{"id":11914,"date":"2009-02-07T10:17:08","date_gmt":"2009-02-07T10:17:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/analysis-of-carrefours-dubai-market-entry\/"},"modified":"2026-01-27T15:20:11","modified_gmt":"2026-01-27T20:20:11","slug":"analyse-des-markteintritts-von-carrefours-dubai","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.sisinternational.com\/de\/analyse-des-markteintritts-von-carrefours-dubai\/","title":{"rendered":"Carrefours Markteintrittsanalyse in Dubai"},"content":{"rendered":"

Zusammenfassung<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\"SIS<\/figure>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n

1995 weitete Carrefour sein europ\u00e4isches Hypermarktkonzept, das es vor Jahrzehnten entwickelt hatte, auf Dubai in den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten aus. Nach einer vorsichtigen Expansionsstrategie von Land zu Land in Schwellenm\u00e4rkte erkannte Carrefour das Potenzial des Emirats Dubai. Der Emirat hatte einen florierenden Einzelhandel und wies starke Fundamentaldaten in seiner florierenden Wirtschaft auf. Carrefours Ziel war es, einen Markteintrittsweg zu finden, der es ihm erm\u00f6glichte, das Risiko eines Scheiterns zu verringern und die Rentabilit\u00e4t aufrechtzuerhalten und gleichzeitig seinem langj\u00e4hrigen globalen Rivalen Wal-Mart Paroli zu bieten.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dubai bot Unternehmen, die 1995 einen Markteintritt in Dubai in Erw\u00e4gung zogen, viele Vorteile. Obwohl Dubai im Vergleich zu anderen M\u00e4rkten eine geringe Bev\u00f6lkerungszahl aufwies, bot es eine ungew\u00f6hnliche Zusammensetzung aus Expatriates und Einheimischen in einer Wirtschaft mit einem der h\u00f6chsten Lebensstandards und Einkommen der Welt. Der Markt war \u00e4u\u00dferst wirtschaftsfreundlich und bot viele Vorteile wie keine K\u00f6rperschaftssteuer in Verbindung mit sehr wenigen Handelshemmnissen. Es gab hervorragende Verkehrsnetze, ein klar definiertes Rechtssystem, positive Einzelhandelsbedingungen, starkes Wirtschaftswachstum sowie geringe politische und Transferrisiken.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Carrefour \u00fcberpr\u00fcfte die Gesetze und kam zu dem Schluss, dass ein Joint Venture die beste L\u00f6sung w\u00e4re, um das Risiko eines Scheiterns zu minimieren und gleichzeitig einen qualifizierten Partner zu haben, der aggressiv nach Wachstum strebt und den Betrieb leitet. Carrefour ging ein Joint Venture mit Majid Al Futtaim ein, einem \u00fcberregionalen Konglomerat mit Einzelhandelserfahrung im Nahen Osten. Das Joint Venture passte sich dem Markt an, indem es seine Gesch\u00e4fte in ein Einkaufszentrum verlegte, sein Essen den soziokulturellen Normen anpasste, wegen der h\u00f6heren Gewinnspannen vor allem Non-Food-Artikel bewarb und angesichts der zweistelligen Inflation bei Preisnachl\u00e4ssen sehr vorsichtig war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The venture was successful for Carrefour, given that it increased the number of stores opened in Dubai and expanded to nearby countries. Ultimately, Carrefour was successful because it developed a First Mover Advantage, it thoroughly adapted to the extent that it did not feel foreign to many consumers, and because of Majid Al Futtaim\u2019s aggressiveness in identifying and pursuing growth opportunities. Carrefour faces two key problems including Customer inconvenience and Dubai\u2019s long-term macroeconomic challenges. To address these challenges, Carrefour should seek to build new advantages through market positioning, strengthen its First Mover Advantage to limit competitive pressures, and build up specialty foods sections to better target expatriates.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Firmen\u00fcberblick<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The French Fournier and Defforey families founded Carrefour in 1959 as a supermarket retailer. It was not until four years later in 1963 that the group opened its first hypermarket, which eventually led Carrefour to its success. In 1969 the company decided to expand internationally and opened its first hypermarket in Belgium In 1977, \u201cProduits Libres\u201d or unbranded products were introduced as a substitute to popular brands and were dubbed just as good. This pioneering idea led the company to create its own brand in 1985, which led the way for supermarket and hypermarkets worldwide. The idea was to help create even lower prices at the markets. Extremely low prices were one of the guiding strategies the company used to compete and buy out other chains.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Carrefours Schl\u00fcssel zum Erfolg ist der Hypermarkt, ein All-in-One-Shop, der alles von Bananen bis zu Kinderwagen zu Discountpreisen verkauft. Dies war die urspr\u00fcngliche Idee des Unternehmens und hat sich inzwischen weltweit ausgebreitet. Seine Akteure geh\u00f6ren zu den gr\u00f6\u00dften Gesch\u00e4ftsgiganten der Geschichte. Zu seinen unternehmensspezifischen Vorteilen geh\u00f6rt, dass das Unternehmen weltweit f\u00fchrend im Bereich der Hyperm\u00e4rkte ist und als Pionier dieses Konzepts gilt. Dies verschafft dem Unternehmen erhebliche Vorteile bei der Umsetzung dieses Konzepts gegen\u00fcber seinen Mitbewerbern. Zweitens hat es sein Eigenmarkenportfolio entwickelt, das es Carrefour erm\u00f6glicht, niedrigere Preise anzubieten.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Drittens ist Carrefour eine sehr starke Marke, die auf Qualit\u00e4t und Wert setzt und deshalb weltweit Anerkennung findet, was sich in seinem Status als Nummer zwei als weltweit f\u00fchrender Anbieter im Hypermarktsegment widerspiegelt. Dar\u00fcber hinaus hat Carrefour erhebliche Vorreitervorteile entwickelt, da das Unternehmen als erstes Unternehmen in viele Schwellenm\u00e4rkte eingetreten ist.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Some Firm Specific Disadvantages include Carrefour\u2019s various entry failures in other markets<\/a> and the negative connotations associated with the company\u2019s conviction of false advertising and charge for undermining capitalism. Also, as a First Mover Carrefour faces the increased costs associated with infrastructure development and extensive advertising. Finally, Carrefour must greatly adapt its product because food is a multi-domestic product and local consumers have diverse preferences and functional requirements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As a French company, Carrefour has several Country Specific Advantages (CSAs). First, French companies were considered to have high-quality goods and specialty items. In particular, French goods had a reputation for being luxurious, unique, and beautiful. Second, countries like the United Arab Emirates and cities like Dubai considered France an ally, given the strong political relationships between the countries. Eventually, France decided to locate a French permanent military base in the UAE in 2008 due to the strong relations. However, France also developed Country Specific Disadvantages. One of these perceptions was that the French were considered uptight and that the French considered their ways of doing things superior. Compared to English, the French language was not widely spoken worldwide and thus a language barrier existed. Last, although goods were luxurious, a disadvantage was that French goods were deemed too fancy for everyday life.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

1993 betrug der weltweite Umsatz von Carrefour $21,82 Milliarden und Carrefour suchte uners\u00e4ttlich nach Wachstumsm\u00f6glichkeiten in Schwellenm\u00e4rkten. Zu dieser Zeit expandierte keiner der Konkurrenten von Carrefour wie Wal-Mart, Tesco, Auchuan, Casino und E. Leclrc in die Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate. W\u00e4hrend der Konkurrent Geant den Markt angesichts seiner Strategie der Expansion in Schwellenm\u00e4rkte m\u00f6glicherweise in Betracht zog, w\u00e4re Carrefour der erste gro\u00dfe ausl\u00e4ndische Einzelh\u00e4ndler gewesen, der auf dem Markt in Dubai t\u00e4tig war, was ihm einen First-Mover-Vorteil verschafft h\u00e4tte.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Currently, Carrefour is the second largest hypermarket chain worldwide behind Wal-Mart and the largest in Europe, with 2006 sales of $102,774,800 and 16.5% growth. It operates about 15,000 stores of many different sizes and categories including hypermarkets, supermarkets, convenience stores, discount stores, and cash-and-carry stores. Today Carrefour hypermarkets \u201coffer an average surface area of 8,400 sq.m filled with a range of between 20,000 and 80,000 food and non-food items.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Carrefour\u2019s major competitor is Wal-Mart who seemed to have similar success and failure abroad. Wal-Mart succeeded in Japan, through joint ventures and an emphasis on local culture. It did, however, fail in Germany where the concept of a huge American discount store did not culturally resonate. Carrefour\u2019s major French competitors are Auchan, Casino Guichard and E.Leclerc who all fall far behind the company in sales and size, by provide constant price competition to Carrefour.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fr\u00fchere ausl\u00e4ndische Eintr\u00e4ge: Gelernte Lektionen<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Carrefour strebt traditionell stark nach Wachstum, insbesondere in Schwellenm\u00e4rkten, wo das Wachstum h\u00f6her ist als in Industriel\u00e4ndern. Das Unternehmen verfolgt eine Wasserfall-Wachstumsstrategie, da es sich bei der Expansion vorsichtig entscheidet, wenn es sich auf dem Zielmarkt sicher f\u00fchlt, erfolgreich zu sein. Trotz dieser Vorsicht musste sich das Unternehmen aus M\u00e4rkten zur\u00fcckziehen, in denen es seine Wachstumsziele nicht erreicht hat.\u201c<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Zun\u00e4chst scheiterte Carrefour in den 1980er Jahren in den USA mit nur zwei Hyperm\u00e4rkten. Der Markteintritt in Philadelphia war schwierig, da es gegen den 31.500 Quadratmeter gro\u00dfen Laden zu heftigen Protesten der Gewerkschaften kam und die bestehenden Kunden von sichtbaren Streikposten gest\u00f6rt wurden. Nach dieser schwierigen Erfahrung er\u00f6ffnete das Unternehmen 1992 einen Laden in New Jersey, der viel kleiner war und einem Lagerhaus \u00e4hnelte, mit Produkten, die aussahen, als k\u00e4men sie aus einem Supermarkt.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But Carrefour conducted little advertising to bring more customers into its huge stores. Also, Wal-Mart opened a store nearby, and Carrefour finally pulled out of the US. Ultimately, Carrefour lost $80 million on its failed US expansion. Second, Carrefour failed in Japan because of Carrefour\u2019s inability to answer the needs of Japanese consumers, highlighting the importance of pre-entry research.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In addition, the company tried to enter alone rather than working with a local partner in a joint venture. Consequently, Carrefour sold its stores to the AEON group, a Japanese retailing chain, to operate its stores under the Carrefour brand name. In addition, Carrefour withdrew from Hong Kong in 2000 due to the difficulty in transferring the concept due to the lack of retail space, and Korea in 2006, largely due to intense competitive practices and poor performance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ebenso nutzt Carrefour je nach Markt typischerweise sowohl direkte Eigent\u00fcmerschaft als auch Joint Ventures. Insbesondere in M\u00e4rkten, die Carrefour als schwierig betrachtet, werden h\u00e4ufig Joint Ventures eingesetzt.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Heimatlandanalyse: Dubai als Markt f\u00fcr Carrefour im Jahr 1995<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Carrefour began the market entry process by examining the barriers to entry into Dubai and government regulations that might affect the introduction of the Carrefour brand into the market. The company had read how over only a few decades, the Emirate of Dubai had rapidly moved from an oil-producing economy into an economic marvel with towering skyscrapers, abundant wealth, and booming free markets in the middle of the desert.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sheikh Rashid led Dubai\u2019s economy through a period of explosive economic growth from the 1970s to the 1990s with a vision to diversify away from oil production towards a modern city in the Arabian Gulf. The Sheikh\u2019s son, Sheikh Maktoum Bin Rashid Al Maktoum became ruler in 1990, and pursued free trade, technology, transportation, and tourism, dramatically turning Dubai into a global economic powerhouse.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fueling Dubai\u2019s success was its increasingly diversified economy outside of oil, strategic location between continents, burgeoning re-exports market to emerging markets, robust infrastructure, high quality of life, competitive cost structure, stable political situation, exceptionally business-friendly climate, defined legal structure, lack of preexisting legacy system, and highly optimistic economic outlook. This prosperity sparked a common expectation and saying in Dubai, \u201cIf you build it, they will come.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On top of these economic figures, Carrefour saw positive retail conditions. The discounting concept had the potential to become successful due to high inflation. Also from 1987 to 2002, Dubai boosted its total retail floor space from 23,000m2 to 365,000m2, making it a major global contender in retail growth opportunities. Retail competition consisted of a handful of privately owned supermarket chains that imported goods and public member-owned cooperatives that were not legally permitted to import.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Carrefour erkannte viele weitere Vorteile des Markteintritts. Obwohl Dubai nur 689.000 Einwohner hatte, wuchs die Bev\u00f6lkerung laut Regierungsstatistiken 1995 um 12,51 TP3T. Au\u00dferdem erwartete Dubai einen Zustrom von Expatriates und Touristen, um den Umsatz anzukurbeln. Dar\u00fcber hinaus war Dubais Wirtschaft aus drei Hauptgr\u00fcnden sehr wirtschaftsfreundlich. Erstens hatte Dubai rationalisierte Systeme f\u00fcr die schnelle Gr\u00fcndung eines Unternehmens entwickelt. Zweitens waren die Einfuhrz\u00f6lle f\u00fcr viele Waren niedrig oder gar nicht vorhanden. Drittens war es eines der wenigen L\u00e4nder, das keine Steuern auf Unternehmens- und Privatgewinne (mit Ausnahme des \u00d6lsektors und des Finanzsektors) oder pers\u00f6nliche Gewinne erhob.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Die politischen und Transferrisiken Dubais waren gering. Dubai erlaubte ausl\u00e4ndischen Investoren den Besitz des Unternehmens und die R\u00fcckf\u00fchrung von Gewinnen und Kapital in das Heimatland. Zweitens verlangte die Regierung von ausl\u00e4ndischen Investoren keine Mindestkapitalinvestitionen. Drittens verf\u00fcgte Dubai \u00fcber ein starkes und schnelles Rechtssystem. Es gab Schutz des geistigen Eigentums durch Gesetze und eine Marken-, eine gewerbliche Eigentums- und eine Urheberrechtsbeh\u00f6rde. Dubai hatte ein Gerichtssystem, das dem westlicher L\u00e4nder \u00e4hnelte, mit drei s\u00e4kularen Gerichten. Dar\u00fcber hinaus orientierten sich die Gesetze f\u00fcr ausl\u00e4ndische Unternehmen an westlichen Modellen.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Many laws were established to protect consumers, prevent fraudulent trading, and ensure fair trading among companies. Despite this, Emirati law favored local Emiratis and gave benefits to local companies over foreign ones. For example, Article 3 of Emirati Law did not afford the same rights of UAE nationals to foreign corporations: \u201cEach company incorporated in the State shall hold its nationality but it shall not necessarily be entitled to privileges reserved only to U.A.E nationals.\u201d Nonetheless, Emirati law had very low political risks. Lastly, there were very low transfer risks. Foreign investors enjoyed the fact that the UAE\u2019s currency, the Dirham, was pegged to the dollar. This peg meant that investors would have confidence in not losing the value of their revenues in currency fluctuations against other major currencies. Lastly, Dubai had one of the lowest crime rates for a city in the world, which was optimal for retail companies selling expensive merchandise.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dubai possessed superior transportation networks starting in the 1960s. Given its strategic location between continents, it eventually became a transshipment point between Australia and Europe; and between Asia and Africa. This infrastructure provided many benefits for a retail commercial hypermarket firm. Furthermore, major infrastructure projects were planned in the future, optimizing the logistics in Dubai. In the future, Carrefour could expect major logistics projects to be built. One of these was the world\u2019s largest free trade logistics zone, Dubai Logistics City. Another project was the rapidly growing number of passengers and renovations to the Dubai International Airport, a major airport aiming to become the region\u2019s main hub and service several dozen million passengers and tons of cargo. This infrastructure was important to Carrefour, which planned to important its inventory. Thus, Dubai\u2019s outlook for global retailers like Carrefour seemed to provide ample opportunities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Markteintrittsstrategie f\u00fcr den Dubai-Markt<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Carrefour evaluated Dubai\u2019s laws and market conditions, and determined that a joint venture would be best for market entry. Factoring in this decision were the favorable laws towards Joint Ventures. First, there was less risk in a joint venture. This was important as Carrefour had suffered an $80 million loss in the US market. Second, the UAE\u2019s Federal Commercial Agencies Law protected foreign companies in a joint venture from contract termination and exclusive presence in the region. To qualify as a Joint Venture, companies would have to be partnered with UAE nationals or commercial entities owned solely by UAE nationals. Carrefour would also have to rent and not own the property in its operations. This condition was not a drawback to Carrefour, which saw benefits in joint venturing with the sponsor embracing the liability of ownership. Furthermore, operating as a Joint Venture with a local sponsor would likely make it easier for Carrefour to obtain Food Health Certificates to import food, given that it was a foreign retailer attempting to sell food in a culture with important religious and cultural restrictions. Part of the Health Certificates was the Halal slaughter certificate allowing the sale of meat that has been slaughtered by a Muslim man according to Islamic rites. With the Joint Venture, Carrefour would enjoy the same low or no trade barriers on most of its inventory, excluding cigarettes and other luxury goods.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yet, Carrefour saw some major barriers to entry include the difficulty in finding a local partner who was willing to accept the burden of navigating complex local import statutes and pre-operational regulations such as product licensing, ensuring that the local municipal lab has access to product samples to test that the products being sold meet their health and cultural standards. Another barrier to entry was the costs of operating associated with the size of the locations used. For example, choosing to open large hypermarkets rather than smaller supermarkets, Carrefour would have to endure high costs of renting stock shelving as well as listing fees. Another barrier to entry was a regulation passed by the Gulf Cooperation Council, which the UAE was a part of, which stated that all food products imported into the UAE must have half or more of its shelf life remaining at the time of entrance or clearance will not be issued. Some minor factors influencing entry into Dubai included the fact that weekends in Dubai did not correspond with traditional western weekends. Fridays and Saturdays constituted the weekend in the UAE and this would require adaptation to local customs to conduct daily business.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Carrefour evaluated Dubai\u2019s market benefits and risks as well as the modes of entry and decided in 1995 to partner with Majid Al Futtaim (MAF), a major pan-regional company owning and operating mall properties. The first benefit was that MAF owned the high-traffic malls and properties that would be perfect for Carrefour\u2019s location. Also, this could prevent other large hypermarket chains from entering the same malls, limiting direct competition. Secondly, MAF had operations throughout the entire Middle East, and this could potentially allow Carrefour to expand to other countries in the Middle East under the same partnership. Thirdly, Carrefour preferred Dubai as a first market because it is the most populated emirate in the UAE, Lastly, MAF had experience in venturing with foreign retailers and could handle Carrefour\u2019s operations. By positioning itself correctly in Dubai, Carrefour could then use the waterfall approach to enter the remaining six emirates and capitalize on the rising growth of standard of living in the UAE.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Vermarktungsstrategie<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Ort<\/span><\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Carrefour\/Majid al Futtaim\u2019s strategy was to adapt to the cultural importance of shopping malls and create a \u201ccity within a city\u201d by being located inside a mall with entertainment centers, cinemas, food courts, and other convenience amenities. Hence, Carrefour decided to place its stores in big malls in Deira City Centre Mall, Mall of the Emirates, Al Mamzar Century Mall, and Bur Dubai – Al Shindagha. Indeed, this adaptation differed from Carrefour\u2019s standard location of a freestanding warehouse-like building.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The rationale behind adapting the traditional hypermarket was due to the fact that Dubai has a very strong mall culture, owing largely to Dubai\u2019s cultural dynamics and harsh climate. First, the climate in Dubai is often so harsh that going to the mall is one of the few options to keep cool and entertained. Second, daily the mall provides an exciting experience beyond the shopping. In Arab society, socializing with family is paramount, and malls provide culturally appropriate entertainment for long periods of time. During the workday, Arab housewives will often go to malls with their friends to socialize, and bring their young children to play with each other at entertainment centers located on upper floors, while men are at work.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The elements Masculinity and Collectivism of Hofstede\u2019s Model are evident in Emirati culture. Men will often go with their friends to watch movies in cinemas located in the upper levels of the mall, and drink coffee with friends at cafes into the late hours of the night. During the Friday and Saturday weekend, large Arab families pour into malls and spend many hours there shopping, taking their kids to arcades, eating at restaurants, staying at mall hotels, walking, and reclining. Despite spending long periods of time in the malls, many consumers only expect to window-shop and leave without buying merchandise. Third, Dubai\u2019s society has adapted to the convenience of being able to get high-quality consumer goods in one mall. Fourth, Dubai\u2019s society is very young and enamored by the popular brands, found in malls. For many of these reasons, retailers must often accept malls as the place to locate their stores.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Weitere Vorteile der Lage in Einkaufszentren bestanden darin, dass Carrefour mit einem noch gr\u00f6\u00dferen Kundenaufkommen in den Carrefour-Filialen rechnen konnte. Dar\u00fcber hinaus gab es in Dubais Einkaufszentren gen\u00fcgend Verkaufsfl\u00e4che f\u00fcr Carrefour. Dar\u00fcber hinaus behielt Carrefour seine traditionelle Gr\u00f6\u00dfe bei, da Majid Al Futtaim zwei der in Betracht gezogenen Einkaufszentren besa\u00df. Infolgedessen wurde Carrefours Filiale im Deira City Center die gr\u00f6\u00dfte Filiale in Dubai. Durch die Lage in zentralen Gebieten Dubais stand Carrefour jedoch in Konkurrenz zu traditionellen, kleinen Einzelhandelsgesch\u00e4ften, die n\u00e4her am Verbraucher lagen. Die Bedeutung der Lage in Dubai kann angesichts der Verkehrsprobleme Dubais nicht untersch\u00e4tzt werden.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Produkt<\/span><\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Dubai was a very international and diverse Emirate, particularly due to the large number of foreign workers. As such, Carrefour adapted by accepting foreign credit cards, the currencies of all GCC countries, and international currencies like the Euro and US dollar. While Carrefour implemented bilingual signage in the stores, language and cultural barriers were not likely problems given that English was so widely spoken and consumers had experience with Western products.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Erstens musste Carrefour sein Warenangebot der Kultur anpassen. So mussten beispielsweise bestimmte Nuancen in Lebensmitteln ber\u00fccksichtigt werden, wie etwa der Verkauf von Halal-Lebensmitteln ohne Schweinefleisch. Zweitens musste sich Carrefour an die Saisonalit\u00e4t des Konjunkturzyklus in Dubai anpassen, da es in der Kultur Dubais \u00fcblich war, dass die Menschen ihre Sommerferien daf\u00fcr nutzten, an k\u00fchlere Orte zu fahren. Drittens musste sich Carrefour an islamische kulturelle Feiertage wie Ramadan und Eid anpassen, an denen die Ums\u00e4tze in der Spitze lagen. W\u00e4hrend dieser Feiertage musste Carrefour die erh\u00f6hte Nachfrage ber\u00fccksichtigen und sein Angebot entsprechend planen, um die K\u00e4ufer nicht zu entt\u00e4uschen. Viertens mussten die \u00d6ffnungszeiten in Dubai der Arbeitswoche in Dubai von Sonntag bis Donnerstag und dem Wochenende von Freitag bis Samstag Rechnung tragen.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

F\u00f6rderung<\/span><\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Carrefour did not adapt its promotional effort, which consisted of discounting certain items. Majid Al Futtaim handled local promotions and coordinated some of these regionally with its stores throughout the Middle East. Promotions were placed in print media and in-store, to attract mall-walking traffic. Because Dubai was a society emphasizing the importance of social relationships, Carrefour could reasonably expect that consumers might discuss some of the deals.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Werbung war in Dubai wichtig, weil die Lebenshaltungskosten und die Inflation hoch waren. Die Bev\u00f6lkerungsstruktur Dubais war sehr verzerrt. Als Carrefour 1998 in den Markt eintrat, bestanden nur 171 TP3T der Bev\u00f6lkerung aus \u201eeinheimischen Arabern\u201c, w\u00e4hrend 851 TP3T \u201eausl\u00e4ndische Asiaten\u201c und 31 TP3T aus dem Westen stammten. Das Segment der asiatischen Auswanderer hatte das niedrigste verf\u00fcgbare Einkommen, war aber gro\u00df und weitgehend offen f\u00fcr den Kauf westlicher Elektronik und Produkte. Aufgrund der Bedeutung der Inflation und dieser demografischen Entwicklung bestand Carrefours Zielsegment haupts\u00e4chlich aus Auswanderern.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Preis <\/span><\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Carrefours Preisposition war die eines Discounters und nutzte die Preisgestaltung als Teil seiner Werbema\u00dfnahmen. Aufgrund seines starken Markennamens musste sich Carrefour keine Sorgen \u00fcber eine Markenverw\u00e4sserung durch seine Discountprodukte machen.
er, discounting was problematic in Dubai where inflation was sky high, and when fluctuations in inflation could erode profits. Another pricing concern was the food retail market was most competitive<\/a> and thus profit margins were thin. Carrefour could sell non-foods, household goods and toiletries at higher margins.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Leistung<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Carrefour \/ Majid Al Futtaim does not report its Dubai-generated revenues or other countries\u2019 specific sales. We did a thorough literature search and even contacted Carrefour\u2019s Investor Relations. Yet in both cases, the information was unavailable. There are two reasons for this. First, Carrefour MAF was a private joint venture and was not obligated to show its sales figures. Secondly, in the region, there is a tendency to underreport information and lack transparency due to suspicion of what other entities might use such data for, according to Seraphina Anderson Executive Director of Feedback Market Research in Dubai\/Sharjah. This venture likely prefers to keep their sales figures and data private to prevent competitors from taking such information and using it to their advantage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Auf regionaler Ebene hingegen meldete Carrefour MAF f\u00fcr 2005 einen Gesamtumsatz von 141 Milliarden TP2Billionen in seinen 13 Filialen, was etwa 113 Milliarden TP2Billionen des weltweiten Umsatzes entspricht. Andere Indikatoren zeigen, dass das Joint Venture erfolgreich war. Aufgrund eines aggressiven regionalen Wachstums stiegen die Ums\u00e4tze von Carrefour 2007 auf regionaler Ebene auf 142,5 Milliarden TP2Billionen. 2008 gab das Joint Venture Pl\u00e4ne bekannt, in den Iran einzusteigen, um weiter zu wachsen.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kritische Bewertung<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Choosing Majid Al Futtaim (MAF) was a good idea for Carrefour. It had an appetite for expansion and growth, and aggressively entered into other markets in the Middle East<\/a>. The choice also prevented direct competition in the same malls owned by MAF. Furthermore, the joint venture\u2019s adaptation to the local market ensured its success, given that many people of Dubai today consider the store as non-foreign and a part of life. Yet, Carrefour MAF has not done enough to ensure that is enough parking and sufficient taxis and good traffic flow around its malls, especially around weekends and holidays. This makes the venture more vulnerable to smaller niche stores and stores located closer to the consumer.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Der Markt in Dubai steht vor erheblichen Herausforderungen. Erstens nimmt die Konkurrenz zu, insbesondere im Lebensmittelsegment, was die Gewinnmargen effektiv reduziert. W\u00e4hrend Wal-Mart und Costco den Nahen Osten nicht in Betracht ziehen, dr\u00e4ngen andere europ\u00e4ische Hyperm\u00e4rkte strategisch in den Nahen Osten. 2006 er\u00f6ffnete Union Coop in Dubai einen 16.000 Quadratmeter gro\u00dfen Hypermarkt. Geant, eine europ\u00e4ische Hypermarktkette, ist 2003 ebenfalls in Dubai eingestiegen. Hinzu kommt, dass nahe gelegene Gesch\u00e4fte Kunden wie die im Ausland lebenden Asiaten abwerben, die lieber nicht weit zum Einkaufen fahren.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The second challenge is chronic inflation. Due to rapid growth, high liquidity, high demand, low supply, and a currency peg to the recently declining US dollar, national inflation rates stood at around 13% in 2008, though economists expect actual consumer price inflation in Dubai to be at 20% per year. This inflation erodes revenues and rapidly raises the costs of inventory and staffing. Thirdly, the decline of the dollar versus other currencies can lower the value of revenues when repatriated to foreign countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fourthly, the UAE government has recently implemented more difficult visa regulations. This makes it more difficult to attract skilled Asians and Westerners to help drive the economy\u2019s growth. Lastly, the region faces political risks from Iran, Iraq, and from terrorism. Additionally, Dubai is more dependent on foreign investment and tourism than the other Emirates.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dubai was expected to be more vulnerable to global economic downturns than Abu Dhabi and other emirates. Due to the global credit crunch, the UAE\u2019s non-oil GDP growth was expected to slow from 8.8% in 2008 to 7.1% in 2009. Foremost to retailers is the expected implementation in early 2009 of a VAT (Value Added Tax) tax regimen of around 5%. It was anticipated that this tax system will drive inflation even higher than its current high level.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Carrefour hat mit seinem Modell ein gro\u00dfes Problem: die Bequemlichkeit des Einkaufens in seinen Filialen. Da die Eink\u00e4ufe in Einkaufszentren stattfinden, ist es oft schwierig, bei Carrefour einzukaufen, insbesondere an Wochenenden und Feiertagen, wenn die Einkaufszentren voll sind. In Dubai ist die Autokultur sehr ausgepr\u00e4gt, was es schwierig macht, wenn es wenig Platz und wenige Taxis gibt. Infolgedessen kann die Warteschlange f\u00fcr ein Taxi Hunderte von Metern lang sein, wie zum Beispiel vor dem Einkaufszentrum Deira Center, und der Parkplatz kann bis auf den letzten Platz gef\u00fcllt sein. Carrefour muss dieses Problem angehen, um sicherzustellen, dass diese Unannehmlichkeiten die Kunden nicht davon abhalten, in seine Filialen zu kommen.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

M\u00f6gliche Vorgehensweisen<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

To best compete in the Dubai market, Carrefour MAF could follow several potential courses of action. Each focuses on improving Carrefour\u2019s competitive advantages, market positioning, and driving sales. First, Carrefour may need to ensure that customers are not leaving its stores due to more convenient specialty stores located closer to customers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dazu m\u00fcsste das Unternehmen die Unannehmlichkeiten angehen, die das Carrefour-Einkaufserlebnis mit sich bringt, insbesondere die Verkehrs- und Transportprobleme in Dubai. Dazu geh\u00f6rt, dass ausreichend Parkpl\u00e4tze und Taxis zur Verf\u00fcgung stehen und der Verkehr z\u00fcgig flie\u00dfen kann, insbesondere an Wochenenden und Feiertagen. Dies k\u00f6nnte m\u00f6glicherweise erreicht werden, indem man sich bei der Regierung f\u00fcr die Taxi- und Verkehrssituation einsetzt und bei Majid Al Futtaim f\u00fcr die Parkplatzprobleme, da das Unternehmen die Immobilien betreibt.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Secondly, Carrefour could seek new advantages to solidify its position. Among these include positioning Carrefour as the place to go during economic turmoil. The rationale is that by attaching this perception to Carrefour\u2019s brand, it ensures that customers associate Carrefour with savings and with rough economic times. In so doing, it can improve its performance in economic downturns. Also, Carrefour could reinforce its First Mover Advantage as the authentic hypermarket. In Eastern countries, the most loved brands are those that are considered authentic. As such, by reinforcing this perception, Carrefour could potentially limit the effectiveness of direct European hypermarket competitors in Dubai like Geant and Union Coop.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thirdly, Carrefour has been successful in Dubai along several indicators, but it could find significant growth in the market by focusing on the countless expatriates that come in and out of the country. Carrefour could strengthen its specialty food sections to attract various demographics, in terms of a better selection. In so doing, it can better target Dubai\u2019s expatriate population that prefers to eat its own cultural food, and increase the frequency at which these huge segments visit its stores.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Carrefour\u2019s pricing strategy is also helpful in targeting this group because most expatriates work in Dubai to remit money home to their families. So Carrefour could become a great place to save money while not compromising quality. It could even develop to be a great place to buy gifts to send home. This effort could be supported by a Word of Mouth promotional strategy, harnessing existing customers to tell their friends about the deals and quality at Carrefour.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Given that Dubai\u2019s expats mostly come from Asia where there are high-context cultures, Word of Mouth could be effective in targeting those expats who strongly value friends’ and family\u2019s suggestions over media and corporate opinion. Further marketing techniques adhering to Dubai\u2019s cultural imperatives could include discount coupons, a customer loyalty card, and a home delivery service to the expatriate segment. Home delivery service may be a viable option for Carrefour because it fits into the cultural context of Dubai. The service could take advantage of the lack of public transportation in Dubai, thus helping it\u00a0to better reach a broader customer base. Ultimately by targeting the expatriate population, Carrefour could potentially continue to grow and hit the population of Dubai that is not included in the 689,000 citizens (est. 1995).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Anmerkungen:<\/span><\/h6>\n\n\n\n
This article does not necessarily reflect the typical report composition of an SIS International report, and is for information purposes only. The article does not contain advice for decision-making. No permission granted for reproduction.\u00a0 SIS International.\u00a0 Copyright (C) 2009.<\/h6>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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