{"id":12132,"date":"2012-11-24T20:52:18","date_gmt":"2012-11-24T20:52:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/understanding-chinas-shadow-banking-system\/"},"modified":"2025-09-16T21:51:25","modified_gmt":"2025-09-17T01:51:25","slug":"entendiendo-el-sistema-bancario-en-la-sombra-de-china","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/es\/entendiendo-el-sistema-bancario-en-la-sombra-de-china\/","title":{"rendered":"Comprender el sistema bancario en la sombra de China"},"content":{"rendered":"
\"Investigaci\u00f3n<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n

El sistema bancario en la sombra de China, o el mercado financiero informal que se encuentra fuera del control de los reguladores, ha sido recientemente objeto de escrutinio a medida que la econom\u00eda china se desacelera a su tasa de crecimiento m\u00e1s baja desde 1999.<\/h2>\n

Si el crecimiento econ\u00f3mico contin\u00faa desaceler\u00e1ndose, los impagos repentinos de los pr\u00e9stamos otorgados en el sistema bancario paralelo del pa\u00eds podr\u00edan amenazar al sector bancario de China y, eventualmente, al resto de la econom\u00eda.<\/p>\n

The unregulated and decentralized interconnected underground economy that comprises the shadow banking system have proven difficult for foreign analysts and observers to pin down. The sheer size of the system indicates that it is interconnected with China\u2019s economy. Shadow banks issue an estimated 14.5 trillion renminbi in loans, roughly 25% of all the loans made in China by the traditional banking institutions.<\/p>\n

The shadow banking system is largely composed of investment<\/a> trusts, pawn shops, guarantors, underground banks, and wealth management products. Investment trusts are companies that manage<\/a> investors\u2019 money and use it to finance business projects or property loans. In 2011, the investment trust industry was handling 4.8 million renminbi. The total lack of transparency in the investment trust industry–only 10 of the 62 investment trusts in China disclose investment returns–makes it harder to gauge if the highly leverage trusts are facing systemic collapse.<\/p>\n

Casas de Empe\u00f1o<\/h2>\n

Pawnshops are prevalent in China, with over 4,000 operating across the country. Pawnshops have become a problem because they accept any sort of collateral for their short-term loans including financial securities like stocks and bonds, and even real estate property. If China\u2019s property market<\/a> deteriorates, pawnshops will be left with defaulted loans that are backed by collateral that have less value on the market.<\/p>\n

Garantes<\/h2>\n

Como sugiere su nombre, los garantes brindan garant\u00edas sobre pr\u00e9stamos otorgados a prestatarios riesgosos. Los garantes no generan tanto inter\u00e9s como las casas de empe\u00f1o y pueden recurrir a pr\u00e1cticas ilegales para aumentar sus ganancias. Los garantes pueden tomar una parte del pr\u00e9stamo que garantizan y volver a prestarlo al sistema bancario paralelo. Esto aumenta la posibilidad de que los inversores se queden sin nada si los pr\u00e9stamos en la sombra incumplen.<\/p>\n

Bancos subterr\u00e1neos<\/h2>\n

Los bancos clandestinos est\u00e1n en auge en China. Los bancos est\u00e1n emitiendo cartas de cr\u00e9dito que son veh\u00edculos fuera de balance que no tienen en cuenta los \u00edndices de apalancamiento del balance del sector. Las empresas pueden obtener m\u00faltiples pr\u00e9stamos de diferentes bancos utilizando la misma garant\u00eda, lo que dificulta determinar qu\u00e9 tan apalancados est\u00e1n realmente estos bancos.<\/p>\n

Acci\u00f3n gubernamental<\/h2>\n

Los productos de gesti\u00f3n patrimonial han sido los m\u00e1s afectados por las cr\u00edticas al sistema bancario en la sombra, y el presidente del Banco de China, Xiao Gang, calific\u00f3 los productos de esquema Ponzi en un art\u00edculo de opini\u00f3n publicado en el Diario Chino<\/em> newspaper.\u00a0 Wealth management products fund projects<\/a> such as property development or infrastructure that cannot access funds through normal loan channels. Investors may not have any idea about what the investment is or what kind of returns<\/a> they can generate. The products are riskier than deposits, but investors believe that banks back them as they are marketed<\/a> in most bank branches. If the products default, banks\u2019 reputations will take a hit.<\/p>\n

El sistema bancario en la sombra de China es muy complejo y plantea enormes riesgos para el sistema bancario convencional debido a la relaci\u00f3n entrelazada de estos sistemas. Dado el tama\u00f1o del sistema bancario en la sombra y su importante lugar en la econom\u00eda, China podr\u00eda enfrentar una turbulencia econ\u00f3mica si el sistema bancario en la sombra colapsa.<\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

El sistema bancario en la sombra de China, o el mercado financiero informal que se encuentra fuera del control de los reguladores, ha sido recientemente objeto de escrutinio a medida que la econom\u00eda china se desacelera a su tasa de crecimiento m\u00e1s baja desde 1999. Si el crecimiento econ\u00f3mico contin\u00faa desaceler\u00e1ndose, se producir\u00e1n impagos repentinos de los pr\u00e9stamos otorgados en el pa\u00eds. El sistema bancario en la sombra podr\u00eda amenazar al sector bancario de China y... Leer m\u00e1s<\/a><\/p>","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":67495,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[287],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-12132","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-industry-spotlight","generate-columns","tablet-grid-50","mobile-grid-100","grid-parent","grid-50"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12132","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=12132"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12132\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":81309,"href":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12132\/revisions\/81309"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/67495"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=12132"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=12132"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=12132"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}