\u2019s aggressiveness in identifying and pursuing growth opportunities. Carrefour faces two key problems including Customer inconvenience and Dubai\u2019s long-term macroeconomic challenges. To address these challenges, Carrefour should seek to build new advantages through market positioning, strengthen its First Mover Advantage to limit competitive pressures, and build up specialty foods sections to better target expatriates.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Pr\u00e9sentation de l'entreprise<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The French Fournier and Defforey families founded Carrefour in 1959 as a supermarket retailer. It was not until four years later in 1963 that the group opened its first hypermarket, which eventually led Carrefour to its success. In 1969 the company decided to expand internationally and opened its first hypermarket in Belgium In 1977, \u201cProduits Libres\u201d or unbranded products were introduced as a substitute to popular brands and were dubbed just as good. This pioneering idea led the company to create its own brand in 1985, which led the way for supermarket and hypermarkets worldwide. The idea was to help create even lower prices at the markets. Extremely low prices were one of the guiding strategies the company used to compete and buy out other chains.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

La cl\u00e9 du succ\u00e8s de Carrefour r\u00e9side dans l'hypermarch\u00e9, le magasin tout-en-un qui vend de tout, des bananes aux poussettes, \u00e0 prix discount. C'\u00e9tait l'id\u00e9e originale de l'entreprise et elle s'est aujourd'hui \u00e9tendue dans le monde entier, ses acteurs \u00e9tant parmi les plus grands g\u00e9ants \u00e9conomiques que l'histoire ait connus. Dans le cadre de ses Avantages Sp\u00e9cifiques \u00e0 l'Entreprise, il est le leader mondial des hypermarch\u00e9s ayant \u00e9t\u00e9 pionnier du concept, ce qui lui conf\u00e8re des avantages significatifs par rapport \u00e0 ses concurrents dans l'exploitation du concept. Deuxi\u00e8mement, il a d\u00e9velopp\u00e9 son portefeuille de produits de marques propres qui permettent \u00e0 Carrefour de proposer des prix plus bas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Troisi\u00e8mement, elle poss\u00e8de une marque tr\u00e8s forte en termes de qualit\u00e9 et de valeur sur les march\u00e9s, ce qui lui a permis d'acqu\u00e9rir une reconnaissance mondiale, comme en t\u00e9moigne son statut de num\u00e9ro deux en tant que leader mondial du segment des hypermarch\u00e9s. De plus, Carrefour a d\u00e9velopp\u00e9 des avantages significatifs en tant que premier arrivant en ayant \u00e9t\u00e9 le premier \u00e0 p\u00e9n\u00e9trer de nombreux march\u00e9s \u00e9mergents.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Some Firm Specific Disadvantages include Carrefour\u2019s various entry failures in other markets<\/a> and the negative connotations associated with the company\u2019s conviction of false advertising and charge for undermining capitalism. Also, as a First Mover Carrefour faces the increased costs associated with infrastructure development and extensive advertising. Finally, Carrefour must greatly adapt its product because food is a multi-domestic product and local consumers have diverse preferences and functional requirements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As a French company, Carrefour has several Country Specific Advantages (CSAs). First, French companies were considered to have high-quality goods and specialty items. In particular, French goods had a reputation for being luxurious, unique, and beautiful. Second, countries like the United Arab Emirates and cities like Dubai considered France an ally, given the strong political relationships between the countries. Eventually, France decided to locate a French permanent military base in the UAE in 2008 due to the strong relations. However, France also developed Country Specific Disadvantages. One of these perceptions was that the French were considered uptight and that the French considered their ways of doing things superior. Compared to English, the French language was not widely spoken worldwide and thus a language barrier existed. Last, although goods were luxurious, a disadvantage was that French goods were deemed too fancy for everyday life.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

En 1993, le chiffre d'affaires mondial de Carrefour s'\u00e9levait \u00e0 14,82 milliards de dollars et Carrefour recherchait avec voracit\u00e9 une croissance sur les march\u00e9s \u00e9mergents. \u00c0 cette \u00e9poque, aucun des concurrents de Carrefour tels que Wal-Mart, Tesco, Auchuan, Casino et E. Leclrc ne s'est \u00e9tendu aux \u00c9mirats arabes unis. Alors que son rival G\u00e9ant envisageait peut-\u00eatre ce march\u00e9 compte tenu de sa strat\u00e9gie d'expansion sur les march\u00e9s \u00e9mergents, Carrefour aurait \u00e9t\u00e9 le premier grand d\u00e9taillant \u00e9tranger \u00e0 op\u00e9rer sur le march\u00e9 de Duba\u00ef, ce qui lui aurait conf\u00e9r\u00e9 un avantage de premier arrivant.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Currently, Carrefour is the second largest hypermarket chain worldwide behind Wal-Mart and the largest in Europe, with 2006 sales of $102,774,800 and 16.5% growth. It operates about 15,000 stores of many different sizes and categories including hypermarkets, supermarkets, convenience stores, discount stores, and cash-and-carry stores. Today Carrefour hypermarkets \u201coffer an average surface area of 8,400 sq.m filled with a range of between 20,000 and 80,000 food and non-food items.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Carrefour\u2019s major competitor is Wal-Mart who seemed to have similar success and failure abroad. Wal-Mart succeeded in Japan, through joint ventures and an emphasis on local culture. It did, however, fail in Germany where the concept of a huge American discount store did not culturally resonate. Carrefour\u2019s major French competitors are Auchan, Casino Guichard and E.Leclerc who all fall far behind the company in sales and size, by provide constant price competition to Carrefour.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Entr\u00e9es \u00e9trang\u00e8res pr\u00e9c\u00e9dentes\u00a0: le\u00e7ons apprises<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Carrefour a une tradition de forte recherche de croissance, en particulier dans les march\u00e9s \u00e9mergents o\u00f9 la croissance est plus \u00e9lev\u00e9e que dans les march\u00e9s d\u00e9velopp\u00e9s. L'entreprise poursuit une strat\u00e9gie de croissance en cascade car elle choisit soigneusement de se d\u00e9velopper apr\u00e8s s'\u00eatre sentie \u00e0 l'aise avec le succ\u00e8s sur le march\u00e9 cible. Pourtant, malgr\u00e9 cette prudence, l\u2019entreprise a d\u00fb se retirer des march\u00e9s o\u00f9 elle n\u2019a pas atteint ses objectifs de croissance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Premi\u00e8rement, dans les ann\u00e9es 1980, Carrefour a fait faillite aux \u00c9tats-Unis avec seulement deux hypermarch\u00e9s. Son entr\u00e9e sur le march\u00e9 de Philadelphie a \u00e9t\u00e9 difficile, avec un antagonisme syndical protestant contre le magasin de 335 000 pieds carr\u00e9s et des lignes de piquetage visibles qui d\u00e9rangeaient les clients existants. Apr\u00e8s cette exp\u00e9rience difficile, elle ouvre en 1992 dans le New Jersey un magasin beaucoup plus petit et qui ressemble \u00e0 un entrep\u00f4t avec des produits qui semblent provenir d'un supermarch\u00e9.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But Carrefour conducted little advertising to bring more customers into its huge stores. Also, Wal-Mart opened a store nearby, and Carrefour finally pulled out of the US. Ultimately, Carrefour lost $80 million on its failed US expansion. Second, Carrefour failed in Japan because of Carrefour\u2019s inability to answer the needs of Japanese consumers, highlighting the importance of pre-entry research.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In addition, the company tried to enter alone rather than working with a local partner in a joint venture. Consequently, Carrefour sold its stores to the AEON group, a Japanese retailing chain, to operate its stores under the Carrefour brand name. In addition, Carrefour withdrew from Hong Kong in 2000 due to the difficulty in transferring the concept due to the lack of retail space, and Korea in 2006, largely due to intense competitive practices and poor performance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

De m\u00eame, Carrefour a g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement recours \u00e0 la fois \u00e0 la propri\u00e9t\u00e9 directe et \u00e0 des coentreprises, selon le march\u00e9. Concr\u00e8tement, les march\u00e9s consid\u00e9r\u00e9s comme difficiles par Carrefour sont plut\u00f4t des coentreprises.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Analyse du pays d'origine : Duba\u00ef, march\u00e9 pour Carrefour en 1995<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Carrefour began the market entry process by examining the barriers to entry into Dubai and government regulations that might affect the introduction of the Carrefour brand into the market. The company had read how over only a few decades, the Emirate of Dubai had rapidly moved from an oil-producing economy into an economic marvel with towering skyscrapers, abundant wealth, and booming free markets in the middle of the desert.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sheikh Rashid led Dubai\u2019s economy through a period of explosive economic growth from the 1970s to the 1990s with a vision to diversify away from oil production towards a modern city in the Arabian Gulf. The Sheikh\u2019s son, Sheikh Maktoum Bin Rashid Al Maktoum became ruler in 1990, and pursued free trade, technology, transportation, and tourism, dramatically turning Dubai into a global economic powerhouse.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fueling Dubai\u2019s success was its increasingly diversified economy outside of oil, strategic location between continents, burgeoning re-exports market to emerging markets, robust infrastructure, high quality of life, competitive cost structure, stable political situation, exceptionally business-friendly climate, defined legal structure, lack of preexisting legacy system, and highly optimistic economic outlook. This prosperity sparked a common expectation and saying in Dubai, \u201cIf you build it, they will come.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On top of these economic figures, Carrefour saw positive retail conditions. The discounting concept had the potential to become successful due to high inflation. Also from 1987 to 2002, Dubai boosted its total retail floor space from 23,000m2 to 365,000m2, making it a major global contender in retail growth opportunities. Retail competition consisted of a handful of privately owned supermarket chains that imported goods and public member-owned cooperatives that were not legally permitted to import.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Carrefour a remarqu\u00e9 de nombreux autres avantages \u00e0 l'entr\u00e9e sur le march\u00e9. Alors que la population de Duba\u00ef n'\u00e9tait que de 689 000 habitants, elle augmentait de 12,51 TP3T en 1995, selon les statistiques gouvernementales. Duba\u00ef s\u2019attend \u00e9galement \u00e0 un afflux d\u2019expatri\u00e9s et de touristes pour stimuler les ventes. En outre, l'\u00e9conomie de Duba\u00ef \u00e9tait tr\u00e8s favorable aux affaires pour trois raisons principales. Premi\u00e8rement, Duba\u00ef avait d\u00e9velopp\u00e9 des syst\u00e8mes rationalis\u00e9s pour cr\u00e9er rapidement une entreprise. Deuxi\u00e8mement, les droits de douane sur les importations \u00e9taient faibles, voire inexistants pour de nombreux produits. Troisi\u00e8mement, c\u2019\u00e9tait l\u2019un des rares pays \u00e0 n\u2019imposer aucun imp\u00f4t sur les b\u00e9n\u00e9fices des entreprises et des particuliers (\u00e0 l\u2019exclusion du secteur p\u00e9trolier et du secteur financier) ou sur les b\u00e9n\u00e9fices des particuliers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Les risques politiques et de transfert \u00e0 Duba\u00ef \u00e9taient faibles. Duba\u00ef a autoris\u00e9 100% la propri\u00e9t\u00e9 de l'entreprise aux investisseurs \u00e9trangers, et 100% le rapatriement des b\u00e9n\u00e9fices et des capitaux vers le pays d'origine. Deuxi\u00e8mement, le gouvernement n\u2019a pas exig\u00e9 des investisseurs \u00e9trangers qu\u2019ils consentent un investissement minimum en capital. Troisi\u00e8mement, Duba\u00ef disposait d\u2019un syst\u00e8me juridique solide et rapide. Il disposait de protections en mati\u00e8re de propri\u00e9t\u00e9 intellectuelle, de protections l\u00e9gales et d'un d\u00e9partement des marques, d'un d\u00e9partement de la propri\u00e9t\u00e9 industrielle et d'un d\u00e9partement des droits d'auteur. Duba\u00ef avait un syst\u00e8me judiciaire similaire \u00e0 celui des pays occidentaux, avec trois niveaux de tribunaux la\u00efcs. En outre, les lois sur les soci\u00e9t\u00e9s \u00e9trang\u00e8res \u00e9taient calqu\u00e9es sur les mod\u00e8les occidentaux.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Many laws were established to protect consumers, prevent fraudulent trading, and ensure fair trading among companies. Despite this, Emirati law favored local Emiratis and gave benefits to local companies over foreign ones. For example, Article 3 of Emirati Law did not afford the same rights of UAE nationals to foreign corporations: \u201cEach company incorporated in the State shall hold its nationality but it shall not necessarily be entitled to privileges reserved only to U.A.E nationals.\u201d Nonetheless, Emirati law had very low political risks. Lastly, there were very low transfer risks. Foreign investors enjoyed the fact that the UAE\u2019s currency, the Dirham, was pegged to the dollar. This peg meant that investors would have confidence in not losing the value of their revenues in currency fluctuations against other major currencies. Lastly, Dubai had one of the lowest crime rates for a city in the world, which was optimal for retail companies selling expensive merchandise.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dubai possessed superior transportation networks starting in the 1960s. Given its strategic location between continents, it eventually became a transshipment point between Australia and Europe; and between Asia and Africa. This infrastructure provided many benefits for a retail commercial hypermarket firm. Furthermore, major infrastructure projects were planned in the future, optimizing the logistics in Dubai. In the future, Carrefour could expect major logistics projects to be built. One of these was the world\u2019s largest free trade logistics zone, Dubai Logistics City. Another project was the rapidly growing number of passengers and renovations to the Dubai International Airport, a major airport aiming to become the region\u2019s main hub and service several dozen million passengers and tons of cargo. This infrastructure was important to Carrefour, which planned to important its inventory. Thus, Dubai\u2019s outlook for global retailers like Carrefour seemed to provide ample opportunities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Strat\u00e9gie d'entr\u00e9e sur le march\u00e9 de Duba\u00ef<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Carrefour evaluated Dubai\u2019s laws and market conditions, and determined that a joint venture would be best for market entry. Factoring in this decision were the favorable laws towards Joint Ventures. First, there was less risk in a joint venture. This was important as Carrefour had suffered an $80 million loss in the US market. Second, the UAE\u2019s Federal Commercial Agencies Law protected foreign companies in a joint venture from contract termination and exclusive presence in the region. To qualify as a Joint Venture, companies would have to be partnered with UAE nationals or commercial entities owned solely by UAE nationals. Carrefour would also have to rent and not own the property in its operations. This condition was not a drawback to Carrefour, which saw benefits in joint venturing with the sponsor embracing the liability of ownership. Furthermore, operating as a Joint Venture with a local sponsor would likely make it easier for Carrefour to obtain Food Health Certificates to import food, given that it was a foreign retailer attempting to sell food in a culture with important religious and cultural restrictions. Part of the Health Certificates was the Halal slaughter certificate allowing the sale of meat that has been slaughtered by a Muslim man according to Islamic rites. With the Joint Venture, Carrefour would enjoy the same low or no trade barriers on most of its inventory, excluding cigarettes and other luxury goods.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yet, Carrefour saw some major barriers to entry include the difficulty in finding a local partner who was willing to accept the burden of navigating complex local import statutes and pre-operational regulations such as product licensing, ensuring that the local municipal lab has access to product samples to test that the products being sold meet their health and cultural standards. Another barrier to entry was the costs of operating associated with the size of the locations used. For example, choosing to open large hypermarkets rather than smaller supermarkets, Carrefour would have to endure high costs of renting stock shelving as well as listing fees. Another barrier to entry was a regulation passed by the Gulf Cooperation Council, which the UAE was a part of, which stated that all food products imported into the UAE must have half or more of its shelf life remaining at the time of entrance or clearance will not be issued. Some minor factors influencing entry into Dubai included the fact that weekends in Dubai did not correspond with traditional western weekends. Fridays and Saturdays constituted the weekend in the UAE and this would require adaptation to local customs to conduct daily business.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Carrefour evaluated Dubai\u2019s market benefits and risks as well as the modes of entry and decided in 1995 to partner with Majid Al Futtaim (MAF), a major pan-regional company owning and operating mall properties. The first benefit was that MAF owned the high-traffic malls and properties that would be perfect for Carrefour\u2019s location. Also, this could prevent other large hypermarket chains from entering the same malls, limiting direct competition. Secondly, MAF had operations throughout the entire Middle East, and this could potentially allow Carrefour to expand to other countries in the Middle East under the same partnership. Thirdly, Carrefour preferred Dubai as a first market because it is the most populated emirate in the UAE, Lastly, MAF had experience in venturing with foreign retailers and could handle Carrefour\u2019s operations. By positioning itself correctly in Dubai, Carrefour could then use the waterfall approach to enter the remaining six emirates and capitalize on the rising growth of standard of living in the UAE.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Strat\u00e9gie de marketing<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Lieu<\/span><\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Carrefour\/Majid al Futtaim\u2019s strategy was to adapt to the cultural importance of shopping malls and create a \u201ccity within a city\u201d by being located inside a mall with entertainment centers, cinemas, food courts, and other convenience amenities. Hence, Carrefour decided to place its stores in big malls in Deira City Centre Mall, Mall of the Emirates, Al Mamzar Century Mall, and Bur Dubai – Al Shindagha. Indeed, this adaptation differed from Carrefour\u2019s standard location of a freestanding warehouse-like building.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The rationale behind adapting the traditional hypermarket was due to the fact that Dubai has a very strong mall culture, owing largely to Dubai\u2019s cultural dynamics and harsh climate. First, the climate in Dubai is often so harsh that going to the mall is one of the few options to keep cool and entertained. Second, daily the mall provides an exciting experience beyond the shopping. In Arab society, socializing with family is paramount, and malls provide culturally appropriate entertainment for long periods of time. During the workday, Arab housewives will often go to malls with their friends to socialize, and bring their young children to play with each other at entertainment centers located on upper floors, while men are at work.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The elements Masculinity and Collectivism of Hofstede\u2019s Model are evident in Emirati culture. Men will often go with their friends to watch movies in cinemas located in the upper levels of the mall, and drink coffee with friends at cafes into the late hours of the night. During the Friday and Saturday weekend, large Arab families pour into malls and spend many hours there shopping, taking their kids to arcades, eating at restaurants, staying at mall hotels, walking, and reclining. Despite spending long periods of time in the malls, many consumers only expect to window-shop and leave without buying merchandise. Third, Dubai\u2019s society has adapted to the convenience of being able to get high-quality consumer goods in one mall. Fourth, Dubai\u2019s society is very young and enamored by the popular brands, found in malls. For many of these reasons, retailers must often accept malls as the place to locate their stores.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

L'autre avantage d'\u00eatre situ\u00e9 dans des centres commerciaux \u00e9tait que Carrefour pouvait s'attendre \u00e0 un volume de clients encore plus important dans les magasins Carrefour. En outre, les centres commerciaux de Duba\u00ef disposaient d'un espace de vente au d\u00e9tail suffisamment grand pour que Carrefour puisse y fonctionner. De plus, Carrefour a conserv\u00e9 sa grande taille traditionnelle, \u00e9tant donn\u00e9 que Majid Al Futtaim \u00e9tait propri\u00e9taire de deux des centres commerciaux consid\u00e9r\u00e9s. En cons\u00e9quence, le magasin Carrefour Deira City Centre est devenu le plus grand magasin de Duba\u00ef. N\u00e9anmoins, en \u00e9tant situ\u00e9 dans les quartiers centraux de Duba\u00ef, Carrefour \u00e9tait en concurrence avec les petits magasins de d\u00e9tail traditionnels situ\u00e9s plus pr\u00e8s du consommateur. L'importance de l'emplacement \u00e0 Duba\u00ef ne peut \u00eatre sous-estim\u00e9e \u00e9tant donn\u00e9 les probl\u00e8mes de circulation de Duba\u00ef.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Produit<\/span><\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Dubai was a very international and diverse Emirate, particularly due to the large number of foreign workers. As such, Carrefour adapted by accepting foreign credit cards, the currencies of all GCC countries, and international currencies like the Euro and US dollar. While Carrefour implemented bilingual signage in the stores, language and cultural barriers were not likely problems given that English was so widely spoken and consumers had experience with Western products.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Tout d'abord, Carrefour a d\u00fb adapter ses marchandises \u00e0 la culture. Par exemple, certaines nuances alimentaires devaient \u00eatre appr\u00e9ci\u00e9es, comme la vente de produits halal d\u00e9pourvus de porc. Deuxi\u00e8mement, Carrefour a d\u00fb s'adapter au caract\u00e8re saisonnier du cycle \u00e9conomique de Duba\u00ef, \u00e9tant donn\u00e9 qu'il \u00e9tait de coutume dans la culture de Duba\u00ef que les gens prennent leurs vacances d'\u00e9t\u00e9 pour s'\u00e9vader vers des destinations plus fra\u00eeches. Troisi\u00e8mement, Carrefour a d\u00fb s'adapter aux f\u00eates culturelles islamiques comme le Ramadan et l'A\u00efd, ce qui lui permettrait d'augmenter ses ventes. Pendant ces vacances, Carrefour a d\u00fb tenir compte de l'augmentation de la demande et planifier son approvisionnement en cons\u00e9quence pour ne pas d\u00e9cevoir les acheteurs. Quatri\u00e8mement, les horaires d'ouverture \u00e0 Duba\u00ef devaient s'adapter \u00e0 la semaine de travail de Duba\u00ef, du dimanche au jeudi, et au week-end, du vendredi au samedi.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Promotion<\/span><\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Carrefour did not adapt its promotional effort, which consisted of discounting certain items. Majid Al Futtaim handled local promotions and coordinated some of these regionally with its stores throughout the Middle East. Promotions were placed in print media and in-store, to attract mall-walking traffic. Because Dubai was a society emphasizing the importance of social relationships, Carrefour could reasonably expect that consumers might discuss some of the deals.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

La promotion \u00e9tait importante \u00e0 Duba\u00ef en raison du co\u00fbt de la vie \u00e9lev\u00e9 et de la forte inflation. La d\u00e9mographie de Duba\u00ef \u00e9tait tr\u00e8s asym\u00e9trique. Au moment de l'entr\u00e9e de Carrefour, seuls 171 TP3T de la population \u00e9taient des \u00ab Arabes locaux \u00bb en 1998, tandis que 851 TP3T \u00e9taient des \u00ab Asiatiques expatri\u00e9s \u00bb et 31 TP3T \u00e9taient des Occidentaux. Le segment des expatri\u00e9s asiatiques avait le revenu disponible le plus faible, mais il s'agissait d'un segment important et largement ouvert \u00e0 l'achat de produits \u00e9lectroniques et de produits occidentaux. En raison de l'importance de l'inflation et de ces donn\u00e9es d\u00e9mographiques, le segment cible de Carrefour \u00e9tait majoritairement constitu\u00e9 d'expatri\u00e9s.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Prix <\/span><\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

La position de prix de Carrefour \u00e9tait celle d'un discounter et utilisait la tarification dans le cadre de son effort promotionnel. Gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 sa marque forte, Carrefour n'a pas eu \u00e0 s'inqui\u00e9ter de la dilution de la marque due \u00e0 ses produits \u00e0 prix r\u00e9duits. Cependant
er, discounting was problematic in Dubai where inflation was sky high, and when fluctuations in inflation could erode profits. Another pricing concern was the food retail market was most competitive<\/a> and thus profit margins were thin. Carrefour could sell non-foods, household goods and toiletries at higher margins.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Performance<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Carrefour \/ Majid Al Futtaim does not report its Dubai-generated revenues or other countries\u2019 specific sales. We did a thorough literature search and even contacted Carrefour\u2019s Investor Relations. Yet in both cases, the information was unavailable. There are two reasons for this. First, Carrefour MAF was a private joint venture and was not obligated to show its sales figures. Secondly, in the region, there is a tendency to underreport information and lack transparency due to suspicion of what other entities might use such data for, according to Seraphina Anderson Executive Director of Feedback Market Research in Dubai\/Sharjah. This venture likely prefers to keep their sales figures and data private to prevent competitors from taking such information and using it to their advantage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Au niveau r\u00e9gional cependant, Carrefour MAF a publi\u00e9 en 2005 un chiffre d'affaires global de $1 milliard sur ses 13 magasins en 2005, soit environ 1% du chiffre d'affaires mondial. D'autres indicateurs montrent que la coentreprise a \u00e9t\u00e9 couronn\u00e9e de succ\u00e8s. En 2007, les ventes de Carrefour ont atteint $2,5 milliards au niveau r\u00e9gional, gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 une croissance r\u00e9gionale agressive. En 2008, la coentreprise a annonc\u00e9 son intention de s'implanter en Iran pour poursuivre sa croissance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00c9valuation critique<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Choosing Majid Al Futtaim (MAF) was a good idea for Carrefour. It had an appetite for expansion and growth, and aggressively entered into other markets in the Middle East<\/a>. The choice also prevented direct competition in the same malls owned by MAF. Furthermore, the joint venture\u2019s adaptation to the local market ensured its success, given that many people of Dubai today consider the store as non-foreign and a part of life. Yet, Carrefour MAF has not done enough to ensure that is enough parking and sufficient taxis and good traffic flow around its malls, especially around weekends and holidays. This makes the venture more vulnerable to smaller niche stores and stores located closer to the consumer.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Le march\u00e9 de Duba\u00ef est confront\u00e9 \u00e0 des d\u00e9fis consid\u00e9rables. Premi\u00e8rement, la concurrence s\u2019intensifie, notamment dans le segment alimentaire, ce qui r\u00e9duit effectivement les marges b\u00e9n\u00e9ficiaires. Alors que Wal-Mart et Costco n\u2019envisagent pas le Moyen-Orient, d\u2019autres hypermarch\u00e9s europ\u00e9ens entrent strat\u00e9giquement sur le march\u00e9 du Moyen-Orient. En 2006, Union Coop a ouvert un hypermarch\u00e9 de 180 000 pieds carr\u00e9s \u00e0 Duba\u00ef. Geant, une cha\u00eene d'hypermarch\u00e9s europ\u00e9enne, est \u00e9galement entr\u00e9e \u00e0 Duba\u00ef en 2003. De plus, les magasins \u00e0 proximit\u00e9 \u00e9cument les clients comme les Asiatiques expatri\u00e9s qui pr\u00e9f\u00e8rent ne pas conduire loin pour faire leurs achats.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The second challenge is chronic inflation. Due to rapid growth, high liquidity, high demand, low supply, and a currency peg to the recently declining US dollar, national inflation rates stood at around 13% in 2008, though economists expect actual consumer price inflation in Dubai to be at 20% per year. This inflation erodes revenues and rapidly raises the costs of inventory and staffing. Thirdly, the decline of the dollar versus other currencies can lower the value of revenues when repatriated to foreign countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fourthly, the UAE government has recently implemented more difficult visa regulations. This makes it more difficult to attract skilled Asians and Westerners to help drive the economy\u2019s growth. Lastly, the region faces political risks from Iran, Iraq, and from terrorism. Additionally, Dubai is more dependent on foreign investment and tourism than the other Emirates.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dubai was expected to be more vulnerable to global economic downturns than Abu Dhabi and other emirates. Due to the global credit crunch, the UAE\u2019s non-oil GDP growth was expected to slow from 8.8% in 2008 to 7.1% in 2009. Foremost to retailers is the expected implementation in early 2009 of a VAT (Value Added Tax) tax regimen of around 5%. It was anticipated that this tax system will drive inflation even higher than its current high level.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Carrefour a une difficult\u00e9 majeure avec son mod\u00e8le : la facilit\u00e9 de faire ses courses dans ses magasins. Les achats se faisant dans les centres commerciaux, il est souvent difficile de faire ses achats chez Carrefour, en particulier le week-end et les jours f\u00e9ri\u00e9s, lorsque les centres commerciaux se remplissent. Duba\u00ef a une culture de conduite automobile tr\u00e8s forte, ce qui rend la t\u00e2che difficile lorsque l'espace est limit\u00e9 et que les taxis sont peu nombreux. En cons\u00e9quence, la file d'attente des taxis peut s'\u00e9tendre sur des centaines de m\u00e8tres, comme au centre commercial Deira Center, et le parking peut \u00eatre rempli \u00e0 pleine capacit\u00e9. Carrefour doit s'attaquer \u00e0 ce probl\u00e8me pour s'assurer que ces d\u00e9sagr\u00e9ments n'emp\u00eacheront pas les acheteurs de venir dans ses magasins.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Plans d\u2019action potentiels<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

To best compete in the Dubai market, Carrefour MAF could follow several potential courses of action. Each focuses on improving Carrefour\u2019s competitive advantages, market positioning, and driving sales. First, Carrefour may need to ensure that customers are not leaving its stores due to more convenient specialty stores located closer to customers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Pour ce faire, il faudrait rem\u00e9dier aux inconv\u00e9nients li\u00e9s \u00e0 l'exp\u00e9rience d'achat chez Carrefour, notamment li\u00e9s aux inconv\u00e9nients de la circulation et des transports \u00e0 Duba\u00ef. Parmi celles-ci figurent la garantie d'un nombre suffisant de parkings et de taxis ainsi que d'une circulation efficace, en particulier pendant les week-ends et les jours f\u00e9ri\u00e9s. Elle pourrait potentiellement le faire en faisant pression aupr\u00e8s du gouvernement sur la situation des taxis et de la circulation, et aupr\u00e8s de Majid Al Futtaim sur les probl\u00e8mes de stationnement, car elle g\u00e8re les propri\u00e9t\u00e9s.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Secondly, Carrefour could seek new advantages to solidify its position. Among these include positioning Carrefour as the place to go during economic turmoil. The rationale is that by attaching this perception to Carrefour\u2019s brand, it ensures that customers associate Carrefour with savings and with rough economic times. In so doing, it can improve its performance in economic downturns. Also, Carrefour could reinforce its First Mover Advantage as the authentic hypermarket. In Eastern countries, the most loved brands are those that are considered authentic. As such, by reinforcing this perception, Carrefour could potentially limit the effectiveness of direct European hypermarket competitors in Dubai like Geant and Union Coop.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thirdly, Carrefour has been successful in Dubai along several indicators, but it could find significant growth in the market by focusing on the countless expatriates that come in and out of the country. Carrefour could strengthen its specialty food sections to attract various demographics, in terms of a better selection. In so doing, it can better target Dubai\u2019s expatriate population that prefers to eat its own cultural food, and increase the frequency at which these huge segments visit its stores.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Carrefour\u2019s pricing strategy is also helpful in targeting this group because most expatriates work in Dubai to remit money home to their families. So Carrefour could become a great place to save money while not compromising quality. It could even develop to be a great place to buy gifts to send home. This effort could be supported by a Word of Mouth promotional strategy, harnessing existing customers to tell their friends about the deals and quality at Carrefour.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Given that Dubai\u2019s expats mostly come from Asia where there are high-context cultures, Word of Mouth could be effective in targeting those expats who strongly value friends’ and family\u2019s suggestions over media and corporate opinion. Further marketing techniques adhering to Dubai\u2019s cultural imperatives could include discount coupons, a customer loyalty card, and a home delivery service to the expatriate segment. Home delivery service may be a viable option for Carrefour because it fits into the cultural context of Dubai. The service could take advantage of the lack of public transportation in Dubai, thus helping it\u00a0to better reach a broader customer base. Ultimately by targeting the expatriate population, Carrefour could potentially continue to grow and hit the population of Dubai that is not included in the 689,000 citizens (est. 1995).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Remarques:<\/span><\/h6>\n\n\n\n
This article does not necessarily reflect the typical report composition of an SIS International report, and is for information purposes only. The article does not contain advice for decision-making. No permission granted for reproduction.\u00a0 SIS International.\u00a0 Copyright (C) 2009.<\/h6>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

D\u00e9couvrez l'exp\u00e9rience de Carrefour dans son expansion \u00e0 Duba\u00ef, aux \u00c9mirats Arabes Unis.<\/p>","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":64217,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[292],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-11914","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-strategy","generate-columns","tablet-grid-50","mobile-grid-100","grid-parent","grid-50"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11914","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=11914"}],"version-history":[{"count":7,"href":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11914\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":80931,"href":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11914\/revisions\/80931"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/64217"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=11914"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=11914"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=11914"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}